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HISTORY  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS 


l-OR  THE 


EXISTENCE  OF  GOD, 


AARON    HAHN, 
Rabbi  of  the  Tifereth  Israel  Congregation,  Cleveland,  0. 


(Genesis  xxviii.  16) ;    HIPP 
(Ethics  of  the  Rabbis  ii.  19) ;     Dl^lp^^  D^nttf  TO  JTP 


The  BLOCH  Publishing  and  Printing  Company. 
CINCINNATI,  1885. 


e».  6.  Uuduiukj 

57  St.       Clements  A 

OXFORD     England 


•Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1885, 

By    AARON     HAHN. 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


PREFACE, 


This  book,  a  portion  of  which  was  published  in  the 
American  Israelite  in  1SS3,  is  intended  to  show  the  efforts 
that  the  human  mind  has  made  to  solve  the  great  problem 
of  the  Divine,  existence. 

It  is  safe  to  say— and  were  it  for  no  other  reason  but  be- 
cause Atheism  can  never  succeed  in  proving  the  impossibility 
of  the  existence  of  God — the  attempts  to  argue  the  Divine 
existence  will  be  renewed  and  continued  in  every  genera- 
tion, no  matter  how  much  there  will  be  said  or  written 
against  it. 

It  has  been  often  maintained  that  the  triumphs  of  natural 
sciences  in  our  century  have  shaken  the  foundation  of  all 
proofs  of  the  Divine  existence.  That  is  not  so  :  just  the 
reverse  has  been  accomplished  by  the  scientifically  proved 
idea  of  the  "  Unity  of  Nature." 

This  idea,  which  means  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  all- 
embracing,  that  the  most  distant  planets  have  some  of  the 
same  kind  of  minerals  that  the  earth  contains,  and  that  heat, 
light,  electricity,  magnetism  and  chemical  affinity — this 
pentarchy  of  physical  force — are  so  intricately  related  that 
they  can  be  converted  into  one  another,  implies  the  ideas  of 
the  five  main  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God. 

The  "Unity  of  Nature,"  with  regard  to  its  origin,  is  the 
cosmological  proof;  with  regard *to  its  aims,  plan,  products 
and  means,  is  the  teleological  proof;  with  regard  to  that 


2094O66 


PREFACE. 

sameness  of  the  human  mind  that  makes  comparative 
psychology  possible,  is  the  ontological  proof;  with  regard 
to  the  organism  of  history  as  a  whole,  is  the  historical  proof 
of  the  existence  of  God. 

God  is  not  to  he  identified  with  that  "  Unity  of  Nature." 
He  is  the  cause  of  it.  Without  a  cause  it  could  not  have 
arisen. 

There  are  some  who,  like  Algazali,  Juda  Halevi,  Rousseau, 
Jacohi  and  others,  do]  not  lay  much  stress  upon  the  philo- 
sophical argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence,  and  think 
the  only  proof  of  God  is  man's  religious  feeling,  man's 
spiritual  sense,  man's  innate  consciousness  of  God.  Rous- 
seau called  this  spiritual  sense  "  lumieres  primitives,''  and 
Jacohi  "  testimonium  spiritus." 

Whether  the  philosophical  argumentation  can  engender 
in  man  the  "spiritual  sense"  or  not,  this  much  is  certain: 
it  cultivates  it,  it  strengthens  it  in  the  struggles  with  skep- 
ticism, and  it  refutes  the  counter-evidences  of  Atheism. 

This  hook  is  offered  to  the  public  not  without  the  hope 
that  the  views  presented  may  be  interesting  and  useful  to 
its  readers. 

THE  AUTHOR. 
CLEVELAND,  O.,  June,  1885. 


CONTENTS, 


PAGE. 

INTRODUCTION,    -  1 

I.  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,      -  -22 

II.  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,  35 

III.  THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,        -  69 

IV.  THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT,  87 

V.  THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT,  -     103 

VI.  THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY,  -           133 

VII.  THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH,  -     182 

VIII.  THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  MOHAMMEDANS,  196 


E  RR  AT  A 


Paee  II  line  :'.()— for  "Baron  "  read  Bacon. 

•  4:{  "    18;  page  54,  lines  10  and  11— for  "  eternal  "  read  internal  design. 

••  123,  ••    23— for  "  evidence  "  read  evidence. 

"  131,  "    17— for  ••  impose  "  read  imposes, 

••  171,  "    31--for  "  of  Maimon's  "  read  of  .Vnimonides. 

••  178,  "    24— for  •'  phenomena"  read  phenomenon. 

••  l»l,  "    '.U— for  "  that  idea"  read  Hie  idea. 

"  -Sfi.  "     6— for  "  Algazali  (born  105'J)  in"  read  Algasali  born  (1059)  tn. 


INTRODUCTION 


ber  Slbneigung  ber  gegentwrtigen  geologic  gegen  alle  i»iffen» 
fdjaftlidjm  23etoeife,  biirfte  e§  nad?  ttrie  t>or,  unb  toielleidjt  ntetyr  aI3  \l, 
etne  ikbenSfrage  fiir  fie  fein,  ob  fid)  ba3  Safein  ©otteS  beiuetfen  laffe 
ober  nidjt."* 

No  subject  in  the  whole  range  of  human  knowledge  has 
been  of  such  great  moment  in  the  history  of  man's  thought 
and  progress  as  the  idea  of  God.  Ever  since  reflection 
commenced  to  dawn  in  man's  mind,  God  or  gods  have  been 
the  object  of  faith  and  love,  hope  and  fear,  speculation  and 
adoration.  The  history  of  the  idea  of  God  is  closely  con- 
nected with  the  history  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  prog- 
ress of  the  human  race. 

The  idea  of  God  stands  for  everything  that  is  great  and 
good,  glorious  and  pure,  wise  and  majestic. 

In  nature  it  stands  for  the  principle  of  all  laws ;  for  the 
wisdom  that  forms  and  guides,  and  for  the  goodness  that 
preserves  and  sustains  all. 

In  history  it  stands  for  all  the  ideas  and  principles  of 
truth  and  justice,  progress  and  morality,  traceable  in  the 
sea  of  events  and  in  the  waves  of  tendencies. 

In  life  Theism  stands  for  all  that  boundless  wisdom, 
goodness,  power,  love  and  holiness  are  to  man's  thoughts 


*  "  Gottund  die  Natur,"  von  Dr.  Ulrici. 


2  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

and  feelings,  will  and  convictions,  sentiments  and  con- 
science. 

The  difficulties  besetting  a  fair  treatment  of  the  Theistic 
problem  are  great.  Proof  of  this  are  not  only  the  great 
differences  existing  between  the  God  confessed  by  lips  and 
the  God  worshiped  by  the  heart,  between  the  God  of  theo- 
ries and  the  God  of  man's  moral  conduct,  between  the  God 
of  popular  theology  and  the  God  of  rationalism;  but  also 
the  history  of  misapprehensions  and  errors  of  the  meta- 
physicians. An  adequate  treatment  of  this  theme  must 
never  be  expected,  for  the  finite  man  will  never  comprehend 
the  infinite,  absolute  Being  in  its  total. 

The  more  thought  and  study  one  gives  to  the  Theistical 
problem,  the  clearer  will  become  to  him  not  merely  its  real 
intricacies  and  its  real  mysteriousness,  but  also  the  fact 
that  a  final  solution,  the  way  the  large  mass  of  people 
would  like  to  have  it,  will  never  be  reached. 

Cicero  relates  that  the  poet  Simonides  was  questioned 
by  the  king  Hiero  "  what  God  was."  He  asked  the  king 
for  one  day's  time  to  consider.  The  day  passed,  but,  being 
unable  to  make  the  answer,  he  asked  for  two  days'  more 
time  to  consider.  It  was  accorded.  Upon  asking  again  for 
more  time  to  consider,  the  king  Hiero  became  impatient 
and  desired  to  know  the  reason  for  his  delay.  Simonides 
replied :  "  The  more  I  think  of  God,  the  more  dark  and 
unknown  he  still  is  to  me." 

The  answer  of  Simonides,  expresses  to  the  present  day 
the  confession  of  every  earnest,  thoughtful  and  profound 
thinker.  The  philosophers  of  the  nineteenth  century  have 
more  knowledge  and  a  deeper  insight  into  the  fabric  of 
nature,  but  as  to  the  essence  of  God  they  can  not  tell 
much  more  than  old  Simonides  could. 


INTRODUCTION. 


"  Silence  is  the  becoming  praise  to  thee,  0  God  !  "  are  the 
words  of  the  psalmist. 

"  Who  shall  name  Him 

And  dare  to  say, 
'I  believe  in  Him?' 

Who  shall  deny  Him 

And  venture  'o  affirm, 
'  I  believe  in  Him  not?  '  "* 

The  futile  attempts  and  the  hopeless  efforts  to  unveil 
the  great  mystery  of  the  Divine  nature  and  attributes  have 
induced  a  great  many  to  give  up  reasoning  on  God  and  his 
relations  to  the  world,  and  to  advocate,  in  its  stead,  the 
traditional  teachings  of  popular  theology,  or  agnosticism. 

Fully  aware  of  this  difficulty  were  also  the  metaphysi- 
cians Ibn  Bachya  (in  the  eleventh  century)  and  Moses 
Maimon  (1135-1204),  but  nevertheless  they  considered  it 
not  merely  praiseworthy,  but  even  man's  duty,  to  reason 
to  his. utmost  capacity  on  God's  nature  and  ways. 

Their  idea  was,  if  man  can  not  know  all  about  God,  then 
let  him  try  to  know  at  least  as  much  as  there  is  within  the 
reach  of  his  comprehension. 

Ibn  Bachya  uses  the  following  illustration :  A  king  ap- 
pointed as  his  treasurer  a  man  fully  equal  to  the  demands 
of  the  office.  Somehow  or  other,  this  treasurer  was  pre- 
vailed upon  by  the  king's  officers  to  trust  blindly  their 
words,  and  to  take  the  coins  without  any  further  weighing 
or  examining.  For  this  credulity  the  treasurer  was  re- 
proved by  the  king,  who  would  have  excused  such  gulli- 
bility only  in  a  treasurer  deficient  in  the  requisite  qualifi- 
cations for  the  office,  but  not  in  one  who  was  fully  qualified. 


*  Goethe,  "Faust." 


4  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  or  GOD. 

Thus  Ibn  Bachya  thinks  only  people  unable  to  reason  for 
themselves  are  excusable  in  following  the  traditional  guid- 
ance of  others,  while  men  capable  of  reasoning  logically 
ought  to  exercise  this  great  preference  of  their  mind.  The 
same  view  was  shared  by  Moses  Maimonides  in  saying, 
"  Our  love  of  God  is  on  the  increase  in  proportion  to  our 
knowledge  of  him." 

Concerning  the  excesses  both  of  the  sentimentalists  and 
the  rationalists,  in  treating  of  God  and  his  nature,  the 
famous  French  metaphysician,  M.  Cousin,  truly  remarked : 
"  Theodiccea  has  two  rocks  —  one  is  abstraction,  the  abuse 
of  dialectics ;  it  is  the  vice  of  schools  and  metaphysics. 
If  we  are  forced  to  shun  this  rock,  we  run  the  risk  of  being 
dashed  against  the  opposite  rock.  I  mean  that  fear  of  rea- 
soning that  extends  to  reason,  that  excessive  predominance 
of  sentiments  which  develop  in  us  the  loving  and  affection- 
ate faculties  at  the  expense  of  all  others,  throws  us  into 
anthropomorphism  without  criticism,  and  makes  us  insti- 
tute with  God  an  intimate  and  familiar  intercourse,  in 
which  we  are  somewhat  forgetful  of  the  august  and  fearful 
majesty  of  the  Divine  Being.  *  *  We  escape  these 
opposite  excesses  of  a  refined  sentimentality  and  a  chimer- 
ical abstraction  by  always  keeping  in  mind  both  the  nature 
of  God,  by  which  he  escapes  all  relation  with  us,  necessity, 
eternity,  infinity,  and  at  the  same  time  those  of  his  attri- 
butes transferred  to  him,  for  the  very  simple  reason  that 
they  came  from  him." 

Those  who  have  relinquished  reasoning  on  God  and  on 
his  relation  to  the  world  on  account  of  the  great  differences 
of  views  prevalent  among  the  philosophers  themselves, 
ought  to  consider  that,  no  matter  what  the  deficiencies  are  in 
the  systems  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Leibnitz, 
Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel,  etc.,  these  metaphysicians  have  done 


INTRODUCTION. 


incalculably  great  service  to  the  intellectual  progress  of 
mankind  and  to  the  investigation  of  Truth.  Each  one  of 
them  has  drawn  by  the  golden  buckets  of  his  genius  a  few 
drops  of  truth  from  the  ocean  of  the  manifestations  of  the 
Divine  Being;  and  this  is  about  all  that  can  be  expected 
of  mortals.  Man  can  not  explore  the  whole  sea  of  the 
Divine  Infinity ;  at  best,  he  can  only  catch  a  few  glimpses 
of  the  Eternal's  glory.  The  incongruity  and  discrepancy 
of  the  philosophical  systems  would  not  be  nearly  so  great 
if  every  system,  instead  of  being  looked  upon  as  the  final 
solution  of  the  great  metaphysical  problems,  would  be 
considered  merely  the  solution  of  a  certain  side  to  those 
problems.  Each  system  is  only  one  ray  of  the  great  sun  of 
philosophy.  Every  metaphysical  system  is,  to  a  certain 
extent,  right,  and  again,  to  a  certain  extent,  wrong.  For 
man  there  is  in  every  truth  an.  occult  seed  of  error,  and  in 
every  error  there  is  a  grain  of  truth. 

God  is  conceivable  only  by  his  manifestations  in  nature, 
history  and  the  human  soul.  They  are  .the  signs  and  evi- 
dences of  his  existence. 

The  wonderful  discoveries  and  the  marvelous  results  of 
the  modern  natural  sciences  have  had  such  a  dazzling  effect 
upon  the  minds  of  a  great  many  that  they  can  not  see  the 
glory  of  God  in  the  universe.  They  can  not  see  how  the  first 
Cause  can  be  connected  with  the  secondary  causes,  and 
how  the  metaphysical  world  can  be  implied  in  the  physical. 
Among  this  class  of  people  atheism  arose,  the  same  way  as 
it  did  among  the  contemporaries  of  Plato. 

"  The  cause  of  all  impiety  and  irreligion  among  men  is 
that,  reversing  in  themselves  the  relative  subordination  of 
mind  and  body,  they  have,  in  like  manner,  in' the  universe, 
made  that  to  be  first  which  is  second,  and  that  to  be  second 
which  is  first ;  for  while,  in  the  generation  of  all  things, 


6  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

intelligence  and  final  causes  precede  matter  and  efficient 
causes,  they,  on  the  contrary,  have  viewed  matter  and  ma- 
terial things  as  absolutely  prior,  in  the  order  of  existence, 
to  intelligence  and  design ;  and  thus  departing  from  an 
original  error  in  relation  to  themselves,  they  have  ended  in 
the  subversion  of  the  Godhead."* 

This  censure  of  Plato  holds  good  of  the  modern  mate- 
rialistic literature,  in  which  the  confusion  of  the  primary 
and  of  the  secondary  causes  is  carried  on  systematically. 

The  assertion  that  natural  sciences  had  banished  God 
from  nature,  and  that  their  results  were  incompatible  with 
Theism,  is  entirely  false  and  groundless. 

The  natural  sciences  have  co-operated  in  ridding  mankind 
of  narrow  anthropornorphistic  notions  of  God,  but  the 
pure  conception  of  God  as  an  infinite,  spiritual,  omniscient, 
wise  Being  has  rather  gained  in  corroboration  and  proofs 
by  the  so  wonderful  disclosures  of  modern  astronomy, 
geology,  chemistry,  dynamics,  pneumatics,  anatomy,  etc. 

Nature  is  at  present,  no  less  than  ever  before,  the  flaming 
Sinai  of  the  divine  manifestation  and  revelation.  "The 
modern  idea  of  law,  of  the  constancy,  and,  therefore,  of  the 
trustworthiness,  of  natural  forces."  says  the  Duke  of  Argyle, 
"has  been  known,  not  indeed  scientifically,  but  instinct- 
ively, to  man,  since  first  he  made  a  tool  and  used  it  as  the 
instrument  of  purpose.  What  has  science  added  to  this 
idea  except  that  the  same  rule  prevails  as  widely  as  the 
universe,  and  is  made  subservient  in  a  like  manner  to 
knowledge  and  to  will?  In  the  enthusiasm  awakened  by 
the  discovery  of  some  new  facts  or  of  some  new  forces, 
and  in  the  freshness  with  which  they  impress  the  idea  of 


*DeLeg.,X. 


INTRODUCTION. 


such  agencies  on  our  minds,  we  sometimes  very  naturally 
exaggerate  the  length  of  way  along  which  they  carry  us 
toward  the  great  ultimate  objects  of  intellectual  desire  We 
forget  altogether  that  the  knowledge  they  convey  is  in 
quality  and  in  kind  identical  with  knowledge  long  in  pos- 
session, and  places  us  in  no  new  relation  whatever  to  the 
vast  background  of  the  Eternal  and  the  Unseen."  * 

There  is  no  denying  that  modern  natural  philosophy  is 
incompatible  with  dogmatical  views  of  the  churches  ;  and 
that  is  the  reason  why  priests  and  dogmatists  have  always 
been  the  enraged  antagonists  of  the  progress  of  the  modern 
natural  sciences. 

But  there  is  no  cause  for  fearing  the  influences  of  natural 
philosophy  if  religion  means  mainly  the  belief  in  a  wise 
supreme  Preserver  of  all,  and  the  Father  of  mankind ;  the 
belief  in  man's  responsibility,  and  the  belief  that  God  is  to 
be  worshiped  by  man's  dutifulness  toward  himself,  toward 
his  fellow-men,  and  toward  Him  whom  we  shall  know,  and 
love,  and  teach  to  others. 

Science  treats  the  biblical  creation -theories  as  mere 
legends;  but  that  mysteriousness which  religion  sees  in  the 
creation  of  the  world,  science  does  admit  to  be  real. 

Science  has  destroyed  the  belief  in  miracles,  but  it  has 
in  their  stead  pointed  to  the  real  mysteries  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe  which  form  the  portals  to  the 
infinite  temple  of  the  Most  High. 

The  mysteries  of  the  origin  of  things  and  of  the  preser- 
vation of  the  universe  will  always  defy  atheism. 

Professor  Dr.  Noah  Porter.  President  of  Yale  College, 
attributing  the  spread  of  atheism  and  agnosticism  more 
to  the  materialistic  and  skeptical  tendency  of  the  3cttgctft 

*  Eeign  of  Law,  p.  115. 


ARGUMENTS'  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


-spirit  of  the  age  —  than  to  anything  else,  says  truly: 
"  The  new  universe  of  modern  science  has  indeed  become 
immensely  expanded  to  man's  certain  insight,  and  been 
made  immeasurably  more  impressive  to  his  instructed  and 
quickened  imagination.  Its  spaces  stretch  out  in  every 
direction  before  the  eyes  in  immeasurable  tracts,  which  the 
imagination  falters  in  its  attempts  to  traverse.  But  the 
instructed  eye  finds  in  these  most  distant  provinces  exam- 
ples of  order,  beauty  and  goodness  as  brilliant  and  over- 
whelming as  in  those  which  are  near.  New  agents  have 
been  discovered  in  the  far  and  the  near,  the  products  and 
actings  of  which  have  made  science  familiar,  even  to  the 
uninstructed  minds,  as  the  minister  and  magician  of  art. 
It  would  seem  at  first  that  these  brilliant  discoveries,  these 
verified  facts  and  these  determined  laws  have  made  the  old 
theory  of  a  self-existing,  creating  and  loving  intelligence 
more  necessary  and  more  .acceptable  to  the  scientific  intel- 
lect. At  the  least,  we  might  conclude  that  the  logic  of 
atheism  would  find  no  advantage  in  modern  science  above 
the  logic  of  Theism.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  judgment  of  the 
unsophisticated  intellect,  when  first  confronted  with  the 
facts  and  relations  which  modern  science  reveals.  It  be- 
comes, therefore,  a  question  of  more  than  curious  interest, 
by  what  process  of  intellectual  legerdemain  has  the  new 
atheism  become  so  plausible,  and  by  what  subtle  transitions 
of  thought  have  the  atheistic  and  agnostic  theories  so 
largely  taken  possession  of  the  3ettgetft  of  the  present 
generation."  * 

The  assertion  that  natural  sciences  have  dethroned  God 
in  nature  is  false,  and  will  remain  an  error  while  there  will 
be  the  least  vestige  of  mysteries  in  nature,  and  while  there 

*  Science  and  Sentiment,  p.  461. 


INTRODUCTION.  9 


will  be  traces  of  mathematical  calculations  and  geometrical 
relations  and  arrangements  in  the  universe. 

The  French  astronomer,  Lalande,  said  :  "  I  have  searched 
the  heavens,  but  did  not  find  God."  Indeed !  a  strange 
way  of  seeking,  with  a  telescope  in  the  hands,  the  invisible 
God  !  Lalande  betrayed  by  his  words  that  he  had  no  con- 
ception of  a  spiritual,  infinite  God.  Lalande  was  a  great 
astronomer,  but  a  poor  philosopher.  His  God  was  a  mere 
phantom,  an  idol.  The  true  God  can  not  be  detected  by 
means  of  a  mechanical  telescope.  The  true  God  can  be 
detected  only  by  the  telescope  of  mind  and  heart,  earnest 
and  well  prepared  to  seek  the  truth.  The  prophets  and  the 
met  iphysicians  who  proclaimed  the  existence  of  God,  de- 
tected him  by  no  other  instruments  than  a  reasoning  mind 
and  a  pure  heart  longing  for  something  higher  and  better 
than  mere  temporalities  and  sensual  enjoyments. 

Lalande  could  not  find  God  with  a  telescope,  but  Galileo 
Galilei,  when  he  directed  for  the  first  time  the  telescope 
toward  the  sky,  and  saw  the  marvels  of  the  celestial  bodies, 
could  not  help  but  exclaim  in  amazement  and  awe  :  "  How 
great  are  thy  works,  O  Eternal ! " 

Science  has  scaled  the  heights,  sounded  the  oceans, 
opened  the  caverns  and  beds  of  fossils,  detected  the  paths 
of  the  whirlwinds,  analyzed  substances,  discovered  uni- 
versal laws,  disentangled  their  concatenations,  espied  the 
constituents  of  the  planets,  numbered  the  stars,  scanned 
the  silvery  pavement  of  the  milky  way,  and  has  made  sub- 
servient to  man's  purposes  the  elements  and  the  laws  of 
nature.  However,  in  spite  of  all  these  wonderful  results, 
it  did  not  succeed  in  explaining  the  order,  or  the  cause, 
or  the  essence  of  the  laws  and  elements  of  nature.  In 
other  words,  despite  all  the  light  that  natural  sciences  have 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THK  EXISTENCE  OK  GOD. 


shed  upon  the  phenomena  of  nature,  the  universe  itself  is 
at  present  just  as  great  a  mystery  to  man  as  it  ever  was. 

"  In  all  directions,"  says  Herbert  Spencer,  u  our  investi- 
gations bring  us  face  to  face  with  an  insoluble  enigma. 
We  learn  at  once  the  greatness  and  littleness  of  human 
intellect,  its  power  in  dealing  with  all  that  comes  within 
the  range  of  experience,  its  impotence  in  dealing  with  all 
that  transcends  experience.  We  realize  with  a  special  viv- 
idness the  utter  incomprehensibleness  of  the  simplest  fact 
considered  in  itself.  The  scientific  men,  more  truly  than 
any  other,  know  that  in  its  essence  nothing  can  be  known.''  * 

But  even  those  who  believe  that  natural  sciences  have 
dethroned  and  banished  God  from  nature  can  not  help 
admitting  that  God's  throne  is  as  firm  and  as  well  founded 
as  ever  in  the  human  heart  and  in  the  consciousness  of 
mankind.  The  idea  of  God  agitates  the  human  mind  at 
present,  no  less  than  in  previous  ages.  Even  the  agnostics, 
who  abide  by  the  dogma  of  the  "  Unknowable,"  take  the 
liveliest  interest  in  the  Theistical  problem.  This  is  so 
because  the  idea  of  God,  being  constitutional  in  man,  is  an 
indestructible  part  of  his  nature,  and  can  not  be  discarded 
at  mere  pleasure.  Arguments  to  the  effect  that  the  idea  of 
God  is  irrational,  a  weakness  in  man,  a  product  of  fancy, 
an  heirloom  from  the  past,  etc.,  may  weaken  or  shake,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  belief  that  a  great  many  have  in  God's 
providence;  but  the  time  will  never  come  when  materialism 
will  succeed  in  the  extirpation  of  that  idea  from  mankind's 
consciousness.  "There  are  two  great  enemies  to  mate- 
rialism," says  the  Duke  of  Argvle,  "one  is  rooted,  in  affec- 
tion, the  other  in  the  intellect.  One  is  the  power  of  things 
hoped  for— a  power  which  never  dies;  the  other  is  the  evi- 

*  First  Priiici|i'ee. 


INTRODUCTION.  1.1 


dence  of  things  not  seen — and  this  evidence  abounds  in  all 
we  see." 

The  idea  of  God  is  so  inherent  in  the  human  heart,  and 
so  essential  to  the  intellectual  constitution  and  instinct  of 
man,  that  to  a  great  many,  among  them  also  Lord  Bacon 
de  Verulam,  it  was  incredible  that  man  with  intelligence 
and  feeling  could  be  so  destitute  of  every  religious  idea  as 
atheism  implies.  Yet  they  were  mistaken  in  that.  Men 
like  Von  Holbach,  the  author  of  u  La  System  de  la  Nature," 
D'Alambert  and  Diderot,  the  heads  of  the  encyclopaedists, 
were  atheists,  not  merely  with  their  lips,  but  also  at  heart ; 
they  were  conscious  atheists. 

When,  in  1746,  David  Hume  said  to  Baron  de  Holbach 
that  he  doubted  very  much  whether  there  are  real  atheists, 
and  assured  him  that  he  had  never  seen  one,  the  Baron  de 
Holbach  replied :  "  Sir,  you  dine  just  now  in  a  company 
of  seventeen  real  atheists." 

With  some  the  idea  has  become  prevalent  that  the  belief 
in  God  is  the  outgrowth  of  human  ignorance.  They  say, 
people  being  ignorant  about  the  causes  and  effects  of  forces 
and  the  natural  course  of  phenomena,  accounted  for  every- 
thing with  the  intervention  of  gods  or  God.  People  who 
do  not  disregard  the  facts  of  history  and  who  do  not  like 
to  be  partial  must  not  repeat  the  view  that  ignorance  is  the 
mother  of  the  belief  in  God. 

Those  who  know  only  a  little  about  the  history  of  human 
thought  must  know  that  the  greatest  thinkers  and  the 
greatest  poets  were  no  atheists  and  no  materialists. 

The  giant  minds  of  the  human  race,— Socrates,  Plato, 
Aristotle,  Bruno,  Ibn  Sina,  Maimon,  Bacon,  Newton,  Des- 
cartes, Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  Cudworth,  Kant,  Dante,  Shake- 
speare, Pope,  Byrou,  Lessing,  Herder,  Schiller,  Goethe, 


12  ARGUMENTS  TOR  THE  EXISTENCE  or  GOD. 

Longfellow,  Tennyson,  Emerson,  etc.,—  were  anything  but 
atheists  and  materialists. 

It  is  true  these  philosophers,  scientists  and  poets  vary 
greatly  in  their  definitions  and  conceptions  of  God,  but 
nevertheless  they  all  agree  that  the  highest  and  greatest 
idea  man  can  think  of  is  God,  the  infinite,  spiritual  and 
most  perfect  Being. 

*'  If,"  says  Professor  Frohshammer,  "  the  idea  of  God 
were  not  innate  in  man,  and  if  man  were  not  constitution- 
ally religious,  the  grossest  ignorance  could  not  have  brought 
him  to  the  consciousness  of  God.  All  the  ignorance  in  the 
world  could  not  have  prevailed  upon  man  to  believe  in 
God,  had  he  not  been  organized  to  that  effect.  The  animals 
are  ignorant  enough,  and  yet  they  have  never  arrived  at 
the  idea  of  God."* 

By  way  of  ignorance  man  certainly  would  not  have  come 
to  believe  in  God ;  and  it  is  even  doubtful  whether  mere 
ratiocination  and  speculation  had  sufficed  to  effect  that. 
Professor  Lichtenberg's  opinion,  that  it  is  questionable 
whether  mere  reason,  if  not  influenced  by  the  heart,  would 
have  ever  come  to  the  idea  of  God,  is  not  too  paradoxical 
after  all,  but  it  must  be  somewhat  restricted. 

It  has  also  been  asserted  that  the  idea  of  God  arose  from 
the  political  expediency  of  kings.  In  order  to  have  the 
work  of  ruling  easier,  and  to  make  it  effectual,  the  kings 
went  into  close  alliance  with  the  priests.  It  can  not  be 
denied  that  religion  was  made  a  great  agency  in  bridling 
and  ruling  the  people,  but  that  does  not  at  all  warrant  the 
assertion  that  the  idea  of  God  originated  solely  from  po- 
litical scheming.  The  belief  in  God  or  gods  is  undoubtedly 
much  older  than  political  institutions ;  it  is  as  old  as  the 


*  Christenthum  und  Wissenschaft,  316-318. 


INTRODUCTION.  13 


hopes  and  fears,  gratefulness  and  perceptions  of  human 
individuals. 

Had  the  idea  of  God  been  merely  an  invention  of  political 
schemers,  it  would  have  ceased  to  be  a  power  in  those  states 
and  governments  where  despotism  and  oppression,  extor- 
tion and  tyranny  lost  their  sway. 

It  is  true  the  belief  in  God  was  also  abused  for  political 
purposes ;  but  has  there  ever  been  an  idea,  or  a  principle, 
or  a  feeling,  or  a  system,  or  an  invention,  or  any  object 
whatever,  which  escaped  the  fate  of  being  abused,  at  least 
at  a  certain  time,  by  somebody?  If  there  are  cases  in 
which  the  idea  of  God  was  made  instrumental  to  do  wrong, 
there  are,  on  the  other  hand,  a  great  many  cases  where  the 
idea  of  God  was  made  instrumental  to  serve  the  cause  of 
justice,  truth,  virtue,  liberty,  etc.  Moses,  the  prophets  and 
a  great  many  other  champions  of  liberty  and  justice  pleaded 
the  cause  of  the  oppressed  and  persecuted,  in  the  name  of 
God,  the  Father  of  mankind. 

Those  who  believe  that  the  idea  of  God  is  a  mere  fiction 
and  invention  ought  to  consider  that  errors  and  falsehoods  do 
not  last  forever.  Every  fallacy,  falsehood  and  error  sooner 
or  later  destroys  itself.  "  If,"  says  Professor  Fechner,  "  God 
and  hereafter  were  nothing  but  fables,  they  would  not  have 
retained  so  long  their  hold  upon  mankind.  Both  error  and 
truth  can  be  transmitted  historically,  but,  while  the  truth  is 
gaining,  spreading,  and  finally  triumphant,  the  error  has 
certain  limits  where  and  when  it  must  recede  and  must 
make  room  for  the  truth.  Error  is  doomed  to  decrease  and 
to  disappear.  The  idea  of  God  has  always  been  everywhere 
and  among  all  classes  of  people,  and  it  has  done  undeniably 
much  good  for  the  cause  of  the  enlightenment,  refinement, 
unification  and  progress  of  mankind.  Its  hold  on  mankind 


14  ARGUMENTS  FOB  THE  EXISTENCE  or  GOD. 

at  large  is  at  present  not  less  than  ever  before.  This  is  a 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God." 

Since  man  and  everything  around  him  are  subject  to 
inexorable  and  unchangeable  laws  of  nature,  and  since 
these  invariable  and  immutable  laws  of  nature  are  not 
interrupted  and  checked  by  any  miracle,  a  great  many 
scientists  dropped  the  belief  in  God  and  substituted  for  it 
the  "  Reign  of  Mechanical  Law."  The  universe  is  to  them 
a  mechanism,  the  formation  and  arrangement  of  which  was 
brought  about,  not  by  an  internal  principle  of  development 
and  organization,  but  by  mere  external  causes  and  acci- 
dental impulses. 

The  French  astronomer  La  Place,  the  author  of  the  ;<  Ex- 
position du  Systeme  du  Monde,"  is  considered  the  first 
representative  of  the  theory  that  the  universe  is  a  mere 
mechanism,  brought  about  by  adventitious  causes. 

Being  asked  by  Napoleon  I.  why  he,  in  his  "  Systeme  du 
Monde,"  nowhere  referred  to  God,  he  replied :  "  Sir,  je 
n'avais  pas  besoin  de  cette  hypothese."  These  words  of 
La  Place  have  been  repeated  innumerably,  and  have  been 
considered  the  motto  of  modern  atheism,  without  being 
examined  as  to  whether  there  is  in  them  really  a  cogent 
and  a  conclusive  idea.  A  description  of  the  universe,  as 
La  Place's  "  Systeme  du  Monde  "  is,  does  not  presuppose 
necessarily  a  reference  to  God  as  the  primary  Cause  of  all. 
Alexander  von  Humboldt  also  excludes,  in  his  description 
of  the  universe,  the  "  Cosmos,"  every  reference  to  God.  and 
treats  only  of  secondary  causes.  However,  no  sensible 
man  will  hold  that,  because  La  Place  and  Humboldt  ex- 
cluded from  their  descriptions  of  the  universe  the  reference 
to  a  first  Cause,  and  because  of  their  treating  exclusively 
only  of  second  causes,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  primary 


INTRODUCTION.  !•"> 


Cause  and  that  such,  a  thing  as  a  causality  of  the  law  of 
nature  is  not  conceivable. 

No  matter  what  effect  La  Place's  answer  had  upon  Na- 
poleon I.  or  upon  thousands  of  others,  one  thing  is  sure — . 
it  did  not  shed  any  light  upon  the  mysteries  of  the  creation. 
The  beginnings  of  the  inorganic  as  well  as  of  the  organic 
beings  remained  just  as  great  mysteries  shrouded  in  dark- 
ness after  La  Place  made  that  answer,  as  they  were  before. 
La  Place  and  Alexander  von  Humboldt  are  considered 
by  the  materialists  and  atheis's  as  the  representatives  of 
the  theory  of  the  mere  mechanical  self-construction  of  the 
universe.  The  following  quotations  from  their  own  works 
make  it  doubtful  whether  they  really  believed  in  a  mere 
mechanical  arrangement  of  the  universe  : 

In  the  "  Essai  Philosophique  surles  Probabilities"  (Paris, 
1814),  La  Place  not  only  admitted  the  existence  of  a  su- 
preme Being,  but  also  argued  its  omniscience  in  the  fol- 
lowing way :  "  Reason  knowing  for  a  certain  moment  all  * 
the  forces  working  in  nature,  and  knowing  the  mutual  re- 
lation of  the  beings  constituting  the  universe,  and  being 
also  able  to  analyze  them,  could  comprehend  by  that  very 
same  method  the  movement  of  the  hugest  bodies  as  well  as 
of  the  lightest  atoms.  Nothing  could  be  uncertain  to  him, 
and  past  and  future  might  be  open  before  his  eyes.  The 
human  mind  from  what  it  has  accomplished  in  astronomy 
may  be  considered  a  weak  type  of  such  a  mind."  * 

That  Alexander  von  Humboldt  did  not  consider  the  uni- 
verse a  mere  mechanism,  caused  by  mere  external  impulses, 
is  clear  from  his  definition  of  nature  and  his  views  on  the 


*  L'esprit  hurnain  offre  dans  la  perfection  qu'il  a  su  donner  it  1'as- 
tronomie  une  faible  esquisse  de  cette  intelligence. 


Hi  AHGUMKXTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

main  object  of  inquiry.  Right  on  the  first  page  of  his 
"  Cosmos  "  it  reads  : 

"Nature  is  to  the  reflective  observation  a  unity  in  the 
diversity  of  phenomena;  a  harmony  blending  together  all 
forms  and  mixtures;  one  great  whole  of  objects  and  forces 
animated  by  the  breath  of  life.  The  most  important  result 
of  a  rational  inquiry  into  nature  will  be  to  establish  the 
unity  and  harmony  of  this  stupendous  mass  of  force  and 
matter,  to  comprehend  all  the  individual  pa- is  of  all  dis- 
coveries the  past  offers,  to  analyze  special  cases  without 
succumbing  beneath  the  weight  of  the  whole,  and  to  be 
mindful  of  the  high  destiny  of  the  human  race,  namely,  to 
comprehend  the  soul  of  nature  which  is  hidden  under  the 
cover  of  all  phenomena."  * 

Ilumboldt  was  no  atheist,  as  it  has  so  often  been  held 
that  he  was.  Besides,  his  use  in  the  Cosmos  of  the  terms 
"creation,"  "created,"  which  presupposes  a  creator,  there 
is  also  his  religious  creed,  deposited  in  his  "Memoiren." 
It  reads:  "The  clergy  considering  God  and  Nature  two 
subjects  entirely  separate  might  find  offense  in  my  views, 
and  in'order  to  avoid  persecution  I  shall  not  express  them 
publicly. 

"And  yet  my  views  are  only  those  which  were,  since  the 


*  ,,$>ie  9totur  ift  fur  bie  ben!enbe  S3etrad)tung  (Sinfyett  in  ber  SUelfyett,  3Ser= 
binbung  beS  Wannigfaltigen  in  ft-orm  unb  SMifdjung,  ^nbegriff  ber  9iaturbinge 
unb  'Naturfrafte,  ate  cin  lebenbigeS  ©  a  n  5  e  S.  2)a§  iuidjtigfte  9tefultat 
be*  fumigen  pbtyfifdjen  gorfdjenS  ift  bafyer  biefeS :  in  ber  9)tanmgfaltigfeit  bte 
Gtnfyeit  $u  erfennen,  Don  bem  SnbittibueUen  alle§  gu  umfafjen,  tva§  bte  (£nt= 
bedungen  ber  lefcten  ^eitalter  un§  barbteten  ;  bte  (Sinjelfyciten  ^ritfenb  ju  fon= 
bern  unb  bod;  nidjt  ityrer  3DJnffe  su  untetltegen.  3)er  ertyibenen  SBefttntmung 
be^  Wenfdjen  eingebenf,  ben  &  e  i  ft  ber  9t  a  t  it  r  ju  ergreifen,  iwelctjer  unter 
ber  25ede  ber  6rfd;einungen  ber^iillt  Uegt.  2luf  biefent  JBege  retc^t  unfer  33e= 
ftreben  iiber  bie  enge  ©renje  ber  ©innentoelt  b,inauS." 

(§umbolbt'3  KoSmoS,  Ginleitenbe  Semerfungen.) 


INTRODUCTION.  17 


remotest  antiquity,  entertained  by  all  who  interpreted  the 
Bible  in  the  light  of  natural  sciences. 

"At  a  very  early  age  people  have  come  to  know  that 
there  is  only  one  great  and  mighty  power  of  a  creative,  pre- 
serving and  destructive  nature.  It  is  the  same  power  which 
even  to-day  we  call,  according  to  its  effects,  electricity,  light, 
fire,  vital  force,  etc. 

"  It  is  dormant  while  an  absolute  unity,  a  Parabrama.  In 
order  to  know  itself  and  to  work,  it  resolves  itself  into  two 
contrasting  poles.  Then  it  is  the  Jehova  and  the  Asasel  of 
the  Mosaic  writings  ;  the  Brahma  and  Shiva  of  the  Hindoos  ; 
the  Ormuz'd  and  Ahriman  of  the  Persians ;  the  Zeus  and 
Hera  of  the  Greek  legends."  * 

No  matter  how  much  fault  the  theologian  may  find  with 
this  view  of  Humboldt  assuming  a  duality  in  the  Godhead, 
this  quotation  is  an  authentic  testimonial,  showing  plainly 
and  cogently  that  he  was  no  atheist  and  no  materialist. 

There  are  scholars  who  reject  the  theory  that  the  mechani- 
cal construction  of  the  universe  is  the  work  of  mere  acci- 
dental, external  causes.  They  believe  rather  in  an  evolu- 
tionary progressive  principle,  animating  the  matter  and 
workings  from  within.  They  believe  in  the  "  Reign  of 
Laws,"  and  yet  they  deny  the  existence  of,  a  presiding 
Intelligence  in  the  universe,  because  all  in  nature  is  so  or- 
derly and  because  no-  miracles  and  no  intercession  from  out- 
side take  place.  How  strange  a  logic  this  is  !  The  govern- 
ment of  order  and  of  laws,  which  makes  science  possible,  they 
do  not  attribute  to  a  presiding  Reason ;  but  the  government 
of  disorder,  of  interruption  by  miracles,  they  would  capri- 
ciously ascribe  to  a  supreme  Wisdom.  It  sounds  as  if  a 
man  would  say  the  running,  the  working,  and  the  keeping 

*  Memoiren  von  Alexander  von  Humboldt,  I.,  365-366,  Leipzig,  1861. 


is 


A  HOLM  EMS    FOR    THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


of  a  machine  in  good  order  is  not  the  work  of  an  intelli- 
gence ;  but  the  disorder  of  a  machine  is  to  be  attributed  to 
an  intelligent,  wise  power. 

Some  people  account  for  everything  with  the  phrases 
"that  is  nature,"  or  ilit  is  the  law  of.  nature."  These 
phrases  do  not  shed  any  light  whatever  upon  the  origin, 
preservation,  and  operation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse. They  rather  imply  the  confession  of  man's  ignorance 
in  this  regard. 

The  term  '*  law  of  nature  "  allows  of  a  great  many  defini- 
tions, but  as  to  the  causation  of  the  law  of  nature,  it  is  of 
the  greatest  importance  to  take  it  in  the  sense  meaning  a 
definite  regularity  of  causes  and  effects,  of  numbers  and 
measures,  of  relations  and  reciprocal  actions  and  reactions. 
It  is  incontrovertible  that  there  exists  u  laws  of  nature  "  in 
this  sense.  Now,  can  a  sensible  man  think  that  the  laws  of 
physical  and  chemical  changes  and  properties,  and  of  geo- 
metrical relation  and  mechanical  powers  have  become  so 
definite  and  immutable,  as  they  really  are,  by  mere  hap- 
hazard, by  mere  chance,  by  mere  concourses  of  atoms? 

The  k;  laws  of  nature  "  presuppose  a  creator,  a  regulator, 
a  methodizer,  and  at  all  events  a  qualifier  who  has  fitted 
the  matter  and  force,  the  properties  and  conditions  for 
their  efficacy  and  functions,  and  who  endowed  them  with 
their  tendencies  of  combination,  disseveration,  etc. 

Benedict  Spinoza  was  also  in  the  habit  of  accounting  for 
every  phenomenon  and  event  by  the  u  law  of  nature,"  but 
occasionally  he  gave  the  following  explanation  :  "  The  laws 
of  nature,  according  to  which  everything  takes  place  and  is 
determined,  are  nothing  but  the  eternal  decrees  of  God. 
If  we  say  everything  takes  place  according  to  the  laws  of 
nature,  or  everything  takes  place  according  to  God's  de- 
crees, we  say  one  and  the  same  thing.  Further,  the  power 


INTRODUCTION.  19 


of  all  things  of  nature  being  nothing  but  the  power  of  God, 
which  alone  can  make  everything,  it  follows  that  all  that 
man— who  is  only  a  part  of  nature — acquires  for  his  sub- 
sistence, or  what  nature  furnishes  him  with,  without  his 
co-operation,  must  be  considered  as  given  him  alone  by 
God/'  * 

The  Danish  professor,  Oersted,  who  secured  historical 
immortality  bv  the  discovery  of  the  "electro-magnetism," 
considering  all  existence  a  dominion  of  reason,  expressed 
his  opinion  about  the  "  Reign  of  Laws,"  as  follows :  "All 
natural  laws  form  together  a  unity,  which,  viewed  in  their 
activity,  constitute  the  essence  of  the  whole  world.  If  we 
investigate  these  laws  more  closely,  we  find  that  they  har- 
monize so  perfectly  with  reason,  that  we  may  assert  with 
truth  that  the  harmony  of  the  laws  of  nature  consists  in 
their  being  adapted  to  the  dictates  of  reason,  or  rather  by 
the  coincidence  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  the  laws  of 
reason. 

"  The  chain  of  the  natural  laws,  which,  in  their  activity, 
constitutes  the  essence  of  everything,  may  be  viewed  either 
as  a  natural  thought,  or  more  correctly,  as  a  natural 
idea ;  and  since  all  natural  laws  constitute  but  one  unity, 
the  whole  world  is  the  expression  of  an  infinite,  all-compre- 
hensive idea,  which  is  one  with  an  infinite  reason,  living 
and  acting  in  everything.  In  other  words,  the  world  is  a 
revelation  of  the  united  power  of  creation  and  reason  in 
the  Godhead.  We  can  now  first  comprehend  how  we  can 
recognize  nature  through  reason,  for  reason  again  recog- 
nizes itself  in  all."  f 

It  is  noteworthy  how  all  naturalists  and  philosophers  of 

*  Spinoza's  Correspondence, 
t  The  Soul  of  Nature,  Bonn's  Edition,  450-451. 


2o  AK<U-MENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


olden,  as  well  as  of  modern  times,  agree  upon  a  unity  of 
force  underlying  the  infinite  variety  of  phenomena,  com- 
passing them  as  a  tie.  and  pervading  them  as  a  common 
element. 

That  Qtie  in  the  many,  that  Unity  in  the  diversity,  that 
general  element  in  the  perpetual  metamorphoses  of  forms 
and  forces,  is  considered  the  Being,  truly  existing,  and  the 
ultimate  ground  of  all  that  is  ideal  and  real,  subjective  and 
objective. 

That  common  root  of  all  phenomena  and  existence  was 
called  "the  principle  of  water"  by  Thales ;  "the  principle 
of  air  "by  Anaximenes ;  "the  principle  of  fire"  by  Hera- 
c.lit ;  ''  the  idea  of  good  "  by  Socrates,  Euclid  of  Magara,  and 
Plato;  "substance"  by  Spinoza;  "the  universal  monad'' 
by  Leibnitz:  •' the  thing  per  se''  by  Kant;  '  the  Ego"  by 
Kichte;  and  ''the  abstract  being"  by  Hegel. 

That  there  is  such  a  unity  in  the  diversity  of  the  forces 
and  forms  of  nature  has  been  incontrovertibly  confirmed 
by  the  brilliant  discovery  of  the  ''  correlation  of  physical 
forces,"  by  Grove  and  Toulet. 

Until  recently,  it  was  thought  that  there  was  an  essential 
difference  between  light,  electricity,  magnetism,  motion,  etc. 
But  Grove  and  Touet  have  shown  that  all  these  forms  are 
correlated,  so  that  one  of  these  various  forms  of  physical 
force  can  be  turned  into  one  or  more  of  the  other  forces. 

Now  the  question  urges  itself  upon  man's  mind,  what  is 
the  essence  or  quality  of  that  fundamental  force  or  law? 
No  mortal  can  tell.  This  is  a  mystery.  Will  that  mystery 
ever  be  unveiled?  Professor  Eduard  Zeller,  thinks  that 
since  the  fundamental  unity  of  force  comprises  not  merely 
unconscious  but  also  conscious  forces,  and  not  merely  ma- 
terial but  also  spiritual  beings,  our  conception  of  that 


INTRODUCTION.  21 


fundamental  force  is  only  correct  and  true  when  implying 
the  causation  of  the  unconscious  and  conscious  forces,  and 
of  the  material  and  spiritual  beings.* 

\ 
*  TJeber  die  Aut'gabe  der  Philosophic,  20. 


I.  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 


,;)lim  entfteb,  t  bic  grafle :  ftann  biefe  unenblidje  3teifye  bon  Urfacfyen 
unb  SHrfungen,  ofa.ne  Slbfydnfligfeit  con  einem  notfytoenbigen  unb  un= 
Berdnberltcfyen  SBefen,  fur  fi$  beftefyen  ober  nidjt?  ©rb,alt  fidj  biefe 
.Ht.'tte  otjne  Hnfang  unb  (Snbe  burct>  bie  Unwblicfyfeit  »on  felbft  ober  mufe 
fie  trgenb>»o  am  S^rone  ber  2Ulmacfyt  befeftigt  fein,  urn  burdj 
biefe  ^erbinbunfl  mtt  bent  notfyioenbigen  SBefen  in  SBirflicbteit  fommen 
unb  erfyalten  n>erben  ju  fonnenV"* 

K.\i>eriene(!  and  reasoning  teach  that  all  subjects  and 
events  in  the  world  are  both  consequents  and  antecedents. 
One  would  think  that  there  is  nothing  more  natural  for 
people — seeing  every  day  existences  and  events  not  merely 
proceeding  from  causes,  but  also  again  becoming  causes  for 
other  existences  and  events— than  the  putting  of  the  ques- 
tion whether  there  has  been  in  the  world  an  endless  process 
of  causes  and  effects  without  an  ultimate  cause,  or  whether 
all  the  secondary  causes  operating  in  the  universe  originate 
from  one  parent  cause. 

Hut,  strange  enough,  it  took  a  long  time  for  this  question 
to  urge  itself  upon  mankind  and  come  in  the  foreground. 
It  did  not  exist  for  the  Ionic  philosophers.  To  them 
any  of  "  the  elements  "—the  water,  the  fire,  the  air — were  the 
fundamental  principles  of  all.  The  matter  of  which  all  things 
arise,  into  which  they  dissolve,  and  which,  in  the  midst  of  all 
changing  conditions,  remains  essentially  the  same,  they 
considered  the  beginning  of  all.  And  even  Anaxagoras 

*  Moses  Mendelssohn's  Morgenstimden. 


THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  23 

and  the  Eleatic  school,  though  they  assumed  that  cosmical 
matter  is  shaped  by  an  intelligence,  yet  they  had  no  special 
inducement  to  reflect  on  this  problem,  because  to  them  that 
world-shaping  intelligence  was  coequal  with  the  cosmical 
matter.  They  were  Monists.  God  was  to  them  no  inde- 
pendent being ;  nor  did  they  consider  mind  and  matter  in 
the  light  of  an  antithesis.  Also  Plato  did  not  penetrate 
to  the  problem  of  a  first  cause.  He  conceived  God  in  a 
two-fold  relation :  as  substance  and  cause.  All  that  is 
depending  upon  space  and  time  is  not  so  perfect  as  that 
which  is  immutable  and  universal.  The  real  essence  of 
all  things  he  termed  "the  ideas,"  which  are  immutably 
universal  and  form  the  essence  of  God.  Upon  the  form  of 
these  eternal  "  ideas  "  was  shaped  the  order  of  things,  and 
they  constitute  the  eternal  types  and  imprints  of  all  forms. 

The  Being,  of  whom  all  these  eternal  ideas  or  types  form 
the  essence,  has  been  operating  upon  all  that  is  changeable, 
and  is  on  that  account  to  be  called  the  cause  of  all  forms. 
This  theory  is  the  keynote  of  Plato's  theology.  Plato 
treats  only  of  a  formative  cause,  but  not  of  a  first  cause. 
This  was  reserved  for  Aristotle,  the  man  of  wider  generali- 
zation, deeper  reflection,  and  of  a  farther  penetration  in  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  their  concatenations  and  relations  to 
one  another,  than  any  of  all  his  predecessors. 

Considering  nature  a  connected  system,  the  parts  of 
which,  being  united  into  a  whole  by  one  mind  and  directed 
by  one  will,  he  was  led  to  the  question  whether  there  is  not 
behind  the  endless  play  of  causes  and  effects  an  ultimate 
cause  enveloping  the  origin  of  all  phenomena.  "It  is 
^lear,"  says  Aristotle,  "  that  all  depends  upon  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  first  cause,  for  only  he  knows  an  existence  who 
knows  its  first  cause.''  * 

*  Metapliysics,  I.,  8. 


24  AlUiUMENTS    FOK   THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


Uy  cause  Aristotle  understands  something  that  explains 
the  origin  and  the  nature  of  an  existence.  He  (Meta- 
physics, I.,  3)  analyzes  causes  into  four  kinds  : 

the  material  causes,  which  he,  like  the  Ionic  philosophers, 
was  seeking  in  the  principal  elements  of  fire,  water  or  air. 

The  efficient  causes,  producing  change  and  motion. 

The  formal  causes,  being  the  real  and  invisible  essence  of 
all  forms;  or,  as  Plato  termed  them,  the  "ideas." 

The  final  causes,  which  are  the  designs  in  nature  or  the 
reasoned  ends  of  the  phenomena. 

Above  all  these  causes  there  is  a  first  cause  moving  all, 
but  is  itself  unmoved.  Matter,  being  too  inert  and  too 
passive,  could  come  into  motion  only  by  an  outside  force, 
which  Aristotle  termed  Proton  Kinoun— the  first  motor, 
the  primum  mnvens. 

This  reasoning  is  called  the  cosmological  proof.  The 
assumption  of  an  endless  series  of  causes  and  effects  with- 
out a  first  absolute  cause,  Aristotle  considered  an  absurdity. 

The  theory  of  Aristotle's  "  first  cause  "  was  for  centuries 
adopted  by  the  Jewish,  Christian  and  Mohammedan  meta- 
physicians as  safe,  sound  and  self-evident. 

Special  attention  was  given  to  the  "  first  cause  argument " 
by  John  Donus  Scotus,  an  acute  metaphysician  (died  1308), 
who  was  the  first  to  separate  philosophy  from  theology, 
reason  from  faith,  and  natural  from  supernatural  theology. 

According  to  Scotus,  the  existence  of  Clod  can  not  be 
inferred  from  the  mere  idea  man  has  of  him  (ex  terminus), 
nor  can  it  be  proved  a  priori. 

The  a  posteriori  arguments  he  considered  sound  and! 
reliable. 

He  divided  his  demonstration  of  a  first  cause  into  three 
parts,  of  which  the  first  one  treats  of  the  premises,  that 


THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 


all  products  are  brought  about  either  by   nothing   or  by- 
themselves,  or  by  an  exterior  cause. 

He  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  as  of  nothing  nothing  can 
arise,  nor  can  anything  make  itself,  it  must  be  assumed  that 
all  existences  are  the  products  of  an  exterior  force,  which  is 
God.  However,  he  thinks  the  existence  of  a  first  cause  i& 
not  so  self-evident  as  to  be  admitted  without  any  further 
argumentation.  To  that  effect  he  classified  the  causes  in-- 
essential ones  —  causarum  essentialiter  —  when  the  causes  and' 
effects  are  simultaneous  ;  and  into  accidental  causes  — 
causarum  per  accidens  —  when  the  causes  and  effects  are  not 
simultaneous.  The  accidental  causes  proceed  from  the 
essential  ones,  an  endless  series  of  which  is  unimaginable.. 

In  the  second  part  of  his  demonstration  he  argues  that 
coequal  with  the  first  cause  are  also  the  ultimate  designs 
and  the  prime  perfection.  The  more  comprehensive  the 
first  cause  is,  the  more  comprehensive  must  be  also  the 
ultimate  design. 

In  the  third  part  of  his  demonstration  Scotus  argues  that 
the  three  primordials  —  the  first  cause,  the  ultimate  design1 
and  the  prime  perfection  —  are  essentially  connected,  form- 
ing the  modes  of  the  manifestation  of  the  same  Being. 

Since  Aristotle  it  was  maintained  that  the  nature  of  the 
Divine  existence  must  be  essentially  different  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  existence  of  the  creatures.  Scotus  controverted 
this  view  by  the  dilemma  :  If  God's  mode  of  existence  is 
essentially  or  entirely  different  from  that  of  the  creatures, 
then  the  inference  is  correct  that  either  God  does  not  exist 
or  the  creatures  do  not  exist. 

The  great  nominalist,  William  Durandus  de  St.  Touraine 
(died  in  1332),  argued  for  the  existence  of  God  in  three 
ways  : 


•jr.  AlMil'MKXTS    FOR    TUK    ExiSTENCK    OF    Gol>. 

Via  cminentix,  there  are  all  grades  of  perfection  in  ex- 
istence, but  God  is  the  most  perfect  grade  of  them  all. 

Via  causalitatis,  every  effect  is  produced  by  a  cause,  and 
no  matter  how  far  back  the  vista  of  effected  causes  reached 
there  must  be  an  ultimate  cause  where  the  chain  of  the 
efficient  or  secondary  causes  commences. 

Via  necessitatis,  from  nothing  nothing  can  come,  nor  can 
anything  come  into  existence  of  itself. 

In  the  century  in  which  Scotus  and  Durandus  made  such 
great  exertion  to  fortify  the  cosmological  proof,  there  lived 
also  their  antipode,  William  Occam  (died  1347).  He  was 
the  chief  representative  of  the  principle  of  the  "double 
truth."  according  to  which  one  may  deny  in  the  capacity 
of  a  philosopher  what  he  believes  in  the  capacity  of  a 
theologian,  and  vice  versa. 

William  Occam  was  the  first  one  who  attempted  to 
undermine  the  cosmological  proof  advanced  by  Aristotle. 
Jn  his  book— Centilogum  Theologum— he  expressed  a  great 
distrust  in  all  n  posteriori  argumentation*  His  starting- 
point  was  that  no  apodictical  knowledge  must  be  expected 
from  the  mere  sensuous  perception.  The  senses  merely 
intimate  that  there  is  something  existing,  but  through  them 
alone  one  can  not  arrive  at  clear  conceptions.  Thus,  through 
senses  we  perceive  the  smoke,  but  we  do  not  always  see  the 
fire  producing  it ;  or,  we  hear  the  groans,  but  do  not  see  the 
pain  causing  them.  More  reliable  than  the  sensuous  per- 
ception is,  to  Occam,  the  intuition  which  gains  the  necessary 
truths  by  mere  reasoning,  without  any  assistance  from  the 
external  observation. 

It  being  impossible  for  him  to  arrive  at  the  conception  of 
God  by  intuition,  he  did  not  consider  the  existence  of  a 
Supreme  Being  of  a  logical  cogency ;  but  nevertheless  he 


THE  COSMOLOOICAL  ARGUMENT.  27 


was  so  far  from  denying  the  Divine  existence  that  he 
did  not  think  even  a  plurality  of  Gods  impossible. 

His  belief  in  God  he  rested  upon  the  preservation  of  the 
order  and  harmony  and  upon  the  preservation  of  the 
universe. 

He  maintained  that  it  is  not  necessary  at  all  to  assume 
that  efficient  and  formal  causes  must  emanate  from  a  first 
cause. 

Like  Occam,  Peter  de  Aily  (died  in  1425)  would,  by  means 
of  the  chafing  undulation  of  skepticism,  wash  away  the  rock 
of  the  cosmological  argument ;  but  he  did  not  succeed  better. 
Furthermore,  he  holds  that  an  infinite  series  of  causes  and 
effects  was  not  unimaginable,  there  being  things  which  cease 
to  operate  without  an  external  cause  ;  and  so  also  a  beginning 
without  an  external  impulse,  was  to  him  not  unimaginable. 

Both  William  Occam  and  Peter  de  Aily  did  not  deny 
the  existence  of  God  ;  they  merely  disputed  the  Aristotelian 
theory,  it  being  absurd  to  assume  that  the  cosmical  matter 
<-ould  have  come  into  motion  without  a  first  impulse  from 
an  exterior  cause,  and  that  an  endless  series  of  causes  and 
•effects  without  a  connection — without  a  first  cause — was 
unimaginable.  It  is  onl}'  a  pity  that  they  have  not  cor- 
roborated their  views  by  facts. 

These  ideas  of  Occam  and  Peter  de  Aily  were  resumed  by 
Hobbes  and  Locke.  They  considered  the  whole  causation 
theory  only  a  psychological  necessity  or  a  mere  mode  of 
human  thought;  and  this  theory  gained  such  a  hold  upon 
the  minds  of  the  scholars  that  Leibnitz  considered  the  cos- 
mological  argument  lost  if  it  be  not  given  another  more 
rational  meaning. 

Leibnitz  tried  to  do  it  in  this  way  :  All  the  phenomena 
of  the  world  are  contingent  and  changeable  and  have  not 
the  real  cause  of  their  existence  in  themselves.  Now, 


AlUJl'MKNTS   FOR   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GoD. 


where  is  that  first  cause?  It  can  be  either  within  or  with- 
out that  contingent  world.  In  that  contingent  world  it 
can  not  he,  else  it  would  be  also  changeable  or  contingent; 
consequently  it  must  be  without  and  independent  of  that 
world  which  is  a  complex  of  contingent  and  changeable 
phenomena. 

The  first  cause  is  not  merely  the  first  link  of  the  chain  of 
causation,  but  it  is  that  absolute,  self-sufficient  power, 
qualifying  the  elements  and  laws  of  nature,  and  befitting 
them  for  their  relations  and  functions. 

Connecting  and  permeating  all  contingent  and  change- 
able things  into  a  total,  that  absolute,  self-sufficient,  primi- 
tive cause  is  the  sum  of  all  possible  realities,  or  the 
.sufficient  cause — the  causa  sufficient.* 

Of  this  cosmological  argument,  as  set  forth  by  Leibnitz, 
the  English  metaphysician,  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  availed 
himself  in  the  formation  of  his  proof,  which  reads  : 

"  First,  then,  it  is  absolutely  and  undeniably  certain  that 
something  has  existed  from  eternity.  This  is  so  evident 
and  undeniable  a  proposition  that  no  atheist  in  any  age 
has  ever  presumed  to  assert  the  contrary;  and  therefore 
there  is  little  need  of  being  particular  in  the  proof  of  it. 
For,  since  something  now  is,  it  is  evident  that  something 
always  was;  otherwise  the  things  that  now  are  must  have 
been  produced  out  of  nothing,  absolutely  and  without 
cause,  which  is  a  plain  contradiction  in  terms.  For  to  say 
a  thing  is  produced  and  yet  that  there  is  no  cause  at  all1 
for  that  production,  is  to  sav  that  something  is  effected 
when  it  is  effected  by  nothing ;  that  is,  at  the  same  time 
when  it  is  not  effected  at  all.  Whatever  exists  has  a  cause, 
u  reason,  a  ground  of  its  existence  (a  foundation  on  which 


*  Princip.  Philosophique,  36-41. 


COSMOLOGIGAL  "ARGUMENT.  29 


its  existence  relies ;  a  ground  and  reason  why  it  does  exist 
rather  than  not  exist),  either  in  the  necessity  of  its  own 
nature,  and  then  it  must  have  been  of  itself  eternal ;  or  in 
the  will  of  some  other  being,  and  then  that  other  being 
must  at  least  in  the  order  of  nature  and  causality  have 
existed  before  it. 

"  That  something,  therefore,  has  existed  from  eternity,  is 
one  of  the  most  certain  and  most  evident  truths  of  the  world, 
acknowledged  by  all  men  and  disputed  by  none.  Yet,  as  to 
the  manner  how  it  can  be  there  is  nothing  in  nature  more 
difficult  for  the  mind  of  man  to  conceive  than  this  very 
plain,  self-evident  truth.  For,  how  anything  can  have 
existed  eternally,  that  is,  how  an  eternal  duration  can  be 
now  actually  past,  is  a  thing  utterly  as  impossible  for  our 
narrow  understanding  to  comprehend,  as  anything  that  is 
not  an  express  contradiction  can  be  imagined  to  be,  and 
yet  to  deny  the  truth  of  the  proposition  that  an  eternal 
duration  is  now  actually  past,  would  be  to  assert  some- 
thing still  more  unintelligible,  even  a  real  and  express 
contradiction."  * 

After  a  dilation  on  the  difficulties  of  knowing  God,  Clarke 
made  the  argumentation  just  stated,  the  basis  of  his  second 
cardinal  principle  in  the  following  words  : 

''There  has  existed  from  eternity  some  one  unchange- 
able and  independent  Being :  for,  since  something  must 
needs  have  been  from  eternity,  as  has  been  already  proved 
and  is  granted  on  all  sides,  either  there  has  always  existed 
some  one'unchangeable  and  independent  Being,  from  which 
all  other  things  that  are  or  ever  were  in  the  universe 
have  received  their  original ;  or  else  there  has  been  an 


*  Samuel  Clarke's  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of 
•God,  8-9. 


;.{(|  Aui.l  MKNTS    FOR    THK    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


infinite  succession  of  changeable  and  dependent  beings  pro- 
duced from  one  another  in  an  endless  progression,  without 
any  original  cause  at  all.  Now,  this  latter  supposition  is 
so  absurd  that,  though  all  atheism  must  terminate  in  it,  a& 
it  accounts  of  most  things,  yet  I  think  very  few  atheists 
were  ever  so  weak  as  openly  and  directly  to  defend  it.  For 
it  is  only  impossible  and  contradictory  to  itself.  *  *  * 
But  if  we  consider  such  an  infinite  progression  as  one  end- 
less series  of  dependent  beings,  it  is  plain  that  this  whole 
series  ran  have  no  cause  from  without  its  existence, 
because  in  it  are  supposed  to  be  included  all  things  that 
are  or  ever  were  in  the  universe  ;  and  it  is  plain  that  it  cart 
have  no  reason  within  itself  of  its  existence,  because  no  one 
Being  in  this  succession  is  supposed  to  be  self-existent,  but 
every  one  dependent  on  the  foregoing ;  and  where  no  part 
is  necessary,  it  is  manifest  that  the  whole  can  not  be  neces- 
sary. Absolute  necessity  of  existence  is  not  an  intrin- 
sic relative  and  accidental  demonstration,  but  an  inward! 
and  essential  property  of  the  nature  of  the  thing  which  so 
exists. 

"An  infinite  succession,  therefore,  of  merely  dependent 
beings,  without  any  original  independent  cause,  is  a  series 
of  beings  that  has  neither  necessity  nor  cause,  nor  any 
reason  of  ground  at  all  for  its  existence,  either  within  itself 
or  from  without."  * 

A  new  assault  was  made  upon  the  cosmological  argument 
by  the  great  German  metaphysician,  Kant.  Being  resolute 
to  try  his  utmost  in  refuting  it,  he  did  not  take  it  in  the 
sense  given  it  by  Leibnitz  and  Clarke ;  it  was  easier  work 
for  him  to  invalidate  it  when  taken  in  the  old  Aristotelian 
sense.  However,  Kant  failed  even  in  that  way. 


*  Demonstration,  pp.  11,  12. 


THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  31 

Like  William  Occam  and  Peter  de  Ally.  Kant  also 
thought  an  infinite  series  of  causes  and  effects  imaginable,, 
and,  also  like  them,  he  did  not  advance  any  conclusive 
evidence  in  support  of  this  view. 

It  will  be  borne  in  mind  that  Kant  had  no  atheistic 
tendencies  at  all.  His  main  objection  to  all  a  priori  and 
a  posteriori  proofs  was  that,  by  way  of  speculation,  man  can 
not  succeed  in  demonstrating  apodictically  the  existence 
of  God.  His  sincere  belief  was  that  only  the  ethical  nature 
of  man  teaches  the  knowableness  of  God.  This  assertion 
was  so  much  to  the  taste  of  the  theologians,  that  they  over- 
looked all  the  criticism  he  passed  on  the  cosmological. 
theological  and  ontological  arguments ;  and,  indeed,  there 
has  never  lived  a  philosopher  of  an  original  turn  of  mind 
who  was  less  persecuted  and  molested  by  the  theologians 
than  Kant. 

With  all  his  ingenuity  and  acuteness,  he  could  not  suc- 
ceed in  showing  that  a  first  cause  was  unimaginable  ;  on  the 
contrary,  he  admitted  the  possibility  of  a  first  cause,  and 
his  main  criticism  concerned  merely  the  nature  of  that 
first  cause. 

Human  experience,  he  propounded,  being  only  limited,, 
does  not  warrant  any  other  than  a  cause  commensurate 
with  the  effect.  It  does  not  warrant  that  that  first  cause 
was  an  unconditioned,  perfect  being.  That  first  cause  may 
be  a  fate,  a  necessity,  a  purposeless  cause,  a  blank  essence. 

It  is  true,  the  experience  made  in  one  sphere  is  not 
always  and  necessarily  applicable  beyond  that  sphere ;  but 
ihe  very  concession  of  Kant  that  there  is  a  first  cause,  is  of 
the  greatest  importance  to  theology.  This  concession  is 
a  starting-point  for  the  theologian.  Kant  ought  to  hav& 
considered  that  there  have  been  a  great  many  phenomena 
and  events  predicted  and  foreseen  in  history  and  natural 


:J2 


AWH-MENTS  FOB  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


science,  though  experience  did  not  warrant  them.  La 
Verriere  predicted  the  appearance  of  Neptune,  though  it 
was  not  warranted  by  past  experience. 

The  reasoning  from  the  conditioned  upon  the  uncon- 
ditioned, from  the  contingent  upon  the  absolute,  from  the 
finite  upon  the  infinite,  from  secondary  upon  primary 
•causes  is  so  obvious,  that  all  caviling,  dialectical  hair- 
splitting and  sophistry  will  not  prevail  to  eradicate  from 
man's  souml  common  sense  the  belief  in  a  "first  cause," 
or,  as  Leibnitz  calls  it,  the  "sufficient  cause." 

Dr.  Asa  Gray,  Professor  in  the  Harvard  University,  one 
•of  the  greatest  naturalists  and,  in  America,  at  present  the 
greatest  Darwinist,  said :  "  The  notion  of  an  eternal  se- 
quence of  cause  and  effect  for  which  there  is  no  first  cause, 
is  a  view  which  only  a  few  sane  persons  can  long  rest  in.* 

And  John  Stuart  Blackie,  Professor  in  the  Edinburgh 
University,  thinks :  "  The  wretched  cavil  about  invariable 
sequence,  which  David  Hume  introduced  and  John  Stuart 
Mill  made  fashionable  for  a  day,  will  no  more  do  away 
with  the  idea  of  causality  in  the  great  mass  of  normally 
constituted  minds  than  the  assertion  that  the  regular 
going  up  and  down  of  a  piston  in  a  cylinder  renders  the 
•supposition  of  a  constructive  reason  in  the  person  of  a 
James  Watt  superfluous,  in  order  to  explain  the  existence 
of  a  steam-engine.  If  physical  science  can  put  its  fingers 
on  nothing  but  a  series  of  sequences,  it  merely  proves  that 
science  is  no  philosophy,  and  is  altogether  a  subordinate 
affair;  but  when  philosophers,  with  their  acute  spectacles, 
can  see  nothing  in  the  world  but  an  infinite  series  of  invari- 
able sequences,  the  sooner  they  give  up  their  profession  of 
wisdom  the  better ;  for  it  is  just  the  invariability  of  the 

*  Darwiniana,  58,  1876. 


THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  33 

sequences  which  forces  the  reasonable  mind  of  man  to 
assert  that  there  is  a  cause  within  them  or  behind  them, 
which  makes  the  invariability  possible."  * 

Modern  physical  science  has  been  revolutionized  and  put 
upon  an  entirely  new  basis  by  the  discovery  of  the  con- 
servation of  forces  and  continuous  motion.  The  conserva- 
tion of  forces  means  that  matter  is  not,  as  was  believed  in 
former  ages,  destructible,  but  that  the  quantity  of  matter 
and  force  has  always  been  the  same  in  the  one  or  the  other 
form,  and  the  theorem  of  the  continuous  motion  means, 
that  there  is  no  real  stand-still  in  forces  and  no  tendency  to 
entire  rest,  as  was  the  opinion  formerly,  but  that  all  is  in  a 
state  of  motion  and  subtle  transformation. 

These  two  brilliant  discoveries  in  modern  physical 
science  have  been  advanced  as  evidences  against  the  exist- 
ence of  a  first  cause. 

Now,  it  is  claimed  with  a  triumphant  air,  if  matter  and 
force  have  been  in  continuous  motion  and  transformation, 
then  this  does  away  with  the  idea  a  first  cause  being 
necessary. 

This  is  no  conclusive  evidence  whatever.  The  objections 
raised  to  Kant,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  first  cause  being 
perfect,  are  applicable  also  to  these  two  theorems. 

Xo  sensible  man  will  infer,  that  because  matter  and  force 
are  indestructible  and  in  continuous  motion  in  the  sphere 
of  our  experience,  that  they  are  so  also  outside  the  narrow 
sphere  of  our  observations. 

If  the  causation  idea  concerning  the  first  cause  is  not 
founded  in  nature  outside  our  mind,  but  is  merely  a  mode 
of  our  thought,  a  psychological  necessity,  then  the  ideas  of 
the  indestructibility  of  matter  and  of  a  continuous  motion 

*  Natural  History  of  Atheism. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


niav  also  be  only  modes  of  our  thought  and  psychological 
necessities,  because  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  believe  that, 
in  a  natural  way,  there  can  become  of  something  nothing 
and  of  nothing  something. 

It  is  a  gross  mistake  to  think  that  the  modern  theorems 
of  indfstructibility  of  matter,  of  continuant*  motion  and  of 
correlation  of  force*  have  banished  and  wiped  out  the  theory 
of  a  first  cause  as  an  error.  Just  the  reverse  is  the  case. 
These  theorems  imply  the  idea  that  back  of  #11  changes  and 
effects  is  something  that  is  unchangeable,,  persistent  and 
absolute.  All  transformations  of  the  natural  phenomena  are 
only  modes  of  manifestations  of  that  something  that  is 
unchangeable,  persistent  and  absolute;  and  to  that  something" 
the  character  of  a  first  cause  may  be  assigned.  It  is 

'Above  all  things,  below  all  things; 
Around  all  things,  within  all  things ; 
Within  all,  but  not  shut  in  ; 
Around  all,  but  not  shut  out ; 
Above  all,  as  the  Ruler; 
Below  all,  as  the  Sustainer; 
Around  all,  as  all-embracing  Protection  ; 
Within  all,  as  the  Fullness  of  Life."  * 


*  Hildebert  de  Tours,  in  J.  Clark's  Ten  Religions.    Vol.  II. 


II,  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT, 


"  Ceux  q-ui'ont  dit  qn'une  fatalite  aveugle  a  produit  tous  les 
eft'ets  que  nous  voyons .  dans  le  monde,  ant  dit  une  grand' 
absurdite :  car  quelle  plus  grand  absurdit<5  qu'une  fatalite* 
aveugle  qui  aurait  produit  des  Otres  intelligents."  * 

The  great  order,  harmony  and  wisdom  displayed  and 
manifested  in  nature,  urged  imperiously  and  overpower- 
ingly  upon  man's  reflective  mind  the  idea  that  the  structure- 
of  the  physical  universe  was  the  work  or  the  product  of  a 
Supreme  Intelligence,  and  was  brought  about  with  a  design. 

The  regularity  of  the  seasons  and  of  so  many  remarkable 
phenomena;  the  forms  and  constructions  of  organized 
beings  ;  the  individual,  domestic  and  social  instincts  of  the 
animated  kingdom ;  the  relations  and  adaptations  of  the- 
parts  of  the  bodies  to  the  whole— in  short,  the  entire- 
architecture  of  the  universe — impressed  man  as  being  so- 
wonderfully  devised,  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  think 
of  accounting  for  the  existence  of  all  this  otherwise  than  by 
the  assumption  that  a  presiding  intelligence  produced,  or, 
at  least  shaped  it  all. 

Cicero  said  :  "  I  will  not  believe  that  the  world  is  the 
product  of  mere  chance  till  I  shall  see  that  boxes  of  let- 
ters, used  to  teach  children  the  alphabet,  will  arrange 

*  Montesquieu,  Esprit  de  Lois,  I. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


themselves,  by  merely  being  overturned,  into  well-reasoned 
treatises." 

Nevertheless,  in  every  generation  there  have  been  people 
living  who  either  overtly  or  covertly  denied  the  Providence 
in  nature.  They  did  so  from  no  other  reason  than  because 
so  many  and  so  great  evils,  anomalies  and  perturbations 
were  allowed  to  take  place. 

They  reason :  If  there  were  a  Providence,  cases  like 
earthquakes,  inundations,  shipwrecks,  storms,  murders, 
robberies,  madness,  idiocy,  etc.,  would  never  occur. 

People  reasoning  thus  ought  to  bear  in  mind  that  there 
are  no  absolute  evils.  All  evils  are  only  relatively  so. 
Evils,  or  the  law  and  principle  by  means  of  which  those 
^vils  occur,  may  be  in  some  instances  quite  horrible  and 
appalling ;  but  in  many  cases,  or  in  general,  they  may  be 
of  the  greatest  benefit — nay,  even  indispensable  for  the 
development  and  destination  of  the  creatures  and  for  the 
regulation  and  harmony  of  the  world. 

The  truth  is,  the  evils  are  not  for  the  sake  of  the  evils, 
tmt  they  are  in  the  household  and  economy  of  the  universe 
productive  of  much  good,  often  where  we  expect  it  the  least. 

The  evils  of  the  world,  even  in  their  total,  can  not  be 
considered  of  sufficient  conclusiveness  to  prove  anything 
against  the  existence  of  Providence. 

In  an  immense  world  of  all  imaginable  and  unimagin- 
able tendencies  of  elements,  forces  and  laws,  collisions, 
though  fatal  to  individual  existence,  are  unavoidable.  And 
the  more  one  reflects  on  the  office  and  agency  of  the  physical 
and  moral  evils  of  the  world,  the  readier  must  he  be  to 
say  with  the  English  poet,  Pope,  "Presume  not  God  to 
scan."  Man  judges  merely  by  the  impressions  of  the 
moment  and  by  his  personal  advantages,  while  God  rules 
with  regard  to  the  whole  and  to  eternitv. 


THE  TKLEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  37 


"The  existence  of  evil,''  says  Professor  Blaikie,  "  is  no 
proof  that  there  is  no  God ;  but  it  is  by  this  overcoming  of 
evil  constantly  that  God  proves  himself  to  be  God ;  and 
man  proves  himself  to  be  godlike  when,  in  his  subordinate 
sphere,  he  does  the  same.  The  only  real  e\il  in  the  world 
is  , the  negative  carping  spirit  —  the  Mephistopheles  of 
Goethe's  Faust — which,  for  lack  of  will  to  use  the  given 
material  in  the  given  way,  gratifies  an  unreasoning  rest- 
lessness in  blaming  everything  and  doing  nothing." 

The  Bible  teaches  that  all  works  of  God  are  as  perfect  as 
he  would  have  them.  The  very  fact  that  this  is  the  view 
of  the  Bible,  has  been  an  inducement  for  many  to  contra- 
dict it  and  to  try  to  find  fault  with  almost  all  works  of  God. 

The  following,  from  Robert  G.  Ingersoll  s  lecture  on 
"  The  Gods,"  is  a  specimen  of  that  kind  of  fault-finding  : 

"A  very  pious  friend  of  mine,  having  heard  that  I  had 
said  the  world  was  full  of  imperfections,  asked  me  if  the 
report  was  true.  Upon  being  informed  that  it  was,  he 
expressed  great  surprise  that  any  one  could  be  guilty  of 
such  presumption.  He  said  that,  in  his  judgment,  it  was 
impossible  to  point  out  any  imperfection.  '  Be  kind  enough,' 
said  he,  '  to  name  even  one  improvement  that  you  would 
make  if  you  had  the  power.'  '  Well,'  said  I,  '  I  would  make 
good  health  catching  instead  of  disease.' '' 

This  argument,  advanced  by  the  grandiloquent  Mr. 
Ingersoll  with  so  much  self-complacency,  is  just  as  irra- 
tional as  if  he  had  said,  "if  I  had  the  power  to  make 
improvements,  I  would  make  vinegar  taste  as  sweet  as 
honey  and  sulphur  as  fragrant  as  incense.''  Contagiousness 
is  nothing  but  a  chemical  process.  To  desire  that  the 
contagious  diseases  shall  not  be  catching,  means  to  desire 
that  the  laws  of  nature  underlying  those  chemical  processes 
shall  cease  to  work. 


FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


Mr.  Ingersoll's  words  imply  the  idea  that,  had  he  the 
power  to  make  improvements,  he  would  put  an  end  to  the 
natural  causes  and  effects  in  nature,  and  would  rather 
perform  miracles. 

As  to  the  office  of  evils  in  nature,  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill 
thinks :  "Along  with  the  preserving  agencies  there  are 
destroving  agencies,  which  we  might  be  tempted  to  ascribe 
to  the  will  of  a  different  Creator;  but  there  are  rarely 
appearances  of  the  recondite  contrivance  of  means  of 
destruction,  except  when  destruction  of  one  creature  is  the 
means  of  preservation  to  others.  Xor  can  it  be  supposed 
that  the  preserving  agencies  are  wielded  by  one  Being,  the 
destroying  agencies  by  another.  The  destroying  agencies 
are  a  necessary  part  of  the  preserving  agencies  :  the  chemi- 
cal compositions,  by  which  life  is  carried  on,  could  not 
take  place  without  a  parallel  series  of  decompositions.  The 
great  agency  of  decay,  in  both  organic  and  inorganic  sub- 
stances, is  oxidation,  and  it  is  only  by  oxidation  that  life 
is  continued  for  even  the  length  of  a  minute."  * 

The  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  derived  from  the 
vestiges  of  design  and  finality  in  nature,  is  called  the  teleo- 
logical  or  the  physico-theological ;  and  the  first  metaphysi- 
cian to  apply  it  was  Socrates,  the  great  monotheist  among 
the  Greeks. 

It  is  true  that  before  him  Anaxagoras  believed  in  one 
God,  but  to  judge  from  the  censures  passed  upon  him  by 
Socrates  and  Plato,  he  must  yet  have  entertained  a  very 
deficient  notion  of  a  Supreme  Being.  While  the  God  of 
Socrates  was  a  spiritual  Being  and  the  absolute  Creator  and 
Ruler  of  the  universe,  the  God  of  Anaxagoras  was  a  mechani- 

*  Three  Essays  on  Religion,  1874,  page  186. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  39 

cal  power,  a  mere  mover  of  the  matter,  a  purposeless  force, 
a  deus  ex  machina.  Nor  did  Anaxagoras  attribute  to  his 
god  any  moral  qualities.  This  was  done  first  by  Socrates, 
who  considered  God  a  supreme  judge  and  .lawgiver,  an 
adorable  Being  that  can  be  worshiped  only  by  love,  good- 
ness and  dutifulness. 

In  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  Socrates  referred  to  the 
structure  of  the  organized  living  beings ;  the  parts  of  their 
organisms  are  so  adapted  and  subserve  so  well  to  the  whole, 
that  one  can  not  help  to  pronounce  it  the  work  of  a  supreme 
wisdom,  called  God.* 

Plato,  the  disciple  of  Socrates,  resumed  the  theological 
argument  of  his  master,  and  extended  its  application  to  the 
celestial  orbs.  The  rapidity  and  harmony  in  the  movement 
of  the  siderial  bodies  were  to  him  an  indisputable  evidence 
of  a  design  in  nature.  To  Plato,  God  was  the  consumma- 
tion of  goodness,  wisdom  and  of  all  moral  qualities.  But 
just  on  that  account  he  was  perplexed  by  the  question  :  If 
God  is  the  consummation  of  goodness,  purity  and  wisdom, 
why  does  he  allow  so  many  irregularities,  anomalies  and 
evils  to  take  place? 

In  solution  of  it,  he  held  that  the  evils  do  not  come  from 
God,  but  originate  from  the  primitive  matter,  which  was 
co-equal  with  God.  Inherent  in  that  primitive  matter  was 
a  tendency  to  irregularity,  disorder,  confusion,  chaotic 
changes  and  heavings  ;  but  it  was  God  who,  in  the  capacity 
of  a  world-builder,  forced  the  primitive  matter  into  that 
arrangement  of  harmony,  proportion  and  mathematical 
forms  and  relations  which  is  manifested  in  nature. 

Though  God  in  doing  so  was  actuated  by  mere  goodness, 
which  is  essential  to  his  nature,  being  merely  the  architect 

*  Xenophon's  Memorabil.,  I.,  4. 


10  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

a  ml  not  the  world-creator,  he  could  not  succeed  in  forcing 
the  matter  so*  entirely  as  to  make  all  irregularities  im- 
possible. Such  a  forcing  would  have  destroyed  the  nature 
of  the  primitive  matter;  hence  the  evils  and  the  blind 
necessity  in  the  world. 

Plato's  disciple,  Aristotle,  did  not  treat  of  the  moral 
nature  of  God  at  all.  God  was  to  him  an  object  of  the 
greatest  interest  to  reflection  and  speculation.  He  regarded 
only  the  metaphysical  wants  of  man.  Plato  considered 
goodness,  while  Aristotle  considered  reasoning,  as  the 
prime  attribute  of  God.  It  was  one  of  the  dogmas  of 
Aristotle  that  God  and  nature  do  not  do  anything  in  vain.* 
He  considered  the  world  an  eternal  system,  in  which  matter 
and  form  have  always  been  operating ;  but  the  first  impulse 
to  that  operation  came  from  without,  from  an  intelligent, 
immaterial,  perfect  Being.  He  did  not  consider  God  the 
creator  of  the  world  Having  given  merely  the  first  impulse 
to  the  inert  matter  to  come  into  motion,  his  relation  to  the 
world  was  that  of  a  mere  regulator,  keeping  the  world  in 
order  and  harmony. f 

God  can  not  be  made  responsible  for  the  evils,  anomalies 
and  irregularities  in  nature,  as  he  has  given  merely  the 
impulse  to  nature  to  work,  and  has  not  created  it;  and 
consequently,  Aristotle  accounted  in  this  way  for  the  failures 
and  shortcomings  in  nature. 

In  a  moral  respect,  Plato's  conception  of  God  as  a  con- 
summation of  goodness  stands  higher  than  that  of  Aristotle, 
while  metaphysically  Aristotle's  conception  of  him,  as 
bring  independent  of  matter,  conforms  more  nearly  to 

*  De  Ca-lo,  I.,  4. 
tMetaphy.,  XII.,10. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  41 


the  perfection  of  a  supreme  Being  than  to   the  Platonic 
God-architect  or  matter-shaper. 

The  teleological  arguments  of  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle had  a  great  effect  upon  the  popular  belief  of  their 
contemporaries.  Just  as  the  ethical  teachings  of  Socrates 
were  a  death-knell  to  the  fallacies  and  caviling .  of  the 
sophists,  so  was  also  the  teleological  argumentation  of 
Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  a  severe  blow  to  the  atomistic 
theory,  according  to  which  blind  force,  the  concurrence  of 
atoms  and  the  fortunate  chance  had,  in  a  long  series  of 
combinations,  brought  about  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
universe. 

The  teleological  arguments  of  Socrates  and  Plato  were  to 
carry  the  monotheistic  conviction  into  the  minds  of  the 
Greeks. 

The  atomistic  theory  is  nothing  but  an  absurdity. 
Granted  that  the  improbable  event  should  have  happened 
and  a  fortunate  chance  should  have  brought  about  some 
reasonable  effects,  would  it  not  be  utterly  absurd  to  think 
that  the  endless  variety  of  wonderful  phenomena  and  of 
•reasonable  effects  owes  its  existence  to  a  fortunate  chance? 
And  would  it  not  be  equally  absurd  to  think  that  mere 
chance  and  blind  force  can  keep  and  sustain  the  world  in 
such  an  order  and  harmony  as  it  really  is? 

The  atomistic  hypothesis  of  Democrit,  Lucretius,  Holbach, 
Diderot  and  others  ,  has  been  disowned  and  declared  absurd 
by  the  representatives  of  the  modern  school  of  atomists. 
Its  greatest  authority,  Professor  Fechner,  maintains:  "The 
atoms  themselves  do  not  contain  anything  of  space,  time, 
law  and  spirit,  nor  can  they  produce  anything  of  this  kind ; 
but  they  owe  their  existence  to  their  relation  to  and  connec- 
tion witli  the  Eternal  Mind,  and  by  means  of  this  relation 
and  connection  they  form  existences.  *  *  *  Our  theory 


42  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


of  atoms  explaining  the  formation  of  the  phenomena  does 
not  hinder  us  from  assuming  an  absolute  Being,  whose 
essence  is  the  oneness,  combining  and  connecting  all.  This 
r;j«  mi/iVwiMiwM*  i*  no  idle  fancy,  but  it  is  the  ground  of  all 
real  being.  Above  all  changeable  causes  there  must  be  an 
eternal,  unchangeable  cause ;  above  all  dead  rules  and  laws 
there  must  be  a  pulse  of  life ;  above  all  finite  aims  there 
must  be  an  ultimate,  eternal,  highest  aim."  * 

The  same  opinion  is  also  entertained  by  Dr.  Lotze, 
another  great  representative  of  the  modern  school  of 
atomists. 

The  atomists  of  old,  as  a  matter  of  course,  have  disputed 
that  there  is  a  design  in  nature;  nay,  the  Roman  poet, 
Lucretius,  advanced  the  opinion  that  the  theory  of  final 
causes  inverts  the  order  of  causes  and  effects,  so  that  the 
effects  are  taken  for  the  causes  and  vice  versa.  His  words 
read:  "But  before  all,  be  on  your  guard  against  too  com- 
mon an  error — believe  not  that  the  shining  orb  of  our  eyes 
has  only  been  created  to  procure  for  us  the  sight  of  objects  ; 
that  these  legs  and  these  movable  thighs  have  only  been 
reared  on  the  basis  of  the  feet  to  give  greater  extent  to  our 
paces;  that  the  arms,  in  fine,  have  only  been  formed  of 
solid  muscle  and  terminated  by  the  right  and  left  hands, 
to  be  ministers  of  our  want  and  of  our*  preservation.  By 
such  interpretation  the  respective  order  of  effects  and 
causes  has  been  reversed.  Our  members  have  not  been 
made  for  our  use,  but  we  have  made  use  of  them  because 
we  have  found  them  made.  Sight  did  not  precede  the 
eyes;  the  words  were  not  formed  before  the  tongue—- 
on the  contrary,  language  followed  long  after  the  origin 


*  Die  Physikalische  Atoinenlehre.,  64,  1BG. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  43 

of  that  organ ;  the  ears  existed  long  before  sound  was 
heard,  and  all  our  members  long  before  we  made  use  of 
them."  * 

This  theory  of  Lucretius  is,  in  principle,  the  same  as  that 
of  the  modern  materialists,  who,  like  Dr.  Buechner  (Gottes- 
begriff,  page  25),  say  :  "  The  stag  has  not  long  legs  in  order 
to  run  fast,  but  he  runs  fast  because  he  has  long  legs ;  or, 
as  others  say,  the  ducks  have  not  palmated  feet  in  order  to 
swim,  but  they  swim  because  they  have  palmated  feet." 

All  these  views  do  not  prove  anything  against  the  design 
proper  in  nature.  The  truth  is  the  eyes  see,  the  legs  walk, 
the  hands  work,  the  palmipeds  swim,  because  it  is  the 
immanent  finality  of  these  organs  and  because  it  is  their 
natural  function.  Consequently,  man  does  not  speak  be- 
cause he  has  invented  language,  but  because  speaking  is 
the  natural  function  of  the  respective  organs.  Every  organ 
has  its  end  in  itself,  though  with  regard  to  the  whole  it  is 
often  only  a  means.  This  is  the  idea  of  the  eternal  design, 
or  the  immanent  finality. 

Intervals  between  the  origin  of  the  organs  and  their 
functions,  are  no  ends  in  themselves,  but  they  are  the  occa- 
sions and  the  states  necessary  for  the  qualification  of  the 
organs  for  their  functions.  Had  the  creatures  arisen  of 
themselves,  the  materialists  would  be  right  in  asserting 
that  the  organs  of  their  bodies  can  make  only  that  use  of 
themselves  which  their  inherent  faculty  incidentally  allows  ; 
but  being  created  by  a  supreme  Intelligence,  there  is  a 
design  inherent  in  them,  and  that  design  is  manifested  in 
their  natural  function. 

Notable  are  the  views  of  Baron  de  Verulam  on  the  final 

*  De  Rerum  Natura,  324. 


44  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


causes.  They  are  memorable,  not  merely  because  he  is  the 
father  of  the  experimental  and  inductive  methods  prevalent 
in  modern  physical  sciences,  but  because  he  has  been  mis- 
represented by  a  great  many  as  having  denied  the  finality 

in  nature. 

Bacon  approved  of  the  classification  into  four  kinds  of 
causes— the  material,  the  efficient,  the  formal  and  the  final, 
made  by  Aristotle— but  he  was  opposed  to  the  substitution 
of  the  final  for  the  efficient  causes  and  to  the  false  notion 
arising  from  it,  which  he  styled  "  the  idols  of  the  tribe."  * 

Bacon  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  final  causes  in 
nature;  he  only  compares  them  to  "vestal  virgins,  not 
productive  indeed  but  dedicated  to  God."  Causarumfinalium 
slerilis  est  et  tnnquam  virgo  Deo  consecrata  nihil  parit.  He 
meant  to  say  they  ought  to  be  excluded  from  the  study  of 
physical  sciences,  and  to  be  assigned  a  place  in  metaphys- 
ics. The  reason  he  had  was  that,  the  study  of  final  causes 
in  physics  diverts  the  attention  from  the  efficient  causes,  to 
the  great  disadvantage  of  natural  science,  f 

The  office  of  natural  science  is  the  investigation  of  the 
phenomena  of  nature  in  all  their  relations  and  constituents  ; 
but  this,  he  thought,  could  be  done  thoroughly  only  in  the 
light  of  efficient  and  physical  causes. 

Dr.  William  Whewell,  the  author  •  of  the  masterwork, 
':  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,"  is  more  competent 
than  Bacon  was  to  decide  whether  the  study  of  final  causes 
is  really  disadvantageous  to  the  study  of  physical  sciences. 
His  opinion  is  that  the  study  of  final  causes  is  not  only  not 
disadvantageous  to  natural  science*,  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 

*  Novum  Organum,  II.,  2;  I.,  39-45. 
t  De  Aug.  Scientiarium,  III.,  4. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  45 

"almost  all  great  discoveries  which  have  been  made*  in 
physiology  have  been  made  by  the  assumption  of  a  purpose 
in  animal  structures.* 

Of  the  same  opinion  is  also  Professor  Dr.  Noah  Porter. 
«  *  *  *  Final  cause  is  so  far  from  being  barren  that  she 
deserves  to  be  honored  the  Alma  Mater  of  the  inductive 
philosophy  itself."  f  In  corroboration  of  this  assertion, 
Professor  Porter  furnishes  evidences  from  mathematics, 
psychology,  goology,  paleontology,  anthropology,  ethics,  etc. 

Descartes,  though  he  did  not  deny  the  existence  of  design 
in  nature,  did  not  approve  of  Bacon's  view  to  relegate  the 
study  of  final  causes  to  the  domain  of  metaphysics ;  and 
he  opposed  the  study  of  the  design  altogether,  for  two 
reasons :  In  the  first  place,  man  is  not  competent  to  find 
out  exactly  what  the  real  design  is  ;  and  secondly,  the  study 
of  final  causes  leads  man  to  the  anthropocentric  view,  con- 
sidering himself  the  end  of  the  whole  creation.  * 

But  Descartes  qualified  his  opinion  when  the  semi- 
materialist  Gassendi,||  with  reference  to  instances  like  the 
wonderful  arrangement  of  the  valves  of  the  heart,  con- 
fronted him  with  a  dilemma  either  to  admit  that  there  is 
finality  in  nature  recognizable,  or  to  declare  frankly  that 
there  is  no  Providence. 

Boyle  wrote  to  Descartes :  "  Suppose  that  a  peasant, 
entering  in  broad  daylight  the  garden  of  a  famous  mathe- 
matician, finds  there  one  of  those  gnomonic  instruments 
which  indicate  the  position  of  the  sun  in  the  Zodiac,  its 
declination  from  the  equator,  the  day  of  the  month,  the 
length  of  the  day,  etc. ;  it  would  no  doubt  be  a  great  'pre- 

*  Volume  II.  t  Human  Intellect,  §  618.  i  Princip.,  III.,  2;  Med.,  IV. 
II  Objections  a  la  4th  Medita. 


•4(5  AlKil'MKNTK    FOR   THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


sumption  on  his  part,  ignorant  alike  of  mathematical 
science  and  of  the  intentions  of  the  artist,  to  believe  himself 
capable  of  discovering  all  the  ends  in  view,  for  which  this 
machine,  so  curiously  wrought,  has  been  constructed ;  but 
when  he  remarks  that  it  is  furnished  with  an  index,  with 
lines  and  honorary  numbers— in  short,  with  all  that  con- 
stitutes a  sun-dial,  and  sees  the  shadow  of  the  index 
mark  in  succession  the  hours  of  the  day,  there  would  be 
on  his  part  as  little  presumption  as  error  in  concluding 
that  this  instrument,  whatever  may  be  its  other  uses,  is 
certainly  a  dial,  made  to  show  the  hours." 

The  first  of  the  modern  metaphysicians  who  denied 
decidedly  and  entirely  the  finality  in  nature,  was  Benedict 
Spinoza.  He  approved  fully  of  all  the  objections  raised 
si  gainst  the  design  theory  by  the  Roman  poet,  Lucretius 
but  he  did  not  deny,  as  the  atomists  did,  the  existence  of  a 
first  cause. 

With  stern  logic  his  negation  of  the  finality  in  nature 
followed  from  his  system,  according  to  which  all  that  exists 
has  to  exist  by  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  God,  from 
which  it  issues,  irrespective  of  the  effects,  whether  bene- 
ficial or  noxious. 

Spinoza's  system  deals  only  with  causes,  but  not  with 
ends,  and  especially  not  with  well-reasoned  ends,  as  God, 
the  cause  of  all,  is,  according  to  Spinoza,  no  free  Being,  but 
a  substance,  producing  all  by  the  necessity  of  its  nature — 
ex  necessitate  naturae. 

A  refutation  of  Spinoza's  negation  of  finality  presupposes 
a  refutation  of  his  whole  substance-theory.  His  denial  of 
the  design-theory  gave  an  impulse  to  the  study  of  teleology, 
which,  since  the  days  of  Spinoza  down  to  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century,  was  a  paramount  subject  of  inquiry  in 
the  school  of  the  English  deists. 


'    THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  47 


Edward  Herbert,  John  Tolant,  Anthony  Collins,  Shaftes- 
bury,  Bolingbroke,  Pope,  and  others,  held  that  the  goodness, 
wisdom  and  power  manifested  in  nature  were  irrefutable 
evidences  of  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being. 

Unlike  the  orthodox  theologians,  who  saw  the  finger  of 
God  especially  manifested  in  the  perturbations  of  nature,  in 
the  appalling  events  of  history  and  in  the  deficiencies  of 
human  life,  the  English  deists  revered,  on  the  contrary,  the 
finger  of  God  in  the  great  harmony,  order  and  wisdom 
displayed  everywhere  in  nature. 

This  tendency  of  the  deists  was  productive  of  excellent 
works  on  natural  theology,  tracing  the  vestiges  of  a  design 
in  the  construction  of  the  creatures,  the  adaptation  of  the 
parts  to  the  whole,  and  in  the  provision  for  the  existence- 
and  regeneration  of  the  organized  beings.  Among  the  best 
deistical  writers  on  teleology  of  that  epoch  were  Henry 
More,  Ralph  Cudworth,  Robert  Boyle,  John  Ray,  Nehemiah 
Green,  William  Derham,  and  others. 

Spinoza's  disteleology  agitated  also  the  German  scholars. 
Christian  Wolf  and  Herman  Samuel  Reimarus  wrote  ex- 
cellent works  on  the  design  in  nature. 

Of  ho  little  interest  is  Voltaire's  article,  "Causes  Finales," 
in  his  "Dictipnair  Philosophique."  Like  all  ^deists,  Vol- 
taire was  a  decided  finalist.  As  the  infallible  criterion  of 
the  real  end  for  which  a  cause  acts  is  the  taking  place  of 
that  effect  at  all  times  and  in  all  places  (Pour  qu'on  puisse 
s'assurer  de  la  fin  veritable  pcur  laquelle  une  caXise  agit, 
il  fault  que  cet  effet  soit  de  tous  les  temps  et  de  tous  lee 
lieux)— for  instance  :  It  can  not  be  said  that  the  ocean  has 
been  made  for  vessels,  for  there  have  not  been  vessels  at  all 
times  and  on  all  seas — it  would  be  ridiculous  to  think 
that  nature  had  had  in  view,  from  the  earliest  times,  the 
adjusting  itself  to  our  inventions,  which  are  only  of  a  later- 


-4.S  ARGUMENTS  FOK  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

<l;ite.  It  is  very  evident  that  if  noses  have  not  been  made 
to  beur  spectacles,  they  have  been  made  for  smelling;  and 
it  is  equally  evident  that  there  have  been  noses  ever  since 
there  have  been  men.  It  is  also  evident  that  man's  hands 
were  not  designed  merely  to  wear  gloves ;  they  are  designed 
to  do  all  that  their  joints,  muscles,  forms  and  forces  enable 
them  to  do. 

In  the  examinations  of  the  metaphysics  of  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  and  M.  Leibnitz,  Voltaire,  in  the  course  of  his 
.argumentation  for  the  intelligent  personality  of  .the  Deity, 
*ays,  with  respect  to  Newton's  proof  of  the  Divine  existence  : 
••  Sir  Isaac's  philosophy  necessarily  leads  to  the  knowledge 
<»f  a  Supreme  Being,  who  has  created  and  disposed  every- 
thing freely.  For  if,  according  to  him,  and  indeed  accord- 
ing to  the  reason  of  things,  the  world  is  finite  ;  if  there  is  a 
vacuum,  matter  does  not  then  exist;  and,  if  so,  it  must 
receive  its  existence  from  a  free  cause.  If  matter  gravitates, 
as  it  has  been  plainly  demonstrated  that  it  does,  it  does  not 
.gravitate  by  its  own  nature,  and  must,  therefore,  have  re- 
ceived its  gravitation  from  God.  If  the  planets  move  in  one 
direction  rather  than  in  another,  in  an  unresisting  space, 
the  hand  of  the  Creator  has  then  ordered  their  courses  in 
this  direction  with  an  absolute  freedom.* 

When  the  French  mathematician  and  natural  philosopher, 
Moreau  Maupertius,  dared,  in  his  "  Essai  de  Cosmologie" 
( 1751),  to  dispute  Newton's  eutaxiological  and  teleological 
views,  and  would  prove  the  existence  of  God  by  the  oblate- 
ness  of  the  spheroidal  form  of  the  earth  and  by  the  motion 
of  the  matter,  which  must  be  caused  by  a  motor,  Voltaire 
ridiculed  him  and  made  him  smart  under  the  most  unmerci- 
ful lashes  of  his  sarcasm. 

*  Voltaire,  Ouvres,  Vol.  13. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  49 

Regarding  the  attempt  of  Maupertius  to  disprove  the 
teleology  and  eutaxiology  of  Isaac  Newton,  Professor 
L.  E.  Hicks  thinks  :  "  Maupertius'  criticisms  simply  show 
that  he  did  not  comprehend.  He  thought  that  Newton 
claimed  a  uniformity  of  animal  structure  throughout,  and 
so  away  he  goes  on  a  false  scent,  comparing  an  eagle  with  a 
tiy,  a  stag  with  a  snail,  etc.,  to  overthrow  the  idea  of 
uniformity."  * 

A  new  phase  in  the  history  of  the  teleological  argument 
commenced  with  the  great  metaphysician,  Emanuel  Kant, 
His  work,  "The  Structure  of  the  Universe  and  the  Theory 
of  Heavens,"  published  1755,  treats  on  the  nebular  theory 
in  the  manner  in  which  it  was  promulgated  at  the  same  time 
by  La  Place  in  France.  Kant  contested,  in  the  book  men- 
tioned, the  orthodox  view  that  the  design  was  the  work  of 
any  exterior  forces  or  of  a  being  that  interceded  in  a  mirac- 
ulous manner.  He  expressed  the  idea  that  the  universe  devel- 
oped, evolved  and  perfected  itself  by  means  of  a  principle 
operating  from  within,  inherent  in  the  matter.  He  says : 
<'  One  obtains  a  higher  idea  of  the  Divine  activity  if  one  con- 
siders nature  an  orderly  whole,  producing  by  means  of  its 
own  laws  all  that  is  beautiful  and  to  a  purpose,  than  if  one 
thinks  that  the  general  laws  of  nature  are  productive  only 
of  disorder,  and  that  the  design  in  nature  must  be  derived 
from  a  miraculous  intervention  of  God." 

Kant  speaks  of  teleology  in  a  strain  of  high  enthusiasm ; 
and  all  that  he,  later  (1781),  in  the  "Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,"  could  advance  against  the  teleological  proof  was, 
that  the  vestiges  of  design  in  nature  do  not  warrant  the 
assumption  that  God  is  also  the  Creator  of  the  world  ex 


*  Hicks'  Critique  of  Design  Arguments,  204-205. 


50  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


iiihilo  ;  and  that  our  finite  experience  does  not  warrant  the 
assumption  of  God's  being  infinite  and  all-wise. 

These  two  objections  raised  by  Kant  against  the  teleologi- 
cal argument  do  not  concern  the  question  proper  at  all. 
They  have  no  direct  connection  with  teleological  proof  and 
arc,  consequently,  entirely  out  of  place.  Kant  admits  that 
logically  it  can  be  inferred  only  that  God  is  the  world- 
architect,  but  not  the  Creator.  Well  and  good.  Suppose 
God  is  only  the  world-architect,  by  what  logic  can  it  be 
inferred  that  on  that  account  there  can  be  no  design  in 
nature?  Plato,  although  he  did  not  believe  in  a  creation 
ex  nihilo,  and  was  the  first  to  advance  the  idea  that  God  is 
merely  the  Architect  who  made  the  world  of  the  matter 
which  he  did  not  create,  was  for  all  that  a  zealous  defender 
of  the  teleological  proof.  While  Socrates  showed  the  evi- 
dences of  design  merely  in  man — the  microcosmos — he, 
Plato,  pointed  to  its  evidences  also  in  the  siderial  world — 
the  macrocosmos. 

Despite  his  attempt  to  disprove  the  teleological  argument, 
Kant  could  not  help  speaking  of  it  with  respect;  designating 
it  a  proof  clear  and  most  conformed  to  the  common  sense 
of  mankind.  Besides  this,  Kant  considered  this  argument 
of  great  interest  to  the  study  of  natural  sciences,  as  it 
induces  man  to  study  nature  to  try  to  find  the  ends  of  the 
phenomena  and  their  construction. 

The  ideas  of  Kant  which  mark  a  new  phase  in  the  history 
of  teleology,  were  promulgated  first  in  1790  in  the  "  Critique 
of  the  Faculty  of  Judgment."  His  object  in  writing  this 
work,  as  he  communicated  in  1787  to  his  disciple,  Reinhold, 
in  a  letter,  was  :  ''  I  am  busy  with  writing  a  critique  of  the 
faculty  of  judgment,  in  which  there  is  to  be  set  forth  an 
entirely  new  principle  a  priori.  Man's  mind  has  three 
faculties — that  of  cognition,  of  feeling,  pleasure  and  of 


THE  TELEOLOUICAL  ARGUMENT.  51 


desire.  The  faculties  of  cognition  are  treated  of  in  the 
'  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.'  The  faculties  of  desire  I  have 
discussed  in  the  '  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason.'  The 
faculties  of  the  feeling  of  pleasure  I  was  also  seeking  to 
bring  into  a  system,  but  it  seemed  to  me  at  first  an  im- 
possible thing  till,  in  the  course  of  my  study,  I  was  led  in 
the  right  way  and  was  prepared  for  the  work.  Now  I  dis- 
tinguish three  parts  in  philosophy — the  theoretical,  the 
practical  and  the  teleological — each  one  of  which  is  a 
way  to  arrive  at  truth,  and  has  its  own  principles  a  priori, 
The  teleological  is  the  most  neglected  of  them  all."  * 

It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  "  Critique  of  the  Facul- 
ties of  Judgment"  is  the  best  book  that  Kant  has  written. 
His  preceding  works  manifest  a  giant  intellect  and  a  great 
philosophical  genius ;  but  for  the  disquisitions  they  contain, 
he  found  the  material  in  the  works  of  his  predecessors, 
while  "the  Critique  of  the  Faculty  of  Judgment "  is  in  every 
respect  an  original  work.  He  conceived  not  only  the  very 
idea  of  it,  but  he  had  also  to  espy  the  material  and  to  de- 
vise the  terms  used  in  it.  This  is  also  the  reason  why  this 
book  is  so  extremely  abstruse,  and  why  it  is  so  difficult  to 
comprehend  the  sense  of  so  many  passages.  * 

The  main  object  of  the  "  Critique  of  the  Faculty  of 
Judgment "  was  to  investigate  whether  and  to  what  extent 
there  is  design  in  nature  conceivable  and  discernible. 

Kant  starts  with  the  a  priori  conception  that  there  is  in 
nature  a  supersensuous  oneness,  the  ground  and  the  reality 
of  the  diversity  of  natural  phenomena,  and  the  principle 
embracing  and  permeating  them  all. 

The  supersensible  oneness  is  specified  in  the  natural  laws, 

*  Brief e,  XI.,  86. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


empirical  forces  and  particular  phenomena.  The  specify- 
ing act  of  that  oneness  is  called  the  "law  of  specification,'' 
and  it  is  merely  through  this  law  that  man  can  form  a  con- 
ception of  the  phenomena.  Without  it,  the  Proteus-like 
nature  would  be  like  fleeting  clouds  without  any  phenomena 
of  constant  forms  and  distinct  character,  unfit  to  be  system- 
atized and  grouped  into  species  or  subjected  to  rules. 

In  our  age  all  possible  attention  is  given  to  the  variation 
of  species,  and  it  is  only  too  often  forgotten  that  there  is 
constancy  of  species,  of  which  Alexander  von  Humboldt  says  : 
"The  potatoes  which  grow  in  Chili  11,000  feet  above  the 
level  of  the  sea,  have  the  same  kind  of  blossoms  as  those 
have  which  are  raised  in  the  plains  of  Siberia.  The  barley 
with  which  the  horses  of  the  Artides  were  fed,  was  of  the 
same  kind  we  are  harvesting.  The  ibis-gourd  in  the  Egyp- 
tian catacombs,  among  the  snakes  and  insect  mummies, 
and  which  is,  perhaps,  older  than  the  pyramids,  i-*  of  the 
species  existing  at  present  on  the  banks  of  the  Egyptian 
rivers."  * 

The  "  law  of  specification"  acts  foriuitously  in  its  forma- 
tions. There  is  no  reason  known  to  man  why  there  are, 
for  instance,  just  certain  trees  and  why  they  have  just  that 
form  and  not  another  one.  But  the  "  law  of  the  constancy 
of  species"  shows  a  conformity  to  rules,  otherwise  no 
species  could  exist. 

This  shows  that  every  phenomenon  has  a  relation  to  the 
universal,  general  rule,  which  again,  being  the  ground  and 
the  reality  of  that  phenomenon,  must  be  considered  its 
finality.  In  other  words,  the  conformity  of  products 
to  the  "law  of  constancy  of  species,"  brought  about  acci- 

*  Apelt,  Die  Epochen  der  Geschich.  d.  Menschheit. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 


dentally  by  the  "law  of  specification,"  is  what  must  be 
considered  as  a  design  in  nature. 

Among  the  formations  and  products  of  nature  there  are 
so  many  which  seem  to  have  been  purposely  adapted  to 
make  a  good  effect  upon  our  faculty  of  judgment.  This 
good  effect  is  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  which  was  singled  out 
by  Kant  as  a  way  to  arrive  at  the  cognition  of  the  real 
designs.  This  theory  of  the  feelings  of  pleasure  has  nothing 
in  common  with  the  theoretical  or  the  practical  reason.  It 
is  called  by  Kant  the  aesthetical  taste  or  the  faculty  of 
judgment. 

Kant  assumes  a  two-fold  faculty  of  judgment:  the 
{esthetic  faculty  or  the  subjective  explanation,  and  the 
teleological  faculty  or  the  objective  explanation. 

A  subject  will,  before  we  have  yet  formed  a  right  concep- 
tion of  it,  impress  us  delightfully  or  painfully.  This  is  the 
testhetical  faculty  of  judgment,  and  shows  that  the  forms  of 
the  objects  are  adapted  to  the  aesthetical  judgment  of  man. 
Nature  must  control  his  cognitive  faculties. 

The  teleological  faculty  means  the  capability  of  man  to 
ascertain  that  there  is  design  in  the  form  of  an  object.  This 
subjective  design  is  again  subdivided  into  an  external  and 
internal  finality. 

The  external  design  means  the  usefulness  or  fitness  of 
one  subject  for  another  one.  For  instance,  the  fitness  of 
certain  kinds  of  food  for  certain  species  of  animals,  or  the 
fitness  of  certain  soils  for  certain  kinds  of  plants.  This 
kind  of  design  is  external,  because  it  is  not  the  end  in  itself, 
but  is  merely  instrumental  to  adaptation  and  conformity. 

The  internal  design,  or  the  immanent  finality,  means  the 
design  in  the  parts  of  the  organized  beings.  The  organic 
products  of  nature  are  so  constituted  that  every  part  of  the 
organism  exists  for  its  own  sake  and  has  its  end  in  itself. 


:>4  Auiir.MKNTS    FOR    THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 

Often  its  end  is  to  serve  also  the  whole,  and  then  it  may  be 
the  end  and  the  means  simultaneously. 

The  organized  products  of  nature  do  not  possess,  like  a 
machine,  only  moving  power,  but  they  are  distinguished  by 
the  formative  or  organizing  power  assimilating  all  they 
take  in  from  the  outside  world  ;  by  the  reproductive  power 
perpetuating  the  kind,  and  the  reparative  power,  by  means 
of  which  nature,  being  the  physician,  helps  itself. 

The  external  design  may  be  explained  by  mechanical 
and  physical  causes,  but  the  eternal  design  never.  The 
eternal  design,  or  the  immanent  finality,  being  a  natural 
organization,  can  be  explained  only  ideologically,  that  is  to 
say,  it  is  under  the  guidance  of  the  principle  of  final  causes. 

This  theory  of  an  internal  finality,  being  a  real  law  of 
nature  and  not  merely  a  subjunctive  view,  does  not  exclude 
the  existence  of  an  ultimate  cause,  but  it  presupposes  it. 
Kant  called  this  cause  the  iniellectm  archetypus,  which  knows 
the  whole  by  way  of  intuition,  and  has  not  to  start,  like  man, 
in  a  discursive  way,  from  parts,  advancing  gradually  to  the 
cognition  of  the  whole. 

The  theory  of  an  "  internal  finality,"  some  think,  is  not 
compatible  with  the  view  of  a  transcendental  cause.  They 
are  mistaken  in  so  thinking.  The  terms  transcendence  and 
immanence  are  opposites  only  to  a  certain  degree,  but  not 
totally.  The  idea  of  a  cause,  above  and  distinct  from 
nature,  does  not  exclude  the  notion  of  a  cause  immanent 
at  the  same  time  in  nature;  nor  does  the  doctrine  that 
nature  is  endowed  with  internal  activity  and  that  it  works 
with  design,  contain  anything  that  was  exclusive  of  a 
supermundane  cause. 

The  theory  of  transcendence  implies  something  of  im- 
manence, and  the  theory  of  immanence  contains  vestiges  of 


THE-  TELEOLOGIGAL  ARGUMENT.  55 

transcendence,  so  that  God,  the  Supreme  Cause,  can  well  be 
conceived  at  once,  outside  of  nature. 

The  Bible  itself  teaches  that  God  is  above  and  distinct 
from  nature,  and  at  the  same  time  it  teaches  that  he  is  present 
in  all,  knowing  all,  working  through  all  and  connected 
with  all. 

Even  the.  pantheists,  who  identify  God  and  nature — the 
causes  and  the  effects,  the  noumen  and  the  phenomena — 
make  a  distinction  between  the  things  and  individuals,  and 
their  causes  and  reasons. 

The  cause  of  the  individuals  is  not  in  them,  but  in  the 
species,  which  always  remain,  though  the  individuals  pass 
away ;  and  again,  the  cause  of  the  species  is  the  archetype, 
constituting  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms,  and  the 
cause  of  these  archetypes  must  be  sought  in  the  idea  of  life. 
Having  set  forth,  with  all  the  force  and  cogency  of  his 
logic,  the  theory  of  the  internal  finality,  Kant  made  the 
•surprivsing  remark  that  there  is  no  way  of  proving  that  the 
design  in  nature  was  produced  intentionally.  A  more 
gifted  mind  than  man's,  which  would  not  necessarily  have 
to  investigate  into  nature,  by  a  discursive  way,  proceeding 
from  parts  to  the  comprehension  of  the  whole,  but  which, 
by  way  of  intuition,  would  know  the  phenomena  of  the 
world  in  all  their  relation  and  succession,  might  find  that 
nature,  or  the  •intellectus  archetypus,  was  not  guided  by  a 
design  in  the  formation  and  production  of  the  phenomena. 
This  opinion  of  Kant,  presenting  the  internal  finality  of 
nature  as  a  mere  subjective  view  of  the  human  mind,  must 
be  taken  as  his  personal  view,  and  is  a  hypothesis  contrary 
to  the  facts  and  evidences  he  advanced  in  support  of  the 
internal  finality. 

The   internal   design   theory  is  indisputably  established 
and  proved  as  a  law  of  nature,  and,  consequently,  it  pre- 


56  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


supposes  u  designer.  When  the  existence  of  a  design  is 
proved,  the  inference  of  the  existence  of  a  designer  is 
inevitable.  Kant  did  not  draw  this  inference,  because,  in 
so  doing,  he  would  have  given  up  his  consistency  in  the 
appliance  of  a  principle  which  forms  the  main  peculiarity 
of  his  criticism,  referring  all  and  everything  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  man. 

Until  Kant,  it  was  generally  believed  that  cognition  was 
dependent  upon  the  subjects  and  phenomena  of  the  world, 
but  he  was  the  first  to  hold  just  the  reverse,  that  the  cogni- 
tion was  dependent  upon  the  mode  of  human  thought. 

This  theory  of  his  own  he  applied  to  the  fullest  extent  in 
his  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  where  he  makes  the  cognition 
dependent  upon  the  categories  of  the  human  mind. 

Now,  for  consistency's  sake,  and  to  establish  that  theory 
of  his  own  by  as  many  cases  as  he  thought  fit,  he,  at  the 
end  of  his  philosophical  researches,  and  in  contradiction 
to  facts  and  evidences  he  had  previously  advanced, 
assumed  that  the  "  design  in  nature  "  was  only  a  mode  of 
the  human  mind. 

This  hypothesis  of  Kant  was  contested  by  the  great 
philosopher,  Herbart,  a  very  decided  advocate  of  the  validity 
of  the  teleological  argument.  If,  says  Herbart,  finality  in 
nature  was  nothing  else  but  a  mere  necessary  sense- 
intuition,  for  instance,  like  space  and  time,  then  it  would 
also  be  applicable  tp  all  things  as  it  is  with  time  and  space. 

This  is  not  the  case.  Besides  that,  if  the  finality  is  merely 
the  sense  of  necessary  convenience  of  the  arrangement  of 
nature,  then  why  is  it  made  evident  only  in  certain  cases? 
Why  not  in  all  cases?  Why  can  we  not  account  by  it  for 
many  a  mechanical  regularity?  Why  does  that  mode  of 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  57 

mind  not  also  guide  us  reliably  in  the  field  of  mechanics 
and  technics?* 

Herbart's  criticism  of  Kant's  hypothesis  of  the  sub- 
jectivity of  design,  was  resumed  and  continued  by  the 
modern  Aristotelian,  Friedrich  Adolph  Trendelnburg.f 
His  criticism  is,  in  essence,  as  follows:  Kant's  reasoning 
was  wrong  in  believing  that  nothing  that  is  subjective  could 
also  be  objective,  and  vice  versa.  Kant  thought  the  finality 
was  necessary,  in  order  to  reduce  the  phenomena  to  rules  ; 
but  if  the  finality  was  merely  of  a  subjective  character,  then 
it  is  the  reverse  of  the  efficient  causes,  and  must  be  a  source 
of  confusion  and  distortion  of  realities. 

The  theory  of  the  internal  finality  of  Kant  was  resumed 
and  developed  by  Hegel,  whose  teachings  regarding  it  were 
reduced,  by  Professor  Janet  J  and  by  Dr.  I.  S.  Diman,§ 
to  the  three  fundamental  points  : 

1.  "  There  are  final  causes  in  nature,  and  not  only  so,  but 
the  final  cause  is  the  sole  veritable  cause,  for  it  alone  has  in 
itself  the  reason  of  its  own  determination.     The  domain  of 
efficient  causes  is  simply  that  of  blind  necessity. 

2.  "  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  conceive  the  final 
cause  in  the  form  which  it  assumes  in  human  consciousness, 
that  is,  an  anticipated  representation  of  the  end.    There  are 
two  ways  of  attaining  an  end — one  voluntary  and  the  result 
of  conscious  choice,  like  that  in  man ;  the  other  rational 
but  unconscious,  the  activity  of  nature. 

3.  u  The  finality  of  nature  is  immanent  and  internal  where 
the  cause,  the  means  and  the  end  are  simply  three  terms  of 

*  Einleitung  in  die  Philosop.,  Sect.  132. 

t  Logishe  Untersuchungen,  p.  47. 
t  Final  Causes,  334-335.     §  The  Theistic  Argument,  210. 


58  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

one  process,  the  cause  attaining  its  end,  without  going  out 
of  itself,  by  self-development.  In  nature  all  is  united  in  the 
same  principle— the  end  realizes  itself.  The  cause  attains 
its  end  by  self-development.  The  image  of  this  develop- 
ment is  in  the  seed  that  contains  the  whole  being  that  it 
was  to  realize.  It  attains  its  end  without  going  outside 
itself.  It  may  be  said  of  entire  nature  what  Kant  said  of 
the  organized  beings,  that  in  it  everything  is  reciprocally 
end  and  means.  Internal  finality  thus  becomes  immanent 
finality." 

Hegel  was  opposed  to  all  frivolous  criticism  passed  on 
the  proofs  of  the  Divine  existence  in  the  name  of  enlighten- 
ment, as  these  proofs  and  their  history  show  the  course  of 
elevation  and  progress  toward  God  which  the  human  mind 
took. 

Hegel  made  the  Kantian  "  internal  finality  "  instrumental 
in  refuting  Kant's  view  that  the  design  in  nature  warrants 
only  the  assumption  of  a  world-architect,  but  not  a  creator 
of  the  world  ex  nihilo.  Hegel  argued  :  %l  If  God  was  a  mere 
world-architect,  then  the  matter  he  had  to  shape  was  '  dead 
matter.'  Such  '  dead  matter '  is  not  imaginable,  as  it  would 
be  a  matter  without  the  properties  of  matter  constituting  it. 
These  properties  come  directly  from  God,  who  permeates 
and  encompasses  all."*  God  is,  consequently,  not  merely 
the  shaper,  but  at  the  same  time  the  creator  of  the  world. 

To  the  theory  of  the  immanent  finality,  Hegel  added  the 
doctrine  of  an  unconscious  finality,  which  achieves  in 
nature  definite  ends  without  any  conscious  choice  of  pur- 
poses ;  that  is  the  case,  for  instance,  in  the  animal  instinct 
of  bears,  beavers,  etc. 

*  Vorlesungen  ueber  die  Philos.  d.  Relig.,  II.,  pp.  29,  30,  1832. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  59 

Hegel's  "unconscious  finality"  does  not  involve  the 
negation  of  an  intelligent  creator.  It  is  only  a  mode  of 
final  activity  side  by  side  of  the  conscious  purpose. 

This  Hegelian  theory  of  the  unconscious  finality  was 
applied  by  Schoppenhauer  to  the  rise  and  formation  of  all 
phenomena,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  conscious  pur- 
pose. His  "will  theory"  is  an  unconscious  finality. 

Eduard  von  Hartman  combined  the  "  will  theory "  of 
Schoppenhauer  with  the  "  logical  idea "  of  Hegel,  and 
maintained  that  the  will  and  the  intelligence,  constituting 
the  substance  of  all  that  exists,  and  being  two  sides  of  one 
and  the  same  thing,  co-operate  in  nature  in  an  unconscious 
way.  The  whole  philosophy  of  the  unconscious  finality  is 
nothing  but  a  system  of  one-sidedness,  derived  from  the 
unconscious  finality,  which  Hegel  co-ordinated  to  the 
immanent  finality  of  Kant. 

In  the  "  Critique  of  the  Faculty  of  Judgment  "  (Sec.  75). 
Kant  makes  the  remark :  "  It  is  quite  sure  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  explain  organized  beings  and  their  internal 
faculties  in  the  light  of  the  mechanical  theory.  Boldly  and 
with  equal  certainty  it  may  be  maintained  that  it  is  absurd 
to  hope  a  new  Newton  will  one  day  be  able  to  explain  the 
production  of  a  blade  of  grass  by  natural  laws,  over  which 
no  design  has  presided.  Such  a  knowledge  must  absolutely 
be  denied  to  man."  Modern  monists,  like  Professor  Kirch- 
man  and  others,  think  that  Kant  was  grossly  mistaken,  and 
that  Darwin  is  that  new  Newton  who  explained  the  exist- 
ence of  organized  beings  by  mere  mechanical  principles  of 
nature. 

Those  who  have  compared  the  real  <(  evolution  idea  "  of 
Darwin  with  the  "  internal  finality  "  of  Kant  and  also  with 
the  "  immanent  finality  "  of  Hegel,  will  find  that  all  these 
theories  mean  essentially  the  same,  and  that  Darwinism, 


fiO  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

just  on  that  account,  can  not  be  pronounced  an  atheistic 
view. 

It  is  decidedly  false  to  hold  that  the  Darwinian  theory 
was  incompatible  with  design  in  nature ;  or  that  the  Dar- 
winian teachings  had  eliminated  once  for  all  every  objective 
basis  of  teleology. 

Darwinism  is,  generally  speaking,  to  the  present  day 
nothing  but  a  hypothesis,  all  assertions  of  its  enthusiastic 
votaries  to  the  contrary  nothwithstanding.  Darwinism  is 
to  the  present  day  so  much  a  hypothesis  that  despite 
all  that  has  been  said  and  written  in  its  behalf  the  following 
remarks  of  the  American  poet,  William  Cullen  Bryant,  de- 
serve consideration  :  "  But  allowing  all  that  Darwin  says  of 
the  consanguinity  of  man  and  of  the  inferior  animals,  ad- 
mitting that  we  are  of  the  same  flesh  and  blood  as  the  baboon 
and  the  rat,  where  does  he  find  his  proof  that  we  are  im- 
proving instead  of  degenerating  ?  He  claims  that  man  is 
an  improved  monkey ;  how  does  he  know  that  the  monkey 
is  not  a  degenerated  man,  a  decayed  branch  of  the  human 
family,  fallen  away  from  the  high  rank  he  once  held,  and 
haunted  by  a  dim  sentiment  of  his  lost  dignity,  as  we  may 
infer  from  his  melancholy  aspect?  Improvement  implies 
effort :  it  is  up-hill  work ;  degeneracy  is  easy  :  it  asks  only 
neglect,  indolence,  inaction  How  often  do  the  descendants 
of  illustrious  men  become  the  most  stupid  of  the  human 
race !  How  many  are  there,  each  of  whom  we  may  call 
'  The  tenth  transmitter  of  a  foolish  face ! '  and  that  face 
growing  more  and  more  foolish  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion. I  might  instance  the  Bourbon  family,  lately  reigning 
in  Spain  and  Naples.  I  might  instance  the  royal  family  of 
Austria.  There  is  a  whole  nation,  millions  upon  millions 
— our  Chinese  neighbors — of  whom  the  better  opinion  is  that 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  61 

they  have  been  going  backward  in  civilization  from  century 
to  century."* 

But  suppose  Darwinism  was  no  hypothesis.  Suppose,  for 
argument's  sake,  that  it  was  a  universal,  conclusive,  matter- 
of-fact  theory,  why  should  it  then  be  incompatible  with  de- 
sign, and  why  should  it  then  exclude  final  cause? 

Darwinism  is  a  system  of  principles,  and  as  such,  whether 
of  a  progressive  or  degenerating  tendency,  it  implies  a 
method,  a  plan,  and  consequently  a  design.  Darwinism  is 
evolution ;  evolution  is  development ;  development  is  a  ten- 
dency to  an  end ;  and  that  is  exactly  what  finality  means. 

''  Darwinian  Evolution,"  says  Prof.  Asa  Gray,  the  greatest 
Darwinist  in  America,  "  is  neither  theistical  nor  non-theisti- 
cal.  Its  relations  to  the  question  of  design  belong  to  the 
natural  theologian ;  or,  in  a  larger  sense,  to  the  philosopher. 
So  long  as  the  world  lasts  it  will  probably  be  open  to  any 
one  to  hold  consistently,  in  the  last  resort,  either  of  the  two 
hypotheses,  that  of  a  divine  mind  or  that  of  no  divine  mind. 
There  is  no  way  that  we  know  of  by  which  the  alternative 
may  be  excluded.  Viewed  philosophically,  the  question 
only  is,  which  is  the  better  supposed  hypothesis  of  the 
two?"  *  *  *  "Darwin's  theory  concerns  the  order  and  not  the 
cause,  the  how  and  not  the  why  of  the  phenomena,  and  so 
leaves  the  question  of  design  just  whe-e  it  was  before."f 

Darwin  himself  did  not  contest  the  teleogical  view.  His 
own  words  read :  "  I  see  no  good  reason  why  the  views 
given  in  this  volume  should  shock  the  religious  feelings  of 
any  one.  It  is  satisfactory  as  showing  how  transient  such 
impressions  are,  to  remember  that  the  greatest  discovery 
ever  made  by  man,  namely,  the  law  of  attraction,  of  gravity, 


*  Prose  Writings,  Volume  II.,  pp.  292,  1884. 
t  Gray's  Darwiniana,  pp.  379,  149. 


02  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

was  also  attacked  by  Liebnitz,  as  subversive  of  natural,  and, 
inferentially,  of  revealed  religion.  A  celebrated  author  and 
divine  has  written  to  me  that  he  has  gradually  learned  to 
see  that  it  is  just  as  noble  a  conception  of  the  Deity  to  be- 
lieve that  he  created  a  few  original  forms,  capable  of  self- 
development  into  other  and  needful  forms,  as  to  believe  that 
he  required  a  fresh  act  of  creation  to  supply  the  voids  caused 
by  the  creation  of  his  laws."* 

In  treating  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  species  and 
individuals,  Darwin,  in  the  "  Descent  of  Man,"  remarks : 
"  The  birth,  both  of  the  species  and  of  the  individual,  are 
equally  parts  of  that  grand  sequence  of  events  which  our 
minds  refuse  to  accept  as  the  result  of  blind  chance." 

It  has  been  said  that  Darwin's  remarks  on  the  religious 
question  are  too  general  and  sometimes  also  somewhat  con 
tradictory.  That  may  be  so,  but  Darwin,  restricting  him- 
self scrupulously  to  the  investigation  of  nature,  did  not  con- 
sider it  his  business  to  give  his  opinion  on  religious  subjects. 
Besides  this,  he  might  have  feared  that  religious  utterance 
would  embroil  him  in  controversies  incurring  hostility  and 
depriving  him  of  the  time  he  preferred  to  devote  to  the  study 
of  natural  sciences. 

The  fact  that  Darwin  did  not  utter  in  all  his  works  any- 
thing against  religion,  marks  him  as  a  naturalist,  conscious 
of  the  boundaries  of  religion  and  physical  science,  and  also 
as  a  man  convinced  that  a  harmony  between  religion  and 
physical  sciences  is  possible. 

If  his  utterances  concerning  religion  seem  sometimes 
somewhat  contradictory,  it  must  be  regarded  that  he  ex- 
pressed them  under  momentary  impressions  as  a  naturalist, 

*  Origin  of  Species,  pp.  421. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  63 

without  having  contemplated  to  furnish  the  world  with 
materials  for  a  compact  system  of  cogent  religious  truths. 

Darwin  was  a  naturalist  who  scrupulously  abstained  from 
acting  the  role  of  a  theologian  or  philosopher. 

The  German  Professors,  Albert  Wiegand  and  K.  E.  von 
Baer,  contest  the  Darwinism  selection  theory  merely  from 
a  scientific  point  of  view.but  they  do  not  consider  it  a  theory 
incompatible  with  religion. 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  about  the  elimination  of 
the  design  theory  in  nature  by  means  of  the  physical 
sciences.  If,  as  it  is  claimed  by  the  materialists,  the  de- 
sign theory  was  disproved,  then  why  do  they  not  give  up 
entirely  the  idea  of  all  that  sounds  like  it,  as  obsolete  ?  Why 
do  modern  monists,  like  Haickel  and  Baer,  torture  their 
minds  in  devising  new  terms  for  a  principle  which  is  to  sub- 
stitute the  old  design  terminology  ? 

The  Professor  K.  E.  Baer  substituted  the  term  design  with 
''Zielstrebigkeit"  (aim).  This  shows  that  even  the  opponents 
of  the  design  theory  can  not  help  admitting  there  is  in 
nature  a  principle  that  is  higher  than  mere  mechanical 
force.  But  there  is  so  much  confusion  regarding  this  point, 
that  while  Professor  Karl  Ernst  von  Baer  thought  he  had 
done  something  great  for  science  in  having  given  expression 
to  a  progressive  scientific  idea  by  his  proposal  to  substitute 
"Zielstrebigkeit"  (aim)  for  "  Zweckmsessigkeit"  (design) 
there  came  another  great  German  Professor,  Dr.  Emil  Du 
Bois-Reymond,  and  says  he  can  not  see  any  advantage  or 
merit  in  Baer's  proposed  term.* 

This  shows  clearly  that  even  the  opponents  of  the  design 
theory  can  not  help  admitting  that  there  is  in  nature  some 
principle  higher  than  mere  mechanical  force,  and  it  is  per- 

*  Reymond's  Darwin  Versus  Gallani. 


04  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD, 

fectly  true  when  Dr.  Noah  Porter,  President  of  the  Yale 
College,  says  :  "  We  have  already  seen  that  the  belief  in  the 
laws  of  nature,  in  regularity  of  their  action,  or  the  mutual 
and  study  adjustment  of  one  force  to  another,  is  but  another 
form  of  assenting  to  the  truth  that  design  and  thought  are 
supreme.  The  circumstance  that  scientific  men  often  stop 
short  with  these  laws,  without  asking  themselves  what  the 
belief  in  laws  imply,  proves  nothing  except  that  they  are 
so  occupied  with  a  special  line  of  inquiry  as  to  leave  little 
leisure  or  occasion  to  inquire  whether  a  purpose  underlies 
law.  The  exclusiveness  of  their  occupation,  with  the  very 
concentration  of  their  inquiries  within  these  limits,  and  the 
current  religious  'belief  which  connects  nature's  laws  with 
the  Supreme  Being  whom  they  worship, render  superfluous 
any  speculative  thought  upon  the  import  of  designs  of 
nature.  Now  and  then  it  happens  that  a  very  able  and 
truth-loving  student  forgets,  in  the  fervor  of  his  faith  in 
law,  that  any  inquiry  in  respect  to  the  grounds  of  this  faith 
is  required  or  admits  of  a  rational  answer.  Others  con- 
found laws  with  forces,  personify  the  confused  concep- 
tions of  both,  and  assume  a  position  of  contemptuous  de- 
fiance toward  any  thinker  who  asks  them  to  give  a  reason 
for  their  faith  in  these  abstractions.  Notwithstanding  all 
this,  the  fact  remains  true  that  modern  science  has  myriads 
or  more  occasions  to  believe  that  nature  is  palpitating  with 
thought  than  had  ancient  or  modern  common  sense  or 
ancient  science.  We  observe,  in  conclusion,  that  the  truth 
that  design  controls  the  universe  alone  furnishes  science 
with  a  satisfactory  conception  of  nature,  of  man  and  of  God. 
If  man  assumes  too  much  in  finding  design  in  nature,  then, 
by  the  same  rule,  he  assumes  too  much  in  finding  anything 
in  nature,  force  or  law — nay,  even  finding  in  it  number  and 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  65 

geometry.  To  deny  design  in  nature  because  it  is  anthro- 
pomorphous, requires  us  to  deny  force  and  law  as  well."* 

The  wonderful  construction  of  the  human  eye  has  always 
been  considered  as  the  most  conclusive  evidence  of  a  design, 
and  such  a  one  it  indeed  is  ;  but  of  late  Professor  Helmholz 
tried  to  demonstrate  that  from  an  optical  point  of  view  the 
eye  ought  to  have  been  more  perfect,  and  that,  as  an  ap- 
paratus, it  is  full  of  imperfections  and  defects.  Professor 
Helmholz  may  be  right, that  the  eye  has  many  imperfections 
and  that  there  are  optical  instruments  which,  as  works  of 
industry  and  art,  are  of  more  precision,  but  that  does  not 
make  the  eye  a  less  conclusive  evidence  of  the  final  causes 
in  nature.  As  long  as  the  eye  responds  to  its  purposes  in 
practical  life  and  is  appropriated  to  its  optical  uses,  it  shows 
a  design,  no  matter  what  its  imperfections  may  be  in  the 
light  of  the  modern  progress  of  optical  science.  And  this  is, 
in  fact,  all  that  theology  regards  and  is  interested  in. 

It  has  been  a  favorite  idea  of  the  French  deists  to  demon- 
strate the  design  theory  by  means  of  the  analogy  of  a  watch. 
The  famous  watch  illustration  of  William  Paley  reads  as 
follows  :  "  In  crossing  a  heath,  suppose  I  pitched  my  foot 
against  a  stone  and  were  asked  how  the  stone  came  to  be 
there,  I  might  possibly  answer  that,  for  anything  I  knew  to 
the  contrary,  it  had  lain  there  forever ;  nor  would  it,  perhaps, 
be  very  easy  to  show  the  absurdity  of  this  answer.  But 
suppose  I  had  found  a  watch  upon  the  ground,  and  it  should 
be  inquired  how  that  watch  happened  to  be  in  that  place, 
I  should  hardly  think  of  the  answer  which  I  had  before 
given,  that,  for  anything  I  knew,  the  watch  had  always 
been  there.  Yet  why  should  that  answer  not  serve  for  the 
watch  as  well  as  for  the  stone?  Why  is  it  not  admissible  in 


*  Science  and  Sentiment,  pp.  284,  285,  287. 


(•>•;  AnorMKXTs  FOR  THK  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

the  second  case  as  in  the  first?  For  this  reason,  and  no 
other,  when  we  come  to  inspect  the  watch  we  perceive — 
what  we  could  not  discover  in  the  stone — that  its  several 
parts  are  framed  and  put  together  for  purpose;  that  they 
are  framed  and  so  adjusted  as  to  produce  motion,  and  that 
motion  so  regulated  as  to  point  out  the  hour  of  the  day ; 
that  if  different  parts  had  been  differently  shaped  and  of  a 
different  size,  or  placed  after  any  other  manner,  either  no 
motion  at  all  would  have  been  carried  on,  or  none  which 
would  have  answered  the  use  that  is  now  served  by  it.  *  *  * 
This  mechanism  being  observed,  the  inference,  we  think,  is 
inevitable  that  the  watch  had  a  maker ;  that  there  must  have 
existed  at  sometime  and  at  some  place  an  artificer  or  artificers 
who  formed  it  for  the  purpose  for  which  we  find  it  actually  to 
answer,  who  comprehended  its  construction  and  designed 
its  use.  *  *  *  Man  would  be  surprised  to  hear  that  the 
mechanism  of  the  watch  was  no  proof  of  contrivance,  only 
a  motive  to  induce  the  mind  to  think  so ;  that  the  watch 
was  anything  more  than  the  result  of  the  laws  of  metallic 
nature,  in  exclusion  of  agency  and  power/'  * 

In  this  way  Paley  continues  his  illustration  to  show  that 
the  wonderful  construction  of  the  world  presupposes  a 
designer.  Much  praise  was  bestowed  upon  Paley  for  the 
masterly  and  elaborate  manner  in  which  he  applied  this 
illustration. 

This  was  a  too  favorite  analogy  to  be  overlooked  by  the 
antagonists  of  teleology. 

Professor  Huxley  was  the  first  who  attempted  to  prove 
that  the  demonstration  of  design  by  the  analogy  of  a  watch, 
referred  to  so  often  by  the  English  and  French  deists,  was 

*  Natural  Theology. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  67 

resting  merely  upon  a  fallacy,  and  he  argued  against  Paley 
as  follows : 

"  In  Paley's  famous  illustration,  the  adaptation  of  all 
parts  of  the  watch  to  the  function  or  purpose  of  showing 
the  time,  is  held  to  be  evidence  that  the  watch  was  especially 
contrived  to  that  end,  on  the  ground  that  the  only  cause 
we  know  of,  competent  to  produce  such  an  effect  as  a  watch, 
shall  keep  time,  is  contriving  intelligence  and  adapting 
the  means  exactly  to  that  end.,  Suppose,  however, that  only 
one  had  been  able  to  show  that  the  watch  had  not  been 
made  directly  by  any  person,  but  that  it  was  the  result 
of  the  modification  of  another  watch  which  kept  time 
but  poorly,  and  that  this  again  has  proceeded  from  a 
structure  which  could  hardly  be  called  a  watch  at  all,  seeing 
that  it  had  no  figures  on  the  dial  and  the  hands  were  rudi- 
mentary, and  that  going  back  and  back  in  time  we  come  at 
last  to  a  revolving  barrel  as  the  earliest  traceable  rudiment 
of  the  whole  fabric.  And  imagine  that  it  had  been  possible 
to  show  that  all  these  changes  had  resulted,  first,  from  a 
tendency  of  the  structure  to  vary  indefinitely,  and,  secondly, 
from  something  in  the  surrounding  world  which  helped  all 
variations  in  the  direction  of  an  accurate  time-keeper  and 
checked  all  those  in  other  directions,  then  it  is  obvious  that 
the  force  of  Paley's  argument  is  gone."  * 

The  argumentation  of  Mr.  Huxley  is  fallacious.  It  does 
not  refute  Paley  at  all,  because  it  ignores  the  primary  cause 
and  the  evolutionary  principle  working  from  within,  and 
accounts  for  the  existence  of  subjects  in  discussion  with 
physical  efficient  causes  and  with  mere  mechanical  forces. 

Whether  the  world  or,  by  way  of  illustration  and  analogy, 
the  watch,  or  any  other  piece  of  workmanship,  is  considered 

*  Lay  Sermons,  XIII.,  pp.  301,  302. 


(58  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


a  work  or  a  product ;  whether  it  arose  by  a  fiat  or  by  a 
gradual  evolutionary  process;  whether  it  counts  its  ages 
by  thousands  or  by  millions  of  years,  is  of  no  considera- 
tion so  far  as  the  existence  of  a  supreme,  intelligent  Cause 
is  concerned.  All  this  concerns  only  the  mode  of  the  pro- 
duction of  the  world,  but  can  by  no  logic  in  the  world  affect 
the  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  ultimate  cause,  from  which 
the  all  is  originating.  There  must  be  a  presiding  Intelli- 
gence. If  the  design  displayed  in  the  laws  of  optics  and 
acoustics,  in  the  properties  of  the  elements,  in  the  geo- 
metrical relations  and  algebraical  calculations  of  the 
planetary  systems,  in  the  laws  making  zoology,  botany, 
psychology,  meteorology,  etc.,  sciences,  arose  of  itself,  then 
why  can  not  order,  regularity,  geometrical  relations,  alge- 
braical calculations,  technical  works,  etc.,  also  arise  of 
themselves  in  the  sphere  of  human  activity? 

Until  this  will  be  the  case,  the  design  theory  as  illustrated 
by  I'aley's  watch  and  as  displayed  in  the  adaptation  and 
adjustment  of  means  to  purposes  and  of  causes  to  effects, 
is  irrefutable,  and  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  a  God 
from  the  design  in  nature  will  remain  valid,  all  that  is 
said  by  materialists  and  atheists  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing. 

"All  nature  is  but  art,  unknown  to  thee ; 
All  chance,  direction  which  thou  canst  not  see ; 
All  discord,  harmony  not  understood ; 
All  partial  evil,  universal  good; 
And  spite  of  pride,  in  erring  reason's  spite, 
One  truth  is  clear,  whatever  is,  is  right." — POPB. 


III.  THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 


"  Intelligi  necesse  est,  esse  deos,  quoniam  insitas  eorum  vel 
potius  innatas  cognitiones  habemus.  De  quo  autem  omnium 
natura  consentit,  id  verum  esse  necesse  est."  * 

The  cognition  of  the  first  principle,  which  is  also  funda- 
mental and  ultimate,  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  both 
from  a  metaphysical  and  ethical  point  of  view. 

If  the  first  principle  be  a  mere  blind  force,  then  the 
destination  of  man  can  be  nothing  higher  than  what  the 
"  prudent  and  smart  men"  please  to  make  of  him ;  how- 
ever, if  the  first  principle  be  a  conscious  Intelligence,  then 
man  is  an  image  of  that  intelligence,  and  that  intelligence 
is  his  ideal,  and  as  such  the  guide  of  his  conduct  and  as- 
piration. 

The  Ionian  philosophers  had  in  that  question  only  a 
physical  interest,  and,  in  explanation  of  the  problem  of  the 
world,  they  set  up  the  material  principles,  air  or  water,  or 
fire.  From  this  rude  view  the  Pythagoreans  broke  off  and 
assumed  that  the  numbers,  remaining  the  same  in  all 
changes,  were  the  essence  of  all  things. 

A  real  metaphysical  interest  in  the  problem  of  the  first 
principle  was  taken  first  by  the  Eleatic  school,  represented 
by  Xenophon,  Permanides  and  Zeno,  who  assumed  that 
the  "pure  being"  was  the  ultimate  principle.  The  "pure 

*  Cicero,  De  Natura  Deorum,  I.,  17. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THK  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


being"  was  to  them  the  negation  of  all  divisions  in  time 
and  space,  the  rational  unity  implying  all  real  substan- 
tiality and  the  oneness  of  thought  and  being.  An  ethical 
significance  was  attributed  to  that  problem  first  by  Socrates, 
the  great  Greek  monotheist. 

The  Eleatic  school,  being  a  school  of  pantheism  and 
monism,  did  nothing  directly  for  the  argumenation  of  the 
existence  of  God,  but  so  much  more  indirectly.  The  argu- 
mentation of  Xenophon,  the  one  being  necessarily  infinite  ; 
of  I'ermanides,  the  non-existence  being  inconceivable;  and 
of  Zeno,  that  the  manifoldness  of  phenomena  as  a  modifi- 
cation of  the  necessarily  indivisible  and  infinite  being  was 
without  a  real  existence  of  its  own,  were  a  preparatory 
schooling  for  the  later  discussions  of  the  a  priori  proof  of 
the  Divine  existence. 

The  ontological  argument  is  the  proof  a  priori  or  from 
intuition.  The  father  of  the  ontological  argument  is  Anselm 
de  Canterbury.  From  the  very  fact  that  man  has  an  idea 
of  God,  he  inferred  the  objectivity  of  the  Divine  existence. 

Anselm  argued  that  even  the  atheist  can  conceive  a  Being 
encompassing  all  and  manifested  in  the  perfection  of  all 
being,  as  the  highest  good  and  the  most  real  perfection.  If 
the  conception  of  an  absolutely  greatest  existed  merely  in 
the  intellect  of  man,  then  there  would  be  the  possibility  of 
conceiving  something  still  greater,  actually  existing  in  the 
external  world.  A  being,  which  is  not  merely  in  the  intellect, 
b'ut  in  the  external  reality  of  such  a  nature  that  no  other 
one  can  be  thought  of  as  higher,  more  absolute  and  more 
perfect,  is  God.  Being  the  most  perfect,  God  can  not  be 
thought  of  otherwise  than  existing  in  reality. 

In  the  second  chapter  of  the  Proslogion,  Anselm  sets  forth  : 
"  It  is  not  the  same  that  the  thing  shall  be  in  the  intellect 
and  that  we  should  understand  the  thing  to  be.  For  when 


THE  ONCOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  71 


a  painter  thinks  beforehand  of  that  which  he  is  about 
to  make,  he  has  it  indeed  in  his  intellect,  but  he  does  not 
yet  understand  what  he  had  not  made.  However,  when 
he  has  painted  it,  he  has  it  in  the  intellect  and  also  under- 
stands what  he  has  made.  Therefore,  even  the  fool  when  he 
says  in  his  heart  there  is  no  God  is  convinced  that  there  is 
in  his  intellect  something,  than  which  nothing  greater  can 
be  conceived  of;  when  he  hears  the  term  God  he  understands 
its  meaning,  and  whatever  is  understood  is  in  the  intellect. 
But,  assuredly  that,  of  which  nothing  greater  can  be 
conceived,  is  in  the  intellect  alone,  for,  if  it  is  in  the  intellect 
alone,  it  may  be  conceived  as  being  also  in  reality.  If, 
therefore,  that  of  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived 
is  in  the  intellect  alone,  that  very  thing  than  which 
nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  is  where  something 
greater  can  be  conceived.  But  this  is  impossible.  There 
exists,  therefore,  beyond  doubt,  something  than  which 
nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  both  in  the  intellect  and 
in  reality."  * 

This  argument,  though  indorsed  by  the  high  authority  of 
Anselm,  was  not  allowed  to  pass  into  the  records  of  history 
without  a  close  examination  and  strict  criticism.  A  con- 
temporaneous monk,  Gaunilo,  wrote  a  refutation,  "  Liber 
Pro  Insipiente,"  setting  forth  that  it  was  a  folly  to  infer 
from  the  mere  conception  of  a  perfect  supreme  Being  that 
such  a  Being  also  exists  in  reality.  The  conception  of  the 
absolutely  greatest  does  not  exist  in  man's  intellect  in  any 
other  sense  than  any  other  subject  we  know  of;  it  was  just 
as  logical  and  rational  to  assert  that  a  certain  monster  or 
mythological  figure,  or  an  island  of  unsurpassed  beauty  and 


*  Mediaeval  Philosophy,  hy  F.  I).  Maurice,  p.  102. 


72          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  Got>. 

treasures  must  exist,  because  man  can  give  them  an  imagin- 
ary existence.  Gaunilo's  objection  centered  in  the  idea  that 
necessary  existence  was  one  thing,  and  the  idea  of  a  necessary 
existence  was  another  thing. 

Gaunilo's  refutation  was  not  considered  by  Anselm  as  an 
invalidation  of  his  argument,  but  it  was  rather  hailed  by  him 
as  a  good  opportunity  to  express  himself  a  little  plainer  and 
more  definite,  and  he  did  it  in  his  "  Liber  Apologeticus 
Adversus  Respondentem  Pro  Insipiente."  Anselm  admitted 
that  not  all  that  is  imaginable  must  necessarily  exist,  yet  it 
was  different  with  the  idea  of  God  comprising  the  absolute 
good,  the  absolute  truth  and  the  absolute  being.  The  con- 
ception of  the  absolutely  greatest  and  most  perfect  (praster 
quod  inajus  cogitari  non  possit)  was  above  any  comparison 
with  any  other  conception,  and  on  that  account  being  an 
exception,  he  declared  Gaunilo's  counter-argumentation 
inapplicable  and  entirely  out  of  place. 

Anselm  considered  it  a  matter  of  impossibility  to  conceive 
of  the  non-existence  of  God,  as  God's  existence  was  involved 
in  the  idea  of  the  absolute  being,  of  the  absolute  truth,  of 
the  absolute  good,  and  of  the  absolute  perfection. 

Despite  all  the  efforts  of  Anselm  to  prove  the  validity  of 
the  ontological  argument,  the  great  mediaeval  scholastics, 
like  Gilbert  de  la  Poire,  Petrus  Lombardus,  Hugo  de  St. 
Victor,  etc.,  did  not  take  any  notice  of  it.  All  the  more 
attention  was  given  to  it  by  the  modern  metaphysicians. 

Rene  Descartes  expressed  the  ontological  argument  in 
two  modes. 

The  one  mode,  containing  essentially  the  idea  of  Anselm, 
reads  about  thus  :  A  supreme  Being  of  absolute  perfection  is 
conceivable  and,  consequently,  also  possible.  A  primordial 
Being  is  necessary,  because  without  its  presupposition  there 
is  no  reality  possible.  The  supreme  Being  can  be  no  other 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  73 

than  the  primordial  one,  and  from  this  it  follows  that  a 
supreme  Being  is  real.* 

The  second  mode  of  the  ontological  argument,  as  expressed 
by  Descartes,!  is  in  essence  as  follows :  All  our  ideas  we 
derive  either  from  without  (adventitiae)  or  we  have  produced 
them  ourselves  (factitio),  or  they  are  inborn  in  us  (insito  or 
innato).  Now,  the  idea  of  God  as  the  most  perfect  Being 
can  not  be  derived  from  without,  for  God  is  no  object  of  a 
sensuous  apprehension ;  nor  can  it  be  produced  by  man 
himself,  for  the  more  perfection  there  is  in  an  idea,  the  more 
perfection  there  must  be  in  the  cause  that  produces  it.  Man, 
a  finite  being,  can  not  be  the  cause  of  the  conception  of  the 
most  perfect  and  infinite  Being,  consequently  the  idea  of 
God  must  be  innate  in  man  and  implanted  in  his  mind  by 
the  Supreme  Being  himself. 

By  way  of  illustration,  Descartes  remarked :  As  in  the 
idea  of  a  triangle  is  involved  the  idea  that  its  angles  are 
equal  to  two  right  angles,  so  there  is  involved  in  the  idea  of 
God  his  necessary  existence.  The  Frenchmen,  Bossuet  and 
Fenelon,  treated  the  ontological  argument  of  Descartes  with 
all  the  brilliancy  of  which  their  pens  were  capable ;  and  the 
great  scholar,  Leibnitz,  added,  in  elucidation  of  the  Cartesian 
theory  that  universality  and  necessity  were  the  criteria  of 
innate  ideas. 

The  "God-intoxicated"  Spinoza  agreed  with  Descartes 
that  the  idea  of  God,  which  encompasses  all  reality,  all  truth 
and  all  perfection,  must  imply  implicitly  the  Divine  exist- 
ence and  is  above  comparison  with  any  other  idea. 

Spinoza,  though  he  saw  God  in  everything,  did  not  argue 
for  the  existence  of  God  from  the  very  reasoning  of  man  or 
from  the  theory  of  innate  ideas,  nor  from  the  conception  of 

*  Principl.  Philo.,  I.,  3-50.     t  Principl.  Philo.,  I.,  18. 


74  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


the  finite  world.  He  took  no  notice  of  all  this.  He  took  as 
a  basis  for  his  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence  his 
definition  of  God  as  the  infinite,  self-caused  Being  (causa 
sui).  The  following  definition  of  God,  he  maintained, 
implied  indisputably  the  Divine  existence  : 

"God,  or  substance,  consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  of 
which  each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essentiality, 
necessarily  exists."*  In  explanation  of  this  proposition, 
Spinoza  advanced  the  following  two  proofs  : 

"'  Proof:  If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  possible,  that  God 
does  not  exist ;  then  his  essence  does  not  involve  existence. 
But  this  (by  Prop.  VII.)  is  absurd.  Therefore,  God  neces- 
sarily exists." 

"Another  proof:  Of  everything  whatsoever,  a  cause  or 
reason  must  be  designed,  either  for  its  existence  or  for  its 
non-existence — e.  g.,  if  a  triangle  exists,  a  reason  or  cause 
must  be  granted  for  its  existence ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  does 
not  exist,  a  cause  must  also  be  granted,  which  prevents  it 
from  existing,  or  annuls  its  existence.  This  reason  or  cause 
must  either  be  contained  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  in 
question  or  be  external  to  it — for  instance,  the  reason  for 
the  non-existence  of  a  square  circle  is  indicated  in  its  nature, 
namely,  because  it  would  involve  a  contradiction.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  existence  of  substance  follows  also  solely 
from  its  nature,  inasmuch  as  its  nature  involves  existence. 
(Prop.  VII.) 

"But  the  reason  for  the  existence  of  a  triangle  or  a  circle 
does  not  follow  from  the  nature  of  those  figures,  but  from 
the  order  of  universal  nature  in  extension.  From  the  latter 
it  must  follow,  either  that  a  triangle  necessarily  exists  or 

*  The  Ethics,  Proposition  XI. 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  75 

that  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  exist.  So  much  is  self- 
evident.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  a  thing  necessarily 
exists  if  no  cause  or  reason  be  granted  which  prevents  its 
existence. 

^'  If,  then,  no  cause  or  reason  can  be  given  which  prevents 
the  existence  of  God,  or  which  destroys  his  existence,  we 
must  certainly  conclude  that  he  necessarily  does  exist.  If 
such  a  reason  or  cause  should  be  given,  it  must  either  be 
drawn  from  the  very  nature  of  God,  or  be  external  to  him — 
that  is,  drawn  from  another  substance  of  another  nature. 
For,  if  it  were  of  the  same  nature,  God,  by  that  very  fact, 
would  be  admitted  to  exist.  But  substance  of  another 
nature  could  have  nothing  in  common  with  God  (Prop.  II.), 
and  therefore  would  be  unable  either  to  cause  or  destroy 
his  existence. 

"As,  then,  a  reason  or  cause  which  would  annul  the  Divine 
existence  can  not  be  drawn  from  anything  external  to  the 
Divine  nature,  such  cause  must,  perforce,  if  God  does  not 
exist,  be  drawn  from  God's  own  nature,  which  would  involve 
a  contradiction.  To  make  such  an  affirmation  about  a 
Being  absolutely  infinite  and  supremely  perfect,  is  absurd ; 
therefore,  neither  in  the  nature  of  God,  nor  externally  to  his 
nature,  can  a  cause  or  reason  be  assigned  which  would  annul 
his  existence.  Therefore,  God  necessarily  exists." 

Regarding  this  proof  from  mere  definition,  his  great  friend, 
Henry  Oldenburg,  the  first  secretary  of  the  Royal  Society  of 
England,  asked  him :  "  Do  you  clearly  and  indisputably 
understand,  solely  from  the  definition  you  have  given  of 
God,  that  such  a  Being  exists?  For  my  part,  when  I  reflect 
that  definitions  contain  only  the  conceptions  formed  by  our 
minds,  and  that  our  mind  forms  many  conceptions  of  things 
which  do  not  exist,  and  is  very  fertile  in  multiplying  and 
amplifying  what  it  has  conceived,  I  do  not  yet  see  that  from 


7i;  ARGUMENTS  KOK  TUP:  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

the  conception  T  have  of  God  I  can  infer  God's  existence. 
I  am  able  bv  a  mental  combination  of  all  the  perfections 
I  perceive  in  men,  in  animals,  in  vegetables,  in  minerals, 
etc.,  to  conceive  and  form  an  idea  of  some  single  substance 
uniting  in  itself  all  such  excellences  ;  indeed,  my  mind  is 
able  to  multiply  and  augment  such  excellences  indefinitely  ; 
it  may  thus  figure  forth  for  itself  a  most  perfect  and  excel- 
lent being,  but  there  would  be  no  reason  thence  to  conclude 
that  such  a  being  actually  exists."  Upon  this  question, 
which  materially  contains  the  same  idea  that  the  monk 
Gaunilo  raised  in  objection  to  the  ontological  argument  of 
Anselm  de  Canterbury,  Spinoza  replied  as  follows :  "  Not 
from  ever}r  definition  does  the  existence  of  the  thing  defined 
follow,  but  only  from  the  definition  or  idea  of  an  attribute, 
that  is,  of  a  thing  conceived  through  and  in  itself.  The 
reason  for  this  distinction  was  pointed  out  in  the  note  to 
the  three  first  propositions  of  the  Ethics,  sufficiently  and 
clearly  at  any  rate  for  a  philosopher,  who  is  assumed  to  be 
aware  of  the  difference  between  a  fiction  and  a  clear  and 
distinct  idea,  and  also  of  the  truth  of  the  axiom  that  every 
definition  or  clear  and  distinct  idea  is  true.* 

The  propositions,  to  which  Spinoza  refers,  are  based 
upon  the  following  three  definitions,  with  which  his  "  Ethics" 
start  and  have  about  the  same  meaning  : 

O 

By  that  which  is  self  caused  (causa  sui),  I  mean  that  of 
which  the  essence  involves  existence,  or  that  of  which  the 
nature  is  only  conceivable  as  existent 

"A  thing  is  called  finite  after  its  kind,  when  it  can  be 
limited  by  another  thing  of  the  same  nature  ;  for  instance, 
a  body  is  called  finite  because  we  always  conceive  another 


*  Spinoza's  Correspondence,  Letters   III.,  IV.,   Bohn's  English 


Edition. 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  77 

greater  body.  So,  also,  a  thought  is  limited  by  another 
thought ;  but  a  body  is  not  limited  by  thought  nor  a  thought 
by  a  body. 

"  By  substance  I  mean  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is  con- 
ceived through  itself:  in  other  words,  that  of  which  a 
conception  can  be  formed  independently  of  any  other 
conception." 

The  whole  argumentation  of  Spinoza  is  centered  upon  the 
idea  that  the  real  perfection  does  not  come  from  an  external 
cause,  but  from  the  nature  of  the  substance.  The  existence 
of  such  a  perfect  and  infinite  substance  is  its  essentiality, 
and  one  can  not  be  more  certain  of  the  existence  of  any- 
thing than  of  the  existence  of  such  a  perfect  and  infinite 
substance  or  God. 

Moses  Mendelssohn  approved  of  the  ontological  argument 
and  has,  in  his  "  Morgenstunden,"  attempted  to  refute  all 
objections  raised  against  the  identification  of  the  conception 
and  of  the  reality  of  the  Divine  existence. 

He  did  not  believe  that  every  conception  which  does  not 
involve  a  logical  or  a  metaphysical  impossibility  must  exist, 
but  like  Anselm  he  thought  that  the  conception  of  God,  the 
absolute  Being,  was  incomparable  with  any  other  concept 
and  that  it  was,  by  reason  of  its  nature,  real. 

The  gist  of  Mendelssohn's  argument  is:  The  Supreme 
Being  must  be  considered  independent,  and  the  dilemma 
arises — either  it  does  exist  or  it  does  not  exist  (Tertium  non 
datur).  If  it  does  not  exist,  there  must  be  some  reason  for 
its  non-existence,  and  that  reason  must  be  either  in  it  or 
outside  of  it.  Outside  it  can  not  be,  lest  God  would  not  be 
independent.  Neither  can  it  be  in  it,  for,  in  the  conception 
of  a  supreme,  independent  Being,  there  is  no  contradiction. 
There  being  no  reason  for  the  non-existence  of  God,  neither 


78  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


in  God  nor  outside  of  God,  it  follows  by  necessity  that  He 
exists  in  reality. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  chapters  of  the  Kantian 
philosophy  is  that  which  treats  of  the  four  antinomies.* 
The  four  theses  arc :  The  world  has  a  beginning  in  time 
and  space;  every  substance  is  composed  of  indivisible 
atoms ;  there  is  besides  a  mere  physical  causality  in  nature 
also  a  causality  of  free  will ;  there  is  a  necessary  being. 

The  four  antitheses  are,  as  a  matter  of  course,  just  the 
reverses  of  these  theses. 

The  English  philosopher,  Hume,  may  be  considered  the 
representative  of  these  antitheses,  while  Christian  Wolf  is 
the  modern  main-representative  of  the  theses. 

Kant  took  a  special  delight  in  showing  that  both  these 
theses  and  these  antitheses  are  right  and  are  wrong.  He 
showed  that  human  reason  has  no  means  and  no  ways  of 
settling  these  problems  definitely. 

Possessed  and  swayed  entirely  by  this  antinomic  idea, 
Kant  was  bent  on  treating  from  such  a  standpoint  the 
arguments  for  the  existence  of  God. 

As  to  the  cosmological  and  teleological  proofs,  in  favor  of 
which  the  phenomena  of  nature  speak  so  much,  he  admitted 
that  there  can  be  advanced  at  least  just  as  many  arguments 
pro  as  con,  but,  since  the  ontological  argument  was  ignored 
and  contested  by  a  great  many  mediaeval  philosophers,  Kant 
pronounced  it  the  weakest  of  all  arguments. 

The  main  objection  Kant  raised  against  Anselm  was  that 
he  had  confounded  the  mere  existence  of  predicates  with  the 
existence  of  an  absolute  Being,  the  bearer  of  all  predicates 
and  perfection. 

The  ontological  proof  was  to  Kant  nothing  more  than  the 


*  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  II.,  2. 


THE  OXTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  79 

assumption  of  a  necessary  existence,  where  only  the  assump- 
tion of  the  idea  of  a  necessary  existence  is  in  place. 

Anselm  and  his  followers  considered  the  existence  itself 
a  predicate,  and  as  such  it  was  implied  in  the  very  conception 
of  the  Divine  perfection. 

Kant,  however,  remonstrated  :  the  existence  was  no  real 
predicate,  but  the  mere  position  of  a  subject.  For  instance, 
the  judgment  that  God  is  omnipotent  contains  two  concep- 
tions of  an  objective  nature  — God  and  omnipotence;  the 
copula  is  does  not  express  an  additional  predicate,  but 
it  expresses  only  what  the  predicate  omnipotent  affirms  of 
the  subject,  God. 

If  one  says  God  is,  then  this  is  does  not  confer  upon  or 
add  to  the  conception  of  God  a  new  predicate,  but  it  only 
presents  the  conception  of  God  with  its  predicate. 

Without  this  position  and  presentation,  the  subject  would 
contain  the  same  predicates  in  the  same  way  as  "owe  hundred 
real  dollars  do  not  contain  more  than  one  hundred  possible 
dollars." 

According  to  Kant,  the  contents  of  a  conception  is  only 
that  which  is  possible,  while  the  being,  the  reality,  are  mere 
positions,  presentations  and  modalities  of  the  position  of  a 
subject  for  human  comprehension. 

If  the  existence  were  a  predicate  adding  anything  to  the 
contents  of  the  subject,  then  the  mere  conception  of  the 
subject  would  be  deficient,  incomplete  and  inadequate. 
Kant's  argument  is  in  essence  as  follows :  When  we  say 
that  such  or  such  a  possible  subject  does  not  exist,  then  it 
is  either  an  analytical  or  a  synthetic  judgment.  An  ana- 
lytical judgment  is  merely  the  full  statement  of  what  there 
is  inclosed  in  the  subject.  Without  adding  or  proving 
anything  in  this  case,  we  give  only  the  definition.  A 
synthetic  judgment  adds  something  to  the  subject,  and,  in 


80  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

this  light,  the  existence  of  a  God  is  not  included  in  the 
mere  conception  of  such  a  perfect  Being.  The  real  existence 
being  the  very  opposite  of  the  ideal  existence,  can  not  be 
in  the  latter,  nor  can  it  be  inferred  from  the  subject ;  it  must 
rather  be  added.  The  real  existence  is  something  that  is 
added  to  the  mere  idea  of  existence. 

This  argumentation  of  Kant  was,  without  any  special 
reference  to  him,  pronounced  by  Moses  Mendelssohn,  in  the 
last  chapter  of  the  "  Morgenstunden,"  as  absurd,  on  the 
ground  that  the  very  idea  of  a  necessary  being  is  non- 
sensical as  long  as  existence  is  separated  from  it ;  and  also 
on  the  ground  that  the  consummation  of  all  perfections  and 
realities  can  not  be  imagined  without  the  inclusion  |_of 
existence. 

Regarding  existence,  Mendelssohn  makes  a  distinction 
between  that  which  is-contingent  and  that  which  is  neces- 
sary. The  former  is  unimaginable  without  existence,  but 
not  so  the  latter. 

To  the  objection  that  people  assume  the  existence  of  a 
Supreme  Being  because  man  can  not  imagine  it  otherwise, 
or  because  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being  is  a  mode  of 
man's  thought,  Mendelssohn  replies:  Well  for  us  that 
so  much  at  least  is  admitted  by  our  opponents,  viz., 
that  man  can  not  help  to  think  a  Supreme  Being  is 
real.  With  this  concession  man  will  come  to  see  that 
the  Being  which  we  can  not  help  to  think  of  is  also  existing. 
A  subject  that  all  men  can  not  help  thinking  of  must  be 
true.  They  all  agree  upon  it,  and  this  is  the  criterion  of 
its  truth.  This  is  the  argumentwn  a  consensu  gentium. 

Kant  thought  he  had  disproved  definitely  the  ontological 
argument;  but  in  that  he  was  mistaken.  Besides  Moses 
Mendelssohn,  there  are  four  other  great  metaphysicians— 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  81 

Hegel,  Serbati,  Cousin  and  Caird — who  have  resumed  it 
again  and  have  defended  it  as  natural,  sound  and  safe. 

Hegel  maintains  that  the  ontological  argument,  if  taken 
in  the  right  light,  is  the  only  real  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God.  True  it  starts  from  a  conception,  which,  being  of  a  sub- 
jective nature,  forms  the  opposite  of  the  objective  reality; 
but  the  conception  of  God  as  the  absolute  Being  implies  the 
existence  of  that  Being.  The  conception  and  the  existence 
of  an  absolute  Being,  God,  can  not  be  separated  from  one 
another,  and,  in  contradistinction  to  all  other  conceptions 
and  existences,  they  exceptionally  are  absolute  and  are  no 
opposites.  God  is  the  consummation  of  all  realities,  one  of 
which  is  the  existence.  Hegel,  as  he  himself  stated,  has 
only  repeated  what  Moses  Mendelssohn  advanced  in  refuta- 
tion of  Kant ;  but  he  also  referred  to  Spinoza,  who  defined 
God  as  something  that  can  not  be  conceived  of  without  the 
reality  of  existence. 

The  Italian  metaphysician,  Antonio  Rosmini  Serbati 
(1797-1855),  expressed  the  ontological  argument  in  the 
following  sense  :  I  feel  that  the  idea  of  an  absolute  Being 
is  not  a  mere  mode  of  human  thought,  but  an  incontro- 
vertible reality.  This  feeling  of  an  infinite  Being  can  not 
be  produced  in  me  by  any  finite  cause.  It  is  the  infinite, 
absolute  and  immutable  cause  that  has  implanted  it  in  my 
mind.  While  the  absolute  Being  is  manifested  to  the 
intellect  as  the  truth,  it  is  manifested  in  nature  as  beauty 
and  goodness,  and  in  society  it  is  revealed  as  justice  and 
right.  In  nearly  all  essential  manifestations  of  the  things 
are  the  manifestations  of  that  absolute  and  perfect  Being 
termed  God. 

Serbati  has  combined  the  Greek  idea  of  the  absolute 
Being  and  Anselm's  view  of  the  Divine  perfection  together 
with  the  Cartesian  theory  of  the  intuitive  or  innate  truths. 


82  ARGUMENTS  FOB  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  French  metaphysician,  M.  Cousin, 
"  the  idea  of  the  infinite  and  perfect  is  as  primitive  and  as 
given  in  the  consciousness,  and  as  necessary  a  product  of 
reason,  as  the  idea  of  the  finite  and  imperfect.  It  is  in  our 
power  to  imagine  the  existence  of  a  gorgon  and  centaur, 
and  we  can  conceive  their  non-existence,  but  it  is  not  in 
our  power,  when  we  have  acquired  a  precise  conception  of 
the  finite  and  the  imperfect,  not  to  conceive  the  infinite 
and  perfect.  This  reasoning  is  no  chimera ;  it  is  a  rational 
necessity,  an  intuitive  truth. 

«.  *  *  *  The  idea  of  the  infinite  and  the  idea  of  the 
finite  are  logical  correlatives  j  and  in  the  order  of  their 
acquisition,  that  of  the  finite  and  imperfect  precedes  that 
Df  the  infinite.  But  it  scarcely  precedes  it ;  it  is  not  possi- 
ble for  the  mind  as  soon  as  consciousness  furnishes  the  mind 
with  the  idea  of  the  finite  and  imperfect,  not  to  conceive 
the  idea  of  the  infinite  and  perfect.  Now,  the  infinite  and 
perfect  is  God."  * 

John  Caird,  Principal  and  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Glasgow,  put  an  end  to  all  the  disputes  about 
what  the  ontological  proof  can  really  mean.  His  opinion 
on  the  subject  reads  as  follows  : 

''  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  conceive  that  an  argument,  of 
which  the  refutation  seems  so  easy  and  obvious,  could  have 
imposed  itself  on  thinkers,  such  as  those  above  named,  as 
on  closer  examination  we  shall  find  that  imperfect  as  may 
be  the  form  in  which  it  has  often  been  presented,  the  principle 
of  this  argument  is  that  on  which  our  whole  religious  con- 
sciousness may  be  said  to  rest. 

"  It  is  quite  true  that  there  are  many  things  of  which, 

*  Elements  of  Psychology,  Henry's  English  Translation. 


THE  ONCOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  83 

from  the  mere  idea  or  conception  of  them  in  our  minds, 
we  can  not  infer  the  objective  existence.  If  existence 
means,  as  in  the  case  of  Kant's  dollars,  the  accidental 
existence  of  particular  objects  for  sensuous  perception, 
such  an  existence  we  can  not  infer  from  thought.  It  is, 
indeed,  of  the  very  nature  of  such  things  that,  regarded 
simply  in  themselves,  they  either  may  or  may  not  be ;  and 
to  infer  their  necessary  existence  from  the  idea  of  them, 
would  be  in  direct  contradiction  with  that  idea.  But  there 
are  other  ideas  with  respect  to  which  this  does  not  hold 
good ;  and  there  is,  especially,  one  idea,  which,  whether  we 
are  explicitly  or  only  implicitly  conscious  of  it,  so  proves 
its  reality  from  thought,  that  thought  itself  becomes  im- 
possible without  it.  Its  objective,  absolute  reality  is  so 
fundamental  to  thought,  that  to  doubt  it  implies  the  sub- 
version of  all  thought  and  all  existence  alike. 

"In  a  former  chapter  I  attempted  to  point  out  the  self- 
contradiction  ultimately  involved  in  materialistic  theories 
of  mind,  viz. :  that  in  making  thought  a  function  of  matter, 
they  virtually  made  thought  a  function  of  itself.  In  other 
words,  they  make  that  the  product  of  matter  which  is 
involved  in  the  very  existence  of  matter,  or  which  is 
prius  of  matter  and  of  all  other  existences.  Neither 
orgnization,  nor  anything  else,  can  be  conceived  to  have 
any  existence  which  does  not  presuppose  thought.  To 
constitute  the  existence  of  the  outward  world,  or  of  the 
lowest  term  of  reality,  we  ascribe  to  it,  say  in  'atoms' 
or  '  molecules,'  or  '  centers  of  forces,'  you  must  think 
them  or  receive  them  as  existing  for  thought — you  must 
needs  presuppose  a  consciousness,  for  which  and  in  which 
all  objective  existence  is.  To  go  beyond  or  to  attempt  to 
conceive  of  an  existence  which  is  prior  to  and  outside  of 
thought  'a  thing  of  itself,'  .of  which  thought  is  only  the 


84  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OP  GOD. 

mirror,  is  self-contradictor)^,  inasmuch  as  that  very  thing 
in  itself  is  only  conceivable  by,  exists  only  for,  thought. 
We  must  think  it  before  we  can  ascribe  to  it  even  an  exist- 
ence outside  of  thought. 

"  But  while  it  is  true  that  the  priority  of  thought,  or  the  ul- 
timate unity  of  thought  and  being,  is  a  principle,  to  doubt 
which  is  impossible,  seeing  that  in  doubt  we  are  tacitly  as- 
serting the  thing  we  doubt;  yet  it  must  be  considered,  fur- 
ther, that  the  unity  thus  asserted,  when  we  examine  what  it 
means,  is  not  the  dependence  of  objective  reality  on  my 
thoughts  or  yours,  or  on  the  thought  of  any  individual  mind. 
The  individual  mind  which  thinks  the  necessary  priority 
of  thought  can  also  think  non-necessity  of  its  own  thought- 
There  was  a  time  when  we  were  not ;  and  the  world  and  all 
that  is  therein  we  can  conceive  to  be  as  real,  though  we,  and 
myriads  such  as  we,  no  longer  existed  to  perceive  and  know 
it.  All  that  I  think,  all  objective  existence,  is  relative  to 
thought  in  this  sense  that  no  object  can  be  conceived  as  ex- 
isting except  in  relation  to  a  thinking  subject.  But  it  is  not 
my  thought  in  which  I  am  shut  up,  or  which  makes  or  un- 
makes the  world  for  me ;  for  in  thought  I  have  the  power  of 
transcending  my  own  individuality  and  the  world  of  objects 
opposed  to  it,  and  of  entering  into  an  idea  which  unites  or 
embraces  both.  Nay,  the  unity  of  subject  and  object  of  self 
and  the  world  which  is  opposed  to  it,  is  implied  in  every  act 
of  thought ;  and  though  I  can  distinguish  the  two,  I  can  no 
more  divide  them,  or  conceive  of  their  separate  and  inde- 
pendent existence,  than  I  can  think  of  a  center  existing 
without  or  independently  of  a  circumstance.  In  thinking 
myself,  my  own  individual  consciousness  and  an  outward 
world  of  objects,  I  at  the  same  lime  tacitly  think  or  pre- 
suppose a  higher,  wider,  more  comprehensive  thought  or 
consciousness  which  embraces  and  is  the  unity  of  both. 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  85 

"  The  real  presupposed  position  of  all  knowledge,  or  the 
thought  which  is  the  price  of  all  things,  is  not  the  indi- 
vidual, but  a  thought  of  self-consciousnesss  which  is  beyond 
all  individual  selves  and  their  objects,  of  all  thinkers  and  of 
all  objects  thought.  Or,  to  put  it  differently,  when  we  are 
compelled  to  think  of  all  existences  as  relative  to  thought, 
and  of  thought  as  prior  to  all,  among  the  existences  to  which 
it  is  prior  is  our  own  individual  self.  We  can  make  our  in- 
dividual self,  just  as  much  as  other  things,  the  object  of 
thought.  We  can  only  think,  but  we  can  think  the  indi- 
vidual thinker.  We  might  even  say  that,  strictly  speaking, 
it  is  not  we  that  think  but  the  universal  reason  that  thinks  in 
us.  In  other  words,  in  thinking  we  rise  to  a  universal  point 
of  view,  from  which  our  individuality  is  of  no  more  account 
than  the  individuality  of  any  other  object.  Hence,  as  think- 
ing beings,  we  dwell  already  in  a  region  in  which  our  indi- 
vidual feelings  and  opinions,  as  such,  have  no  absolute  worth, 
but  that  which  alone  has  absolute  worth  is  a  thought  which 
does  not  pertain  to  us  individually,  but  is  the  universal  life 
of  all  intelligence,  or  the  life  of  universal,  absolute  intelli- 
gence. 

"  What,  then,  we  have  thus  reached  as  the  true  meaning 
of  the  ontological  proof  is  this,  that  as  spiritual  beings  our 
whole  conscious  life  is  based  on  a  universal  self-conscious- 
ness, an  absolute  spiritual  life,  which  is  not  a  mere  subjective 
notion  or  conception,  but  which  carries  with  it  the  proof  of 
its  necessary  existence  or  reality. 

"  And  now  finally,  if  we  consider  what  is  involved  in  the 
idea  of  God,  and  of  his  relation  to  the  world  which  we  have 
reached  as  the  true  meaning  of  ontological  argument,  we  shall 
find  that  we  have  here  the  deepest  basis  of  religion,  and  that 
in  which  lies  its  necessity  for  man  as  a  spiritual,  self-con- 
scious being. 


86  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

"  If  we  think  of  God  merely  as  an  infinite,  which  is  the 
negation  of  the  finite,  or  which  is  related  to  the  infinite  world 
only  by  the  bonds  of  arbitrary  will,  there  is  no  room  under 
such  a  conception  for  any  religion  which  is  spiritual,  or 
which  involves  a  conscious  relation  of  the  human  spirit  to  the 
Divine. 

"  But  if  we  conceive  of  God  as  infinite  mind,  or  as  that  uni- 
versal infinite  self-consciousness  on  which  the  conscious  life 
of  all  infinite  minds  is  based,  and  whose  very  nature  it  is  to 
reveal  himself  in  and  to  them,  then  we  have  before  us  a  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  God  and  the  nature  of  man  which 
makes  religion  necessary  by  making  it,  in  one  sense,  the 
highest  realization  of  both."* 

*  Philosophy  of  Religion,  1880,  159. 


IV,  THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT. 


„  3toei  Singe  erftitten  bag  ©emutb,  mit  imttter  neuer  unb  ^unefymenber 
33en>unberuncj  unb  ©fyrfurdjt,  je  ofter  unb  anb,altenber  fid?  ba&  -ftacfybenfen 
bamit  befdjaftigt :  SD  e  r  beftirnteipimmeluber  mirunbbaS 
m  Of  a  I  i  f  dj|  e  w*  f  e  |  in  mir.  SBeibe  barf  id)  nidjt  al§  in  3)unfelb,eit 
tierfyiiHt,  ober  tm  Ueberfdjtoangndjm,  aufjer  meinem  ©efdjaftSfreife,  fudjen 
unb  blofi  bermttftctt ;  ic^  fe|e  fie  »ov  mir  unb  toerfniipfe  fie  xmmittelbar 
•  mit  bent  Setru^tfein  meiner  ®£iftenj  *„ 

Morality  is  universal  in  the  human  race.  The  virtues 
of  veracity,  honesty,  purity,  justice  and  duty  have  been 
respected  and  practiced  more  or  less  in  every  generation. 
Even  the  rudest  class  of  people  look  upon  fairness  in  action, 
kindness  and  charity  with  more  satisfaction  than  they  do 
upon  cruelty,  injustice  and  wickedness.  The  sense  of  duty 
is  so  essential  to  human  nature  and  is  so  deeply  rooted  in  it, 
that  even  the  most  wicked  and  corrupt  seek  to  have  at  least 
a  show  of  respectability  and  honesty ;  and  if  they  can  not 
help  to  avow  their  guilt  or  wrongs,  they  plead  for  excuse 
with  ignorance,  necessity  or  undesignedness.  It  is  by  no 
means  a  rare  phenomenon  to  find  embers  of  morality 
glowing  in  the  ash-heaps  of  man's  sensuality  and  worldli- 
ness.  Even  the  savages  are  not  destitute  of  every  sentiment 
of  morality.  A  great  many  of  them  have  manifested  such 
a  keen  sense  of  right  and  wrong  and  such  virtues,  that  they 
deserve  to  be  held  up  as  models  for  the  benefit  of  quite  a 
number  of  people  living  in  the  centers  of  civilization  and 

*  Kant's  Kritik  der  Praktischen  Vernunft. 


88  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

boasting  of  a  high  culture.  The  ancient  heathenish  relig- 
ions, though  of  mythical  contents,  were  not  void  of  great 
moral  tenets.  The  varied  literature,  as  well  as  the  poetical 
and  legal  works  of  the  Hindoos,  Buddhists,  Chinese,  Greeks 
and  Romans  contain  many  a  moral  gem  of  unsurpassed 
splendor.  The  elimination  of  the  moral  element  from  the 
works  of  Homer,  Sophocles,  and  others,  would  leave  them 
failures. 

The  Greek  and  the  Roman  theaters  shook  with  applause 
when  there  flashed  forth  in  the  performance  a  great  idea  of 
morality  and  humanity.  All  this  is  a  proof  that  the  moral 
sense  is  universal  and  inborn  in  man. 

The  sacred  literature  of  the  Hebrews,  teaching  that  man 
is  an  image  of  God,  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  walking  in 
the  path  of  godliness  and  virtue,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
maintains  that  morality  ,is  an  original  part  of  human 
nature  and  a  distinctive  faculty.  This  same  view  has  been 
entertained  also  by  Christianity  and  the  Islam. 

Among  the  Greeks  it  was  Plato,  who,  believing  in  the 
pre-existence  of  the  human  soul,  assumed  that  the  soul  was 
possessed  of  moral  qualities  before  it  entered  into  the 
human  body.  And  Aristotle  *  is  of  the  opinion  that  man's 
great  distinction  from  the  animal  kingdom  consists  in  his 
being  endowed  with  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  good  and 
evil.  The  mediaeval  scholastics  were  of  the  opinion  that 
man's  moral  sense  was  one  of  the  latent  faculties  (qualitates 
occulta3)  of  human  nature.  Moses  Maimonides  held  that 
in  primitive  man  there  was  inborn  only  the  sense  of  truth, 
while  the  sense  of  good  and  evil  in  man  arose  through  it 
from  social  conventionalism.! 

This  theory  that  morality  is  universal  was  entertained  to 

*  Politics,  I.,  I.,  14.     t  Moreh  Nebuchim,  I.,  2. 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT.  89 

the  fullest  extent  also  by  Hugo  Grotius,  who.  in  his  great 
work,  "  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pacis,"  declare?  that  the  rights  and 
principles  of  humanity,  morality  and  justice,  as  far  as  they 
concern  the  international  laws,  were  just  as  objective  as  the 
laws  of  nature ;  and  in  pleading  for  them  he  did  not  appeal 
merely  to  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures,  nor  to  the  papal 
decrees,  but  he  appealed  to  the  testimony  of  history  and 
philosophy. 

Hugo  Grotius  pronounced  his  progressive  ideas  with  a 
positiveness  and  frankness  which  could  not  fail  to  produce 
great  opposition.  His  antipode  was  Hobbes. 

While  Grotius  held  that  peaceableness  and  harmlessness 
were  the  natural  state  of  primitive,  undegenerated  mankind, 
according  to  Hobbes  primitive  mankind  lived  in  a  war- 
like state,  or,  as  he  expressed  it,  in  a  state  of  a  bellum 
omnium  in  (contra)  omncs.  The  warlike  state  of  primitive 
mankind  was  abandoned  (exeundum  est  e  statu  naturae) 
only  because  self-preservation  required  it,  and  because 
experience  advised  primitive  mankind  to  subordinate  them- 
selves, at  the/cost  of  their  individual  liberties,  to  a  ruler. 

Hobbes  did  not  attribute  to  morality  any  objective  char- 
acter whatever.  He  does  not  admit  that  there  are  in  man 
perfectly  disinterested  passions  and  sentiments,  enabling 
him  to  keep  in  view  the  public  welfare,  irrespective  of 
interest  and  pleasure.  He  considered  the  rulers,  their 
interests,  their  ambition  and  their  determination  to  keep 
the  nations  subjected  to  their  dynasties,  the  only  source  of 
morality.  As  a  matter  of  course,  such  doctrines,  aiming  a 
blow  at  the  root  of  morality,  aroused  great  antagonism,  and 
rightly  s<>.  \Varlmrton  says  the  whole  church  militant  took 
up  arms  against  Hobbes.  Sir  James  Mackintosh*  compares 

*  General  Views  of  the  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  68,  1838. 


',10  AK<;r.MKNTS    FOR    THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


the  "  moral  and  political  system  of  Hobbes  to  a  palace  of 
ice,  transparent,  exactly  proportioned,  majestic,  admired  by 
the  unwary  as  a  delightful  dwelling  but  gradually  under- 
mined I'v  the  eentral  warmth  of  human  feeling,  before  which 
it  was  thawed  into  muddy  water  by  the  sunshine  of  true 
philosophy.'' 

Among  llobhes'  controverters,  whose  number  was  legion, 
were  the  metaphysicians  Cumberland,  Cudworth,  Baxter. 
Bishop.  Parker,  and  others. 

llohbes'  spirit  of  skepticism  and  materialism  revived  again 
in  John  Locke,  who,  in  opposition  to  Descartes,  denied 
entirely  the  existence  of  innate  ideas.  His  motto  was  : 
Xihil  i'xt  in  Intellect n  (jiirxl  /inn  fiid'if  in  #cn*u.  Locke's  book. 
•'  Human  rnderstanding,''  created  a  great  commotion.  At 
the  head  of  his  assailants  was  the  great  deist,  Lord  Shaftes- 
bury.  lie  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  moral  sense  requires 
culture  and  can  be  developed  by  practice,  by  reflection  and 
by  the  belief  in  a  good  and  wise  (rod,  but  as  to  the  origin  of 
the  moral  sense  he  maintained  that  it  was  organic  and  an 
original  part  of  the  human  constitution. 

The  reaction  against  Locke  reached  its  climax  in  the 
Scottish  School,  the  representative  of  which  did  not  merely 
maintain,  as  Descartes  did,  that  there  were  moral  and 
religious  ideas  innate  in  man,  but  that  there  is  in  man 
inborn  a  sense  for  every  tendency  of  the  human  mind. 
Adam  Smith,  the  father  of  the  '' National  Economy,"  and 
Reid,  the  father  of  the  "Common  Sense  Philosophy," 
assumed  that  there  are  in  man  inborn  senses  for  speech,  for 
commerce,  for  conversation,  etc.  These  men  fell  back  upon 
the  scholastic  theory  of  the  friruJtritcx  acmltfr. 

The  skeptic,  David  Hume,  classified  the  virtues  into  pri- 
mary (Hies,  which  are  an  original  part  of  the  human  consti- 
tution, and  into  secondary  ones,  which  are  acquired  under 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT. 


the  influences  of  circumstances,  education   and   example, 
but  this  only  by  means  of  the  primary  ones. 

The  German  materialist,  Luclwig  Buechner,  has  taken  a 
special  interest  in  collecting  in  his  book,  "  Kraft  und  Stoff," 
the  most  important  objections  urged  against  the  theory  of 
innate  ideas.  He  refers  to  the  observation  of  several  trav- 
elers who  report  that  there  are  a  great  many  tribes  among 
the  savages  who  have  no  idea  of  wrong  or  right,  of  duty  and 
morality,  of  religion  and  immortality. 

The  following  excerpt  from  "  The  Human  Species,"  by 
M.  de  Quatrefages,  Professor  of  Anthropology  in  the  Museum 
of  Natural  History  at  Paris,  proves  plainly  and  conclusively 
that  the  observations  quoted  by  Buechner  are  mere  mis- 
apprehensions. 

"A  traveler,  Avho,  -as  a  general  rule,  speaks  the  language 
of  the  country  very  badly,  interrogates  a  few  individuals 
upon  the  delicate  question  of  the  Deity,  future  life,  etc.,  and 
his  interlocutors,  not  understanding  him,  make  a  few  signs 
of  doubt  or  denial,  which  have  no  reference  to  the  question 
asked,  the  European,  in  his  turn,  mistakes  their  meaning. 
Having,  in  the  first  instance,  merely  regarded  them  as  beings 
of  the  lowest  type,  incapable  of  any  conception,  however 
trifling,  he  concludes,  without  hesitation,  that  these  people 
have  no  idea  either  of  God  or  of  another  life ;  and  his  asser- 
tion, soon  repeated,  is  at  once  accepted  as  true  by  readers 
who  share  his  opinions  about  populations  unacquainted 
with  our  civilization.  The  history  of  travel  would  furnish 
us  with  many  examples  of  this  fact.  Kaffirs,  Hottentots, 
etc.,  have  often  been  spoken  of  as  atheists,  while  we  now 
know  that  this  is  by  no  means  the  case. 

"  Should  the  traveler,  moreover,  speak  the  language  of 
the  country  with  ease,  he  is  still  liable  to  ,fall  into  error. 
Religious  belief  forms  part  of  the  most  hidden  depths  of 


02  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

our  nature.  The  savage  does  not  willingly  expose  his  heart 
to  a  stranger  whom  he  fears,  whose  superiority  he  feels,  and 
whom  he  has  often  seen  ready  to  ignore  or  ridicule  what  he 
has  always  regarded  as  most  worthy  of  veneration.  *  *  * 
Fortunately  among  lay  Europeans  there  are  some  who, 
permanently  settled  in  the  midst  of  these  populations, 
become  initiated  into  their  customs  and  manners  so  as  to 
understand  them  and  to  fathom  mysteries  which  would  by 
others  have  been  passed  over,  on  account  of  offensive  or 
curious  forms.  *  *  *  Little  by  little  the  light  has 
appeared  and  the  result  has  been  that  Australians,  Melane- 
sianp,  Bosjesmans,  Hottentots,  Kaffirs  and  Bechuanas  have, 
iii  their  turn,  been  withdrawn  from  the  list  of  atheistic 
nations,  and  recognized  as  religious." 

Summarizing  the  issue  of  his  disquisition,  Professor  de 
Quatrefages  remarks :  ';  The  result  of  my  investigation  is 
exactly  the  opposite  of  that  at  which  Sir  John  Lubbock  and 
M.  St.  Hilair  had  arrived  in  maintaining  that  'it  is  difficult 
to  suppose  that  savages  so  rude  as  not  to  be  able  to  count 
their  own  fingers  should  have  acquired  intellectual  concep- 
tions sufficiently  advanced  to  possess  a  system  of  belief 
worthy  of  the  name  of  religion.'  Obliged,  in  my  course  of 
instruction,  to  review  all  human  races,  I  have  sought  atheism 
in  the  lowest  as  in  the  highest.  /  have  nowhere  met  with  it, 
except  in  individuals,  or  in  more  or  less  limited  schools, 
such  as  those  which  existed  in  Europe  in  the  last  century, 
or  which  may  still  be  seen  at  the  present  day."  * 

Dr.  Buechner  is  right  in  saying  that  the  question  whether 
certain  ideas  are  innate  or  not  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
to  man,  as  it  implies  the  decision  whether  man  is  the 
product  of  a  higher  spiritual  World,  or  whether  he  is  merelv 


*  The  Human  Species,  473,  482. 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT.  93 


the  product  of  the  elements  of  this  sublunar  world;  but 
Buechner  is  wrong  in  believing  that  the  superficial  observa- 
tions of  tribes  by  a  few  travelers  are  sufficient  evidence  to 
decide  such  an  important  question. 

But  suppose  there  should  be  cases  in  which  it  was  sub- 
stantiated that  there  were  tribes  without  the  least  idea  .or 
sentiment  of  religion  and  morality,  is  that  sufficient  reason 
to  pronounce  such  tribes  as  being  void  of  innate  ideas? 
By  no  means.  This  could  be  done  of  right  only  if  attempts 
had  been  made  to  teach  them  religion  and  morality;  and  if 
then  all  methods  of  instruction  applied  had  failed  to  awaken 
in  them  religious  and  moral  sentiments.  There  is  no  reli- 
able record1  showing  that  savages  have  been  so  entirely  in- 
capable of  all  apprehension. 

Modern  scientists  delight  in  sneering  at  the  theory  of 
innate  ideas.  It  would  be  more  proper  for  them  to  sneer 
at  their  own  inconsequences.  They  decry  on  the  one  hand 
the  existence  of  innate  ideas,  but  on  the  other  hand  they 
admit  that  there  are  such  things  as  "  fundamental  or  neces- 
sary truths"  in  psychology  ;  as  the  Aristotelian  and  Kantian 
"  logical  categories  ;  "  as  the  ''  predicaments  "  of  the  Peri- 
patetics, and  such  things  as  psychological  necessities  and 
modes  of  thought.  What  else  than  innate  ideas  are  all  these 
things,  the  existence  of  which  is  not  and  can  not  be  denied 
entirely,  even  by  the  materialists? 

If  there  are  no  innate  ideas,  how  can  we  account  for  genius? 
The  great  philosophers  were  not  born  with  their  systems,  nor 
were  the  great  poets  b  rn  with  that  special  branch  of  poetry 
in  which  they  excelled ;  but  both  the  philosophers  and  the 
poets  are  born  with  that  proclivity,  tendency,  turn  and  cast 
of  mind  that  under  circumstances  causes  them  to  become 
what  thev  are. 


04  AKUI-.MKNTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  C4oD, 

Every  educator  will  most  readily  admit  that  one  can  not 
make  of  a  child  anything  else  than  what  the  innermost 
germs  of  its  nature  contain.  As  little  as  one  can  elicit  from 
tin  the  sound  peculiar  only  to  gold,  just  as  little  is  it 
possible  to  draw  forth  any  quality  from  a  child  when  the 
germ  of  that  quality  is  lacking  in  its  mind.  But  all  this 
would  not  be  possible  if  there  were  no  such  thing  as  innate 
qualities.  If  there  are  no  innate  ideas,  and  all  ideas  are 
merely  acquired  by  observation,  education,  discipline,  ex- 
perience, etc.,  then  how  is  it  that  so  many  people,  who  have 
no  education  and  not  much  of  discipline,  have  a  sound 
moral  judgment  and  are  virtuous,  while  a  great  many  others 
who  have  passed  through  such  a  discipline,  training  and 
culture  as  to  have  a  claim  to  a  higher  education,  are  void  of 
moral  character,  void  of  principle,  and  void  of  all  qualities 
constituting  a  nobler  and  higher  manhood? 

The  moral  nature  of  man  is  described  by  the  great  French 
poet.  Victor  Hugo,  in  the  following  striking  way:  "Yes, 
men  who  govern  us,  at  the  bottom  of  every  citizen's 
conscience,  the  most  obscure  as  well  as  the  greatest,  at  the 
very  depth  of  the  soul  of  the  last  beggar,  the  last  vagabond, 
there  is  a  sentiment  sublime,  sacred,  insurmountable,  inde- 
structible, eternal — the  sentiment  of  right.  This  sentiment, 
which  is  the  very  essence  of  the  human  conscience,  which 
the  Scriptures  call  the  corner-stone  of  justice,  is  the  rock  on 
which  iniquities,  hypocrisy,  bad  laws,  evil  designs  and 
bad  governments  fall  and  are  shipwrecked.  This  is  the 
hidden,  irresistible  obstacle,  veiled  in  the  recesses  of  every 
mind,  but  ever  present,  ever  active,  on  which  you  will 
always  exhaust  yourselves  and  which,  whatever  you  do,  you 
will  never  destroy.  I  warn  you,  your  labor  is  lost ;  you  will 
not  extinguish  it,  you  will  not  confuse  it,  for  it  is  easier  to 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT. 


drag  the  rock  from  the  bottom  of  the  sea  than  the  sentiment 
of  right  from  the  hearts  of  the  people.''  * 

When,  among  the  Greeks,  through  the  sophists,  a  great 
confusion,  respecting  the  mor.il  concepts,  had  prevailed,  it 
was  Socrates  who  stepped  forth  and  brought  order  into  the 
chaos,  not  by  any  new-fangled  theory,  but  by  returning  to 
the  plain,  sound,  common-sense  ethics  of  the  people  and  of 
the  great  national  poets. 

Of  a  similar  confusion  of  moral  concepts  in  England, 
France  and  Germany  was  productive  also  the  materialistic 
systems  of  Hobbes  and  Locke.  The  opinions  arrived  at  by 
the  English,  French  and  German  moralists  were  greatly 
varying,  and  often  diametrically  opposed  to  one  another. 
Montaigne  reduced  morality  to  ''habit;1'  Mandville derived 
it  from  the  "  vanity ''  of  which  the  law-givers  availed 
themselves;  Hutcheon  originated  it  from  "benevolence;" 
Wollaston  thought  "  veracity !?  was  its  root :  Shaftesbury 
accounted  for  the  origin  of  morality  with  an  innate  "'  moral 
taste"'  or  ''  moral  sense ;  "  Clark  with  the  ''  fitness  of  things ;" 
Lord  Kames  and  Hartley  Avith  an  "  aesthetic  taste"  or 
"  a?sthetic  judgment ;"  Cudworth,  the  fhiglish  precursor  of 
Kant,  derived  the  morality  from  the  ''  intuition  of  reason;" 
Wolf  and  Leibnitz  considered  the  perfectability  of  human 
nature  the  source  of  all  morality  in  man ;  according  to 
Helvetius  the  "  self-interest"  and  according  to  Bentham  the 
"  utility  "  are  the  source  and  the  basis  of  all  morality. 

This  great  confusion  in  the  sphere  of  morality  was 
waiting  for  a  new  Socrates.  He  appeared  in  the  person 
of  Immanuel  Kant,  who,  with  the  rod  of  the  ''categorical 
imperative,"  dug  out  the  well  of  morality  in  man's  moral 
nature.  Kant  agrees  with  the  Bible  as  to  the  moral  nature 

*  Raymond,  The  Orator's  Manual. 


%  AlUU'MKNTS    FOR   THE    EXISTENCE   OF    GoD. 


of  nuin,  but,  while  the  Bible  derives  all  morality  from  God, 
Kant  derived  his  moral  argument  for  the  existence  of  God 
from  the  moral  nature  of  man ;  thus,  he  pronounced 
holdlv  the  (intinionii/  of  tin-  human  nature.  Morality  he 
made  independent  of  religion,  hut  religion— the  idea  of 
God  and  immortality — he  made  dependent  on  man's  moral 
nature. 

Kant  admitted  that  the  moral  sense  of  man  was  developed, 
refined  and  sharpened  by  experience;  and  that  it  is  ex- 
perience that  teaches  man  what  is  right  and  wrong,  good  or 
evil,  useful  or  hurtful;  but  as  to  that  question  whether 
there  is  anything  in  man  independent  and  uninfluenced  by 
pleasure  and  pain,  by  interest  or  disadvantage,  by  mere 
desires  and  wishes,  he  answers  in  the  affirmative  that  there 
is  a  "  moral  law  "  in  man,  a  moral  law  which  is  uncondi- 
tional, unreserved,  reckless  and  categorical  in  its  commands 
and  demands,  and  is  called  generally  the  "  categorical 
imperative.''  This  "categorical  imperative"  must  be  contra- 
distinguished from  the  "  hypothetical  imperative, "the  latter 
giving  laws  according  to  circumstances  and  expediency, 
while  the  hypothetical  imperative  is  the  imperative  of 
prudence, 

The  categorical  imperative,  commanding  man  to  follow 
merely  the  inner  necessity,  or  the  pure  practical  will,  and 
not  to  allow  external  circumstances  to  influence  him,  is 
the  real  principle  of  liberty. 

The  sensuous  part  of  man's  nature  must  be  determined 
and  ruled  by  the  rational  and  pure  will,  which  bears  its 
moral  worth  in  itself,  and  by  means  of  which  alone  the 
moral  worth  of  every  action  is  determined. 

The  categorical  imperative  addresses  itself  to  man  with 
"  thou  oughtest ;  "  and  the  affirmation  "  thou  canst,  because 
thou  oughtest"  must  suffice  to  induce  man  to  do  his  duties. 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT.  97 

When  mail  has  taken  cognition  of  the  ;>  moral  law  "  within 
him,  there  arises  in  him  a  moral  sentiment  or  the  respect 
for  that  "  moral  law."  It  is  this  respect  for  the  "  moral 
law  "  within  us  that  makes  our  actions  "moral."  Without 
this  respect  for  the  "moral  law"  within  us,  no  matter  from 
what  motives  we  are  actuated,  our  actions  can  not  he  called 
"moral." 

The  action  from  respect  for  the  "  moral  law  "  within  us  is 
called  duty,  and,  if  it  has  its  end  in  itself,  it  is  called  virtue. 
If  man  has  advanced  so  far  as  to  he  dutiful  from  mere  love 
of  duty  then  he  is  Jtoli/. 

The  pure,  rational,  autdnomic  will  is  the  original  law- 
giver in  man,  and,  constituting  man's  dignity,  has  to  act 
upon  the  following  three  fundamental  laws  : 

Art  (iccordiiKj  to  jtrittcijilc*  of  which  thou  canst  always 
wish  that  others  may  also  act  according  to  them. 

Act  >-o  a*  to  ahi-fit/*  use  humanity — Die  Menschheit — as 
well  in  thy  person  as  in  the  person  of  others,  as  an  end  and 
never  as  a  means. 

Aft  in  unch  a  wai/  that  the  maxim  of  thy  conduct  might 
be  made  a  general  la\v. 

These  fundamental  principles  Kant  thinks  will  secure 
the  "  autonomy  of  the  will"  to  the  exclusion  of  the  "heter- 
onomy  of  arbitrary  choice."  * 

The  result  of  Kant's  disquisition  of  the  cosmological  and 
teleological  proofs  was  that  these  arguments  are  of  an  anti- 
nomic nature,  that  is  to  say,  there  are  just  as  many  evidences 
against  as  in  favor  of  them.  In  his  inquiries  Kant  was  not 
actuated  by  any  atheistical  motives  or  designs ;  it  was  in 
the  light  of  his  philosophy  that  he  judged  so.  Far  from 
having  or  cherishing  any  atheistical  or  materialistic  tenden^ 

*  Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten. 


AR<; I -MKXTS    FOR   THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


cies  or  intentions,  Kant,  on  the  contrary,  was  as  anxious 
;is  any  philosopher  ever  was  to  destroy  the  roots  of  atheism, 
pantheism,  materialism,  fatalism,  sensualism  and  pernicious 
skepticism.  He  thought  the  moral  argument  was  the  host 
way  to  effect  this. 

His  moral  argument  is  essentially  as  follows :  It  is 
peculiar  to  human  reason  to  proceed  from  the  conditioned 
to  the  unconditioned,  from  the  particular  to  the  universal, 
and  from  the  individual  to  the  collective.  Not  satisfied 
with  the  mere  knowledge  of  the  rules  in  individual  cases, 
human  reason  seeks  for  the  knowledge  of  the  chief  good— 
the  KII  in  in  a  in  IHHIHUI — the  sum  of  all  that  man  has  to  strive 
after. 

Now,  what  is  that  chief  good?  Does  it  consist  in  happi- 
ness or  in  virtue? 

Virtue  is  only  so  far  the  chief  good  as  it  implies  the 
conditions  of  happiness,  and,  again,  happiness  is  only  so 
far  the  chief  good  as  it  is  in  consonance  with  virtue. 

If,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  taken  into  consideration  that 
man  is  in  need  of  and  craves  for  happiness,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  virtue  is  his  duty  and  the  condition  of  his  happi- 
ness, it  will  he  obvious  that  the  chief  good  can  consist  only 
in  virtue  and  happiness  combined. 

But  experience  teaches  that  there  is  often  the  greatest 
disproportion  between  virtue  and  happiness  in  the  world. 
This  disproportion  between  worthiness  and  happiness  can 
be  solved  only  by  the  assumption  of  another  world,  where 
all  these  dissonances  between  morality  and  happiness  are 
turned  into  symphonies. 

From  that  rule  of  conduct,  as  implied  in  the  chief  good 
and  to  which  reason  subjects  us,  Kant  infers  two  things  : 
the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality  of  the  human  soul. 

Without  (tod,  the  wise  Governor  of  the   universe,   and 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT.  99 


without  a  future  life  for  the  compensation  of  virtue,  there 
is  no  proportion  and  no  correspondence  imaginable  between 
morality  and  happiness  and  between  worthiness  and  destiny. 

Without  God  and  a  future  life,  the  ideas  of  morality  and 
virtue  are  mere  matters  of  convenience,  of  expediency, 
of  approval  to  serve  man's  purposes ;  and  .there  is  no 
reason  why  they  should  not  be  changed  or  given  up  entirely 
if  expedient. 

Without  God  and  a  future  life,  all  hopes,  cravings  and 
ideals  of  man's  moral,  mental  and  spiritual  constitution 
would  be  nothing  else  but  tormenting  illusions,  impractical 
ideas,  tantalizing  hopes  and  irreconcilable  discrepancies. 

The  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God  being  a  demand 
of  man's  moral  consciousness  for  a  proportion  and  corre- 
spondence between  worthiness  and  happiness,  was  called 
by  Kant  a  postulate  of  pure,  practical  reason. 

There  are  two  other  postulates — freedom  of  will  and  the 
immortality.  The  freedom  of  will  is  postulated  to  make 
man  independent  of  the  external  world,  and  to  enable  him 
to  be  autonomic,  or,  in  other  words,  to  be  a  law  to  himself. 

The  immortality  is  postulated  to  render  possible  the 
attainment  of  moral  perfection  by  an  infinite  progression. 
And  God,  as  already  stated,  is  postulated  to  make  virtue 
and  happiness,  worthiness  and  felicity  proportionate. 

The  influence  Kant's  moral  argument  for  the  existence 
of  God  had,  was  great.  It  offered  just  that  which  his 
contemporaries,  tired  of  the  English  speculations  and  of 
the  French  frivolity,  craved  for.  It  has  created  a  moral 
revival. 

These  ideas  of  Kant  remained  not  restricted  merely  to 
the  studies  of  the  philosophers,  nor  merely  confined  to  the 
universities,  but  they  found  their  way  into  the  theological 


1IK»  Auor.MKNTS    KOH    THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


seminaries,  into  the  pulpits   and  into  the  hearts  of  the 

people. 

The  number  of  theologians,  especially  in  Germany,  who 
were  imbued  with  Kantian  ideas,  was  great.  The  sermons 
of  the  greatest  German  preachers— Reinhard,  Zollikofer. 
Amon,  Sintenis,  Roehr,  and  others — reflect  the  Kantian  ra- 
tionalism in  its  fullest  strength.  They  estimated  the  "  moral 
argument"  of  Kant  so  highly,  that  it  atoned  in  their 
eyes  for  all  the  sins  he  had  committed  against  theology. 
There  has  never  been  an  original  philosopher  who  had  to 
struggle  so  little  with  the  antagonism  of  the  theologians 
as  Kant,  despite  his  aggressive,  progressive  and  revolution- 
ary views. 

The  German  poets,  Schiller  and  Heine,  were  not  so  well 
satisfied  with  Kant  as  were  the  theologians.  The  former 
considered  Kant's  "categorical  imperative"  too  rigorous, 
and  the  latter  'thought  Kant's  "  moral  argument "  was 
nothing  but  a  makeshift  and  an  expediency.  According  to 
Heine,  Kant's  servant  Lampe  (the  type  of  the  people)  is 
bent  on  believing  something ;  consequently  Kant  would 
appease  his  spiritual  appetite  by  the  "  moral  argument.*' 

Heine's  criticism  amounts  merely  to  a  suspicion  of  Kant's 
sincerity,  but  is  no  invalidation  of  Kant's  moral  argument, 
which  will  remain  solid  and  valid  as  long  as  there  will  be 
in  existence  something  like  a  %<  moral  obligation."  A 
"  moral  obligation  "  presupposes  a  moral  law ;  and,  again,  a 
moral  law  presupposes  a  law-giver.  The  cogency  of  this 
argument  can  not  fail  to  carry  conviction  with  itself. 

"  It  is  self-evident,"  says  Sir  William  Hamilton,  one  of 
the  greatest  British  metaphysicians,  "in  the  first  place, 
that,  if  there  be  no  moral  world,  there  can  be  no  moral 
government  of  such  a  world ;  and,  in  the  second,  that  we 
have  and  can  have  no  ground  on  which  to  believe  in  the 


THE  MORAL  ARGUMENT.  101 

reality  of  a  moral  world  except  in  so  far  as  we  ourselves 
are  moral  agents.  This  being  undeniable,  it  is  further 
evident  that,  should  we  ever  be  convinced  that  we  are  not 
moral  agents,  we  should  likewise  be  convinced  that  there 
exists  no  moral  law  or  order  in  the  universe,  and  no  supreme 
Intelligence  by  which  that  moral  order  is  established,  sus- 
tained and  regulated.  Theology  is  thus  again  wholly 
dependent  on  psycho1  ogy;  for  with  the  proof  of  the  moral 
nature  of  man  stands  or  falls  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  a 
Deity."* 

Of  no  little  interest  and  importance  to  the  "  moral  argu- 
ment," as  set  forth  by  Kant,  is  the  Darwinian  theory  of  the 
"  struggle  for  existence." 

The  followers  of  Hobbes  and  Locke  hailed  it  as  one 
evidence  more  in  favor  of  their  negation  of  the  innate  ideas 
in  general  and  of  the  moral  sense  in  particular. 

If  life  were  nothing  but  a  struggle  for  existence,  in  which 
the  weaker  has  to  perish  through  the  force  and  violence  of 
the  stronger,  then  in  fact  there  could  be  no  idea  or  trace  of 
a  moral  sense  inborn  in  man,  no  idea  of  a  "  conscience," 
and  no  idea  of  a  moral  order  in  the  world.  Then  Spinoza 
would  be  right  in  according  to  each  one  as  much  right  as  he 
has  force ;  then  there  could  be  nothing  wrong  in  warfare 
and  in  the  use  of  brutal  force ;  then  the  mediaeval  state  of 
society,  in  which  the  knights  and  lieges  robbed  and  plun- 
dered people  and  would  not  submit  to  any  law  But  to 
violence  and  physical  superiority,  would  be  considered  as 
the  ideal  of  society. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  there  is  a  u  struggle  for  existence  " 
going  on  in  society.  It  can  be  witnessed  daily  and  every- 
where. But  the  "  struggle  for  existence  "  is  not  the  supreme 


Hamilton's  Metaphys.,  Lectures  II.,  p.  23. 


102  AUUUMKXTS*    FOK   THE    EXISTENCE    OF   Got). 


law  as  the  materialistic  followers  of  Darwin  maintain.  There 
are  agencies  which  counteract  the  sway  of  that  law  and  keep 
it  within  limits';  there  are  moral  factors  which  bid  the 
"  struggle  for  existence  "  to  go  thus  far  and  no  further. 

Every  household  where  maternal  love  and  paternal  care 
tend  to  raise  and  to  make  happy  their  weak  children  regard- 
less of  the  sacrifices  of  the  money,  time,  comfort  and  health  it 
requires,  is  an  evidence  against  the  theory  of  the  Darwinian 
"  struggle  for  existence." 

Every  provision  that  society  makes  for  the  protection  of 
the  weak,  for  the  orphans,  for  old  and  infirm  people  and  for  the 
sick  that  they  may  not  perish  in  their  misery,  is  a  protest 
against  the  Darwinian  "  struggle  for  existence." 

Every  champion  of  human  rights  and  liberties,  every 
pioneer  of  a  lofty  idea,  and  every  martyr  of  a  good  and 
great  principle  is  a  witness  against  the  Darwinian  "  struggle 
for  existence,"  according  to  which  the  weaker  has  to  suc- 
cumb. 

Every  act  of  disinterestedness  and  of  self-sacrifice,  and 
every  compunction,  accusation  and  condemnation  is  a  testi- 
mony against  the  theory  of  the  "  struggle  for  existence," 
which  promises  triumph  only  to  physical  and  brutal  forces, 
to  "  self-interest  well  understood  "  and  to  "  prudence  well 
applied." 

These  remonstrations  will  suffice  to  prove  that  the  Dar- 
winian term,  the  "  struggle  for  existence,"  as  defined  by  the 
materialist,  is  not  warranted  by  all  facts  of  experience  and 
observation  ;  nor  can  the  moral  consequences  of  it  be  in  the 
interest  of  a  higher  civilization  and  humanity. 


V.  THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT, 


,,©s  war  eine  geitlang  3Robe,  ©otte§  2Beisb,eit  in  £b,iemt, 
einjelnen  <Scb,itffalen  ju  beirwnbern.  SBenn  jugegeben  ftrirb,  baft  bie  3Sor= 
fefyung  fid?  in  folcfyen  ©egenftanben  unb  ©tpffen  offenbare,  ivarum  nidjt 
aucfy  in  ber  2Beltaefc!b,ic&te  ?  Siefer  ©toff  fdjeint  ju  groft. 

,,2lber  bie  gbttlidje  2Betb,eit  b.  b,.  bie  isBernunft  ift  eine  unb  biefelbe  im 
©ro^en  h)ie  tin  ftleinen,  unb  tutr  muffen  ©ctt  nicfyt  fiir  ju  fc^mac^  ^alten, 
feine  3Bei§b,eit  auf'§  ©ro^e  anjuiuenben. 

,,llnfere  ^rtenntnife  ge^t  barauf,  bie  Ginficb,  t  jit  geiwinnen,  ba§  ba§  Don 
ber  emigen  3Bet§b,eit  SejiDedtte,  nrie  auf  bem  Soben  ber  9tatur  fo  auf  bent 
Soben  be§  in  ber  "Jtatur  iftrflic^en  unb  tfya'tigen  ©eifteS  b,erau§gefommen 
ift."* 

The  course  of  human  life,  the  destinies  of  nations  and  the 
emergencies  of  history  are  so  marvelous,  and  often  so 
unexpected,  and  have  so  frequently  baffled  all  human  expec- 
tations, that  it  has  been  quite  natural  for  people  to  see  in 
the  destinies  of  man  the  finger  and  the  hand  of  God  or 
gods. 

The  changes  of  human  fortune ;  the  rise  and  fall  of 
nations ;  the  ups  and  downs  of  every-day  life ;  the  course 
and  consequences  of  war ;  the  unexpected  defeats  and  vic- 
tories of  prominent  individuals,  parties  and  nations ;  the 
triumphs  of  knowledge,  liberty,  justice  and  truth  over 
violence,  ignorance,  oppression  and  wrong ;  the  missions  of 
different  nations  and  the  peculiarities  of  the  epochs  of 
history,  have  been  so  striking,  so  astounding  and  so  remark- 
able that,  in  general,  the  reflecting  mind  could  not  help  but 


Hegel's  Philosophic  der  Geschichte. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


think  tluit  all  this  is  more  or  loss  the  work  of  a  supreme 
guidance,  or  Providence. 

"  Faust,''  the  type  of  mankind,  says  : 
"In  being's  Hoods,  in  action's  storms, 
I  walk  and  work,  above,  beneath — 
Work  and  weave  in  endless  motion  ! 
Birth  and  death — 
An  infinite  ocean — 
A  seizing  and  giving 
The  tire  of  the  living : 

This  thus  at  the  roaring  loom  of  time  I  ply, 
And  weave  for  (rod  the  garment  thon  seest  Him  by." 

— GOETHE'S  FAUST. 

However,  there  have  heen  living v in  every  generation  a 
great  many  who  were  skeptical  concerning  Providence. 
They  have  accounted  for  all  events  with  the  force  and  logic 
of  circumstances.  Skepticism  originated  partly  in  their 
minds,  hut  mostly  from  the  great  cruelties  and  wrongs,  and 
from  the  disproportions  between  irorthinexs  and  mccesx, 
which  are  allowed  to  take  place  in  the  sublunar  world. 

If  there  is  a  kind  Providence  ruling  the  destinies  of  man- 
kind, then  how  is  it  that  so  many  pages  of  history  are 
stained  with  innocent  blood?  Why  do  so  many  tears  How 
without  relief?  and  why  do  so  often  the  demons  of  vice 
and  violence,  of  falsehood  and  intrigue  triumph  over  the 
cause  of  justice,  virtue  and  truth? 

If  there  is  a  kind  and  wise  Providence,  why  does  it  allow 
so  many  horrid  abominations  and  terrible  martyrdoms  to  be 
incident  to  the  struggle  for  justice,  equality,  liberty  and 
truth? 

If  there  is  a  just  Providence,  why  do  so  many  good  plans 
fail?  Why  have  so  many  just  and  righteous  people  to 
suffer?  And  why  is  luck  so  frequently  attached  to  the 
trail  and  train  of  wickedness,  egotism  and  selfishness? 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  105 


These  and  similar  other  questions  have  been  ever- 
recurring  complaints  against  Providence,  and  there  is  no 
prospect  whatever  that  man  will  ever  succeed  in  solving 
these  problems. 

The  truth  is,  the  processes  in  history  are  analogous  to 
those  in  nature,  and  in  both  realms  it  is  abortive  and  futile 
to  inquire  into  the  primary  whys  and  into  the  primary 
causes.  Both  in  nature  and  in  history  man  can  only 
observe  the  facts,  the  events  and  the  phenomena,  and,  at 
best,  he  may  find  out  something  about  the  secondary  causes 
and  the  secondary  whys  and  wherefores,  while  all  that  is 
primary  is  of  a  mysterious  nature,  sealed  with  "  Igno- 
rulilmus"  The  primary  causes,  ivhys  and  loherefores  are 
impenetrable  mysteries  of  the  Divine  spirit,  of  the  human 
mind  and  of  the  government  of  the  world. 

The  question  why  the  victories  of  justice,  truth,  freedom, 
enlightenment  and  knowledge  are  not  brought  about  with 
less  crime,  fewer  storms,  and  fewer  struggles,  is  analogous  to 
the  question  why  storms,  earthquakes,  floods,  etc.,  are 
necessary  for  the  production,  preservation,  growth  and  evo- 
lution of  the  cosmical  bodies  and  products. 

The  historical  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  has  to 
show  that  there  are  vestiges  of  supreme  guidance  in  the 
history  of  mankind,  the  same  way  as  there  are  traces  of  a 
supreme  wisdom  in  the  laws,  the  harmony,  the  order  and 
the  formation  of  the  physical  universe. 

In  the  Midd'e  Ages  the  historical  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God  was  based  upon  the  belief  in  miracles,  which 
were  believed  to  be  the  special  intercession  of  God;  or 
upon  the  observations  that  certain  individuals  have  changed 
the  course  of  the  social  affairs,  whereby  they  appeared  to 
b;>  commissioned  for  that  purpose ;  or  upon  such  historical 
emergencies  as  seem  to  come  just  in  time  to  prevent  or 


1(H>  AufifMKXTS    FOR   THE    EXISTENCE   OF    Goi>. 

retard,  or  to  promote.the  tendencies  of  certain. individuals 
or  parties,  or  nations. 

In  modern  times  it  is  the  "philosophy  of  history ''- 
vievving  history  as  a  great  organism  ruled  in  the  totality  of 
its  development,  of  its  course  and  tendencies  by  certain 
fixed  laws— that  has  been  referred  to  as  being  the  domain 
for  the  rational  study  of  the  historical  proof  of  the  Divine 
existence. 

The  "  philosophy  of  history  "  propounds  questions  like  the 
following  :  Are  the  events  and  emergencies  of  history  merely 
like  the  commotions  of  the  waves  or  like  the  falling  snow- 
flakes— aimless,  meaningless— or  do  they  take  place  de- 
signedly and  planfully,  upon  the  principle,  of  causality? 
Is  the  reign  of  law  supreme  merely  in  nature,  and  not  also 
in  the  origin,  and  growth  and  overthrow  of  political  institu- 
tions, in  the  rise  and  fall  of  dynasties,  or  the  progress  and 
decline  of  the  agencies,  tendencies  and  causes  of  historical 
movements.?  Are  all  the  phenomena  of  history  so  con- 
nected that  they  had  to  occur  the  way  they  did,  or  might 
just  the  reverse,  or  something  entiraly  different,  have 
happened  just  as  well? 

The  answers  to  these  questions  have  been  given  by  the 
following  historians,  metaphysicians  and  scholars. 

The  science  of  the  "  philosophy  of  history  "  is  compara- 
tively a  new  one.  The  Italian,  Giovani  Battista  Vico 
(1668-1744),  is  considered  its  father.  His  great  book, 
"  Principii  de  Scienza  Nuova,"  treating  all  institutions  and 
laws  of  society  from  a  natural  and  historical  standpoint, 
may  be  called  a  "natural  history  of  the  human  race."  But 
it  may  also  be  styled  a  "natural  theology  derived  from 
history ;"  for,  though  it  denies  the  miraculous  interference 
of  God  in  history,  it  attempts  to  prove  that  a  Divine  Provi- 
dence guides  all  historical  events  by  a  natural  process. 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  107 


Vico  maintains  that,  in  a  very  remote  epoch,  man  was  in 
a  state  not  much  above  that  of  brutes ;  but,  in  the  lapse  of 
time,  under  the  influence  of  circumstances  the  most  latent 
and  most  innate  ideas  of  morality  were  awakened,  and  man 
gradually  advanced  from  the  condition  of  animality  to  that 
of  human  beings. 

His  theory  was  that  the  development,  progress,  rise  and 
fall  of  a  nation  take  place  according  to  fixed  laws,  analogous 
to  the  laws  which  determine  the  moral,  physical,  social 
and  mental  development  and  progress  of  individuals.  The 
Roman  history  furnished-  him  with  illustrations  for  his 
ideas,  and  he  considered  the  history  of  the  Roman  nation 
typical.  Like  it,  he  thought  the  history  of  every  nation  had 
to  pass  through  three  states  :  that  of  theocracy,  aristocracy, 
and  democracy. 

He  claimed  also  that  history  repeats  itself  in  constantly 
widening  circles. 

While  Vico  held  that  the  reign  of  law*  was  manifested 
only  in  the  life  and  growth  of  nations  and  individuals,  it 
was  Herder  and  Kant,  the  two  illustrious  Germans,  who, 
in  their  works,  published  in  one  and  the  same  year  (1784), 
advanced  the  idea  that  the  history  of  the  whole  human  race 
was  ruled  no  less  by  fixed  laws  than  that  of  one  and  every 
individual. 

Herder,  "the  father  of  universal  history,"  undertook  to 
show  in  his  magnificent  fragments,  ';  Ideas  toward  a  Phi- 
losophy of  the  History  of  Mankind,"  that  the  history  of  the. 
human  race  shows  a  progressive  development  of  humanity, 
of  reason  and  of  liberty.  This  progressive  principle,  or 
evolution,  Herder  considers  the  paramount  law,  both  in  the 
physical  and  in  the  historical  world.  It  wis  to  him  the 
Dirii'ie  pli.n  in  hiMory.  Man.  being  organized  so  that  the 
sense  of  liberty,  humanity,  morality,  sociability,  etc.,  is 


10S  Al«;t'MKNTS    FOK   THE    ExiSTEXCK    cF    GoD. 


an  essential  part  of  his  nature,  has  gradually  and  progres- 
sively developed  himself  under  social,  geographical  and 
pliysical  influences.  Herder,  treating  the  history  of  the 
human  race  as  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  physical  uni- 
verse, did  not  commence  his  work  with  a  certain  tradition 
or  myth,  or  mythical  epoch,  but  with  a  rational  contempla- 
tion of  the  universe. 

Kant  begins  his  essay,  "  Idea  of  a  Universal  History  from 
a  Cosmopolitan  P"int  of  View,"  thus:  "Whatever  meta- 
physical theory  one  may  entertain  as  to  the  free  will  of 
man,  the  manifestations  of  this  free  will — the  human 
actions — are,  as  every  other  event  in  nature,  determined  by 
fixed  laws.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  historiography  will  yet 
succeed  in  showing  that  there  is  a  fixed  law  in  the  occur- 
rence of  all  ethical  phenomena,  so  that,  while  now  they  are 
considered  disconnected  occurrences,  they  will  then  be 
looked  upon  as  necessary  effects  of  the  constantly  pro- 
gressive manifestations  of  the  original  endowment  of  the 
human  race.  The  marriages,  birth  and  death  cases  are,  as 
to  their  number,  subjected  to  fixed  laws  of  nature,  and  so 
are  the  missions,  tendencies  and  ends  of  the  nations  deter- 
mined by  fixed  laws,  although  people  are  not  aware  of  it.'1 
Kant  expressed  the  hope  that  the  man  will  yet  come  who 
will  do  for  the  discovery  of  the  laws  in  history  what  Newton 
and  Kepler  did  for  the  discovery  of  the  laws  in  the  physical 
universe. 

The  idea  that  history  is  ruled  by  fixed  laws,  found  also  at 
that  time  in  France  its  representative.  Condorcet,  who, 
though  a  marquis  and  imprisoned  for  no  other  reason  than 
because  of  his  aristocratic  descent,  proclaimed,  heroically, 
during  the  "reign  of  terror''  in  the  French  revolution,  the 
l»elief  that  liberty  was  the  mother  of  all  true  progress  and 
happiness.  His  excellent  work,  "  Esquisse  d'  un  Tableau 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  109 

Historique  de  Progress  de  1'Esprit  Humain"  (1795),  he 
wrote  while  in  prison.  He  undertook  to  prove  that  man- 
kind has  to  pass  through  eight  stages,  from  the  primitive 
barbarism  to  the  civilization  of  his  day,  and  that  it  was  the 
Divine  design  in  history  to  improve  mankind,  so  that  crime 
and  vice  shall  come  out  of  practice  and  shall  become  almost 
impossible. 

Progress  of  civilization  meant  to  him  the  decrease  of 
crime  and  the  abatement  of  misery. 

That  era  has  to  be  brought  about  by  the  following  four 
measures : 

(a  )  The  laws  of  society  must  not  militate  against  the 
best  interests  of  the  people,  but  must  rather  promote  them. 

(6.)  The  laws  of  society  must  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
arouse  the  good  will  and  the  charitable  proclivities  of  the 
people  in  such  a  degree,  that  people  are  seized  by  an  aversion 
to  all  that  is  wrong  and  mean. 

(c.)  Man  must  learn  to  know  his  real  interests,  and  must 
learn  to  consider  them  objects  of  his  duties. 

(d.)  Man  must  learn  to  make  his  conduct  conformable 
to  the  dictates  of  reason,  and  must  learn  to  understand  the 
voice  of  his  conscience. 

Just  one  decade  later  (1805)  the  German  metaphysician, 
Fichte,  published  his  "  Grundzuege  des  Gegenwsertigen 
Zeitalters,"  in  which  he  treats  history  as  the  manifestation 
of  a  Divine  plan,  man  and  every  age  being  essential  parts 
of  it. 

Fichte  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  obligatory  on  the  indi- 
vidual to  sacrifice — if  social  welfare  requires  it — everything 
for  the  human  species.  In  doing  so,  an  individual  over- 
comes meanness,  selfishness  and  sensuality,  and  he  then 
lives  a  true  life ;  and  duty  will  seem  to  him,  or  to  her,  not 
rigorous,  but  a  pleasure. 


110          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


Civilization  has  for  its  end  to  subject  nature  to  reason 
and  to  become,  by  way  of  liberty,  the  embodiment  of  reason 

itself. 

Preceding  this  end  are  five  epochs  : 

That  of  the  paradisical  innocence,  when  reason  rules  man 
only  through  instinct. 

Tlu.it  of  the  inception  of  the  reign  of  sin,  when  the  instinct- 
reason  is  growing  weaker  in  the  mass  of  the  people,  and 
when  it  works  only  by  the  instrumentality  of  a  few  elect 
persons  setting  up  a  compulsory  rule  of  authority,  by  means 
of  order  and  systems. 

That  of  sinfulness,  when  people  revolt  against  the  author- 
ity of  the  instinct-reason. 

That  of  justification,  when  truth  and  scientific  realization 
are  considered  the  highest  authority. 

Thai  of  perfect  justification  and  holiness,  when  men  will 
edify  themselves  by  art. 

The  epoch,  in  which  Fichte  was  writing,  he  considered 
the  transition  from  the  third  to  the  fourth,  the  epoch  of 
scientific  rationalism.  . 

One  would  hardly  believe  that  such  a  mysticism  was 
taught  by  Fichte,  formerly  the  advocate  of  all  progressive 
rationalism,  as  advanced  by  Spinoza,  Voltaire,  Rousseau, 
Kant  and  others.  Yet  it  is  so. 

Fichte  had  in  his  former  years  identified  God  and  the 
moral  order  of  the  world.  This  incurred  the  charge  of 
atheism  to  him.  The  great  Protestant  preacher,  Dr.  Rein- 
hardt,  of  Dresden,  persecuted  him  so,  that,  despite  his 
defense,  "  Appelation  an  das  Publicum  gegen  die  Anklage 
des  Atheismus"  (1798),  he  was  deposed  from  his  chair  in 
the  Jena  University.  In  his  appeal  to  the  public,  Fichte 
asseverated  that  he  was  a  monotheist,  and  flung  the  charge 
of  atheism  back  upon  his  persecutor  for  teaching  that  God 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  Ill 

is  a  postulate  of  human  happiness.  This  persecution  had  a 
weakening  effect  upon  Fichte's  great  and  bright  intellect, 
and,  afraid  of  further  persecution  and  molestation,  he  was 
anxious1  to  appear  a  good  Christian  and  a  good  German 
patriot.  Hence  his  mysticism  and  his  patriotism  in  his 
latter  years.  Previous  to  that  he  was  a  radical  rationalist 
and  a  cosmopolite  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word. 

A  new  era  in  the  study  of  the  philosophy  of  history  com- 
menced in  1825  with  Hegel's  "  Philosophic  der  Geschichte." 

The  works  of  Vico,  Herder,  Kant,  Condorcet  and  Fichte 
were  only  fragmentary  and  disconnected,  and  it  was  first 
Hegel,  who,  treating  history  as  a  connected  totality  of 
phenomena  and  events,  brought  system  into  this  branch  of 
study.  He  put  the  reflection  on  history  upon  a  scientific 
basis. 

The  universal  history  is,  according  to  Hegel,  the  history  of 
the  development  of  the  consciousness  of  freedom.  It  is  the 
domain  of  reason.  Nature,  moving  in  a  circle,  reproduces 
only  the  physical  phenomena,  while  history,  being  the  realm 
of  progress,  is  incessantly  productive  of  new  phenomena : 
the  fundamental  law  of  nature  being  gravity,  and  the  fun- 
damental law  of  history  being  liberty.  '  Individuals  and 
nations  believe  they  serve  their  own  interest  and  do  what 
they  please,  while,  in  fact,  they  serve  unintentionally  and 
unconsciously  the  plan  of  the  universal  mind.  They  aim 
at  one  thing,  but  this  one  thing  proves,  when  looked  at  in 
the  totality  of  historical  events,  an  instrument,  or  a  co- 
ordinate, or  a  subordinate  part  of  something  it  was  not 
designed,  or  anticipated,  by  man  to  be. 

The  great  men  are  the  instruments  of  the  progress  and 
development  of  history.  Pursuing  their  mission,  they 
destroy  many  a  fine  plant  that  happens  to  be  in  their  way, 
but  that  can  not  be  helped.  Their  passions,  and  interests 


112  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

and  aims,  without  their  knowing  how,  are  subservient  to  a 
higher  guidance.  When  their  mission  is  fulfilled,  they  drop 
like  the  leaves  of  a  tree.  They  die  prematurely,  like 
Alexander;  or  are  assassinated,  like  Caesar;  or  banished, 
like  Napoleon.  Their  misfortune  is  a  comfort  to  their 
envious  and  jealous  contemporaries. 

When  a  nation  has  matured  the  fruits  of  her  mission,  they 
fall  oft',  but  not  in  her  lap ;  on  the  contrary,  they  prove  to 
be  the  potion  annihilating  her.  Those  spirits  were  matured 
for  the  benefit  of  mankind  at  large ;  and  they  operate  in 
mankind  in  the  form  of  a  new  principle. 

History  and  nature  are  the  glory  and  manifestation  of 
the  "Absolute  Spirit,"  which  is  the  real,  eternal  Truth  per  se. 
This  absolute  Spirit  arrives  at  self- consciousness  first  in 
the  history  of  the  human  race,  and  it  has  to  pass  four 
epochs. 

The  history  of  the  Orient  is  the  history  of  the  childhood 
of  mankind.  -In  the  Orient  only  one  is  politically  free. 
There  the  rational  qualities  of  a  government  are  merely 
accidental,  while  the  irrational  ones  are  the  rule.  The 
Orient  is  characteristic  of  stability.  There  is  no  progress 
there,  and,  even  if  by  valor  or  virtue  anything  new  is  effected, 
it  is  only  short-lived. 

Greek  history  represents  the  youth  of  mankind.  Greece 
was  "the  hothouse  of  individualism  and  individualities. 
First,  as  in  the  works  of  fine  arts,  the  sensuous  bears 
the  impression,  and  is  the  expression,  of  the  spiritual,  so, 
in  Greece,  was  the  individual  will  and  the  social  morality 
in  union  only  under  the  form  of  beauty.  The  ethics  of  self- 
discrimination  and  subjection  to  the  moral  law,  as  advocated 
by  Socrates, 'were  not  the  ethics  of  the  Greek  genius,  nor 
was  that  standard  ever  liked,  or  reached,  by  the  Greeks. 
The  esthetic  individualism  was  their  monarch. 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  113 


The  Roman  world  corresponds  to  the  age  of  manhood  in 
history.  Among  the  Romans,  some  were  politically  free. 
Individualism  had  no  free  scope  in,  the  Roman  policy.  The 
universal  end  of  the  state  crushed  all  individualism.  Rome 
was  the  pantheon  of  all  gods  and  spirits,  but  they  were  not 
allowed  to  retain  their  vital  peculiarities. 

The  Teutonic  world  represents  the  high  age  of  mankind- 
There,  all  are  free.  This  high  age,  unlike  the  physical, 
represents  not  weakness,  but  maturity.  The  goal  of  the 
history,  consisting  in  the  reconciliation  of  State  and  Church, 
of  temporal  and  spiritual  principle,  is  realized  in  the 
Teutonic  world. 

This  is  Hegel's  theory,  concerning  the  history.  It  must 
be  admitted  that  Hegel's  "  Philosophic  der  Goschichte"  is  a 
very  thoughtful  book,  full  of  original  ideas  and  of  good, 
sound  observations,  but,  nevertheless,  it  is  not  free  from 
great  mistakes,  one  of  the  greatest  of  which  is  Hegel's  idea 
that  the  Teutonic  world  of  his  age— that  meant  the  Prussian 
State— was  the  last  act  in  the  great  drama  of  the  political 
history. 

Hegel  was  also  severely  criticised  for  his  theory  that  his- 
tory, in  all  its  particular  events,  was  determined  by  fixed 
laws,  the  way  cosmical  phenomena  are.  Such  a  theory,  it 
was  remonstrated,  leaves  no  room  for  man's  free  will  and 
responsibility,  and  does  away  with  every  moral  measure  of 
individual  deeds. 

Professor  Karl  Rosenkranz,  one  of  the  ablest  disciples  of 
Hegel,  tries  to  show,  in  his  monography,  "  Hegel,"  and  in 
his  collected  works,*  that  Hegel  did  not,  as  his  critics  hold, 
consider  the  individuals  and  their  actions  a  mere  "  foam  of 

*  Neue  Studien,  III.,  259   260. 


114          ARGUMKNTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


the    son''  of  history.     Professor  Rosenkranx  is  authority 
for  that. 

1  legel's  system,  being  an  exponent  of  the  evolution  theory, 
was  of  great  fascination  and  attraction  for  his  contem- 
poraries, not  only  in  Germany,  but  in  other  countries.  In 
France,  M.  Victor  Cousin  (1792-1867),  a  metaphysician, 
v\lio.  through  his  great  eloquence,  exerted  great  influence 
upon  all  classes  of  people,  became  a  zealous  student  of 
Hegel's  philosophy.  Being  an  eclectic,  Cousin  did  not 
identify  himself  with  any  of  the  philosophical  systems, 
but  he  selected  from  every  system  sub-elements  which 
seemed  to  him  good,  correct  and  true.  As  to  the  philo- 
sophical reflection  on  history,  Cousin  was  a  Hegelian, 
averring  that  history  is  ruled  by  fixed  laws. 

"  History,"  Cousin  thinks,  "  reflects  not  only  the  whole 
movement  of  humanity,  but,  as  humanity  is  the  summary 
of  the  universe,  which  is  itself  a  manifestation  of  God,  in 
the  last  analysis  history  is  nothing  less  than  the  last  counter- 
stroke  of  Divine  action.  The  admirable  order  which  reigns 
there  is  a  reflection  of  eternal  order,  and  its  laws  have  for 
their  last  principle  God  himself.  God,  considered  in  his 
perpetual  action  upon  the  world  and  humanity,  is  Provi- 
dence. It  is  because  God,  or  Providence,  is  in  nature 
that  nature  has  its  necessary  laws.  This  necessity,  which 
the  vulgar  accuse,  which  they  confound  with  external  and 
physical  fatality,  and  by  which  they  designate  and  disfigure 
the  Divine  wisdom  applied  to  the  world,  this  necessity  is 
the  unanswerable  demonstration  of  the  intervention  of 
Providence  in  human  affairs,  the  demonstration  of  a  moral 
government  of  the  world.  Great  events  are  the  decrees  of 
this  government,  promulgated  by  the  voice  of  time.  History 
is  the  manifestation  of  God's  supervision  of  humanity;  the 
judgments  of  history  are  the  judgments  of  God  himself. 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  115 

God  has  willed  that  humanity  should  have  a  regular 
development,  that  it  might  reflect  something  of  himself — 
something  of  the  intellectual  and  intelligible — God  being 
intelligence  in  his  essence,  and  in  his  eternal  movements 
and  in  its  fundamental  motives,  principles. 

"  Now,  if  history  is  the  government  of  God  made  visible, 
everything  is  there  in  its  place,  everything  is  there  for  good, 
for  everything  arrives  at  an  end,  marked  by  a  beneficent 
power.  Hence  this  historic  optimism  which  I  have  the 
honor  to  profess  is  nothing  less  than  the  idea  itself  of  civili- 
zation in  relation  with  its  first  and  last  principle  with  Him 
who  has  made  it  in  making  humanity,  and  who  has  formed 
everything  with  weight  and  measure,  for  the  greatest  good 
of  all  things. 

"Either  history  is  an  insignificant  phantasmagoria — and 
then  it  is  a  bitter,  cruel  mockery — or  it  has  a  meaning,  it  is 
reasonable ;  and,  if  it  is  reasonable,  it  has  laws,  for  every 
law  must  have  these  characters.  To  maintain  the  contrary 
is  a  blasphemy  against  existence  and  its  author."  * 

In  the  same  lecture  (the  seventh  of  his  course  of  the 
history  of  modern  philosophy,  translated  into  English  by 
O.  W.  Wight,  1852),  M.  Cousin  maintains  that  there  are  only 
three  elements  of  thought — the  element  of  the  infinite,  of 
the  finite  and  of  their  mutual  relation.  Starting  from  this 
view,  he  assumes  that  there  are  also  only  three  epochs  in 
the  development  of  thought  in  history. 

In  the  first  epoch  of  history,  there  ruled  the  idea  of  the 
infinite.  In  that  epoch  everything  was  more  or  less  immo- 
bile. Industry  was  feeble  and  commerce  limited  to  the 
inevitable  relations  of  men  among  themselves  in  the  same 
country.  There  was  little  of  internal  or  maritime  com- 


*  Cours  d'Hhtoire  de  la  Philosophic  au  18  Siecle. 


11C)  ARGUMENTS   FOR   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 


ineire.  The  nations  were  strongly  attached  to  their  terri- 
tory. The  mathematical  and  astronomical  sciences  were 
cultivated  because  they  remind  man  of  the  ideal,  the  abstract 
and  the  infinite.  Experimental  philosophy,  chemistry  and 
the  natural  sciences  were  not  cultivated  with  much  atten- 
tion. The  State,  having  hardly  recognized  the  individuals, 
was  the  reign  of  the  absolute,  fixed,  immutable  law.  Arty 
without  any  ivsthetical  proportions,  was  gigantic.  Religion 
had  for  its  end  less  to  govern  life  than  to  despise  it. 
Philosophy  was  nothing  else  but  a  contemplation  of  the 
absolute  unity. 

In  the  second  epoch  of  the  human  race,  there  had  been 
ruling  the  idea  of  the  finite.  This  second  epoch  is  to  be 
distinguished  by  progress  in  industry;  by  commerce  on  a 
large  scale;  by  discoveries  and  inventions  to  increase  the 
products  of  nature  by  individual  activity  and  enterprise ; 
by  the  study  of  nature  and  of  man,  of  physics  and  psy- 
chology ;  and  by  a  religion  which  transfers  the  earth  to 
heaven,  and  makes  heaven  an  image  of  the  earth. 

A  mixture  of  the  idea  of  the  infinite  and  the  finite  rules 
in  the  third  epoch  of  history.  In  that  epoch,  religion 
is  referred  to  God  and  the  religious  dogma  is  applied  to 
morality.  This  life  is  regarded  as  real  and  as  having  a 
price  of  immense  value.  The  reciprocal  influence  of 
psychology  and  ontology  will  constitute  the  philosophy. 
All  kinds  of  industry,  all  mathematical  and  natural 
sciences,  territorial  and  maritime  power,  the  prepondering 
force  of  the  state  and  individual  liberty  will  prevail. 

There  is  no  epoch  in  history  in  which  one  idea  has  ruled 
to  the  exclusion  of  every  other.  In  every  epoch  only  one 
idea  predominates,  and  the  other  ideas  are  subordinated  to  it. 

The  first  epoch  is  called  that  of  the  infinite,  because  the 
idea  prevalent  is  an  obscure  synthesis,  a  unity,  the  absolute ; 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  11' 


•while  the  next  epoch  is  that  of  diversity,  of  division  and 
separation. 

Cousin's  three  terms— "the  infinite,"  ''the  finite"  and 
"their  mutual  relations"  are  expressive  of  the  same  ideas 
as  Hegel's  "  absolute,"  'k  subjective ''  and  "  objective  spirit." 

Cousin  did  not  say  anything  new ;  he  was  only  the  inter- 
preter and  advocate  of  Hegel  among  the  French. 

By  far  more  original  than  Cousin  was 'his  contemporary, 
August  Comte  (1798-1857),  the  father  of  the  modern 
agnosticism  and  of  the  moral  maxim  styled  altruism.  Con- 
sidering himself  the  prophet  of  the  positive  dispensation, 
according  to  which  man  can  not  know  anything  about  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  things,  and  has  no  way  of  knowing 
anything  certain  about  God  and  immortality,  Comte  would 
replace  the  worship  of  God  by  the  "  worship  of  humanity." 
Humanity  he  took  in  the  sense  of  the  whole  human  race. 
The  symbols,  the  nomenclature  and  the  ritual  which  he 
recommended  to  his  followers  were  absurd  and  foolish,  but 
the  agnostical  idea,  as  well  as  his  division  of  the  natural 
sciences,  his  altruism  and  the  great  stress  he  laid  upon 
sociology,  gained  him  many  admirers  and  followers. 

The  six  fundamental  sciences  are  mathematics,  chemis- 
try, astronomy,  physics,  biology  and  sociology:  The  latter 
one,  sociology,  Comte  made  the  main  field  of  his  study. 
He  held  that  history  is  ruled  by  fixed  laws,  so  that  man- 
kind, in  the  course  of  its  development,  had  to  pass  three 
stages  the  theological,  the  metaphysical  and  the  positive 
or  scientific.  Himself  he  considered  the  herald  of  the 
positive,  or  scientific,  stage  of  mankind.  Comte's  asser- 
tion that  these  three  stages  are  only  consecutive  to  one 
another  is  false.  Men  like  Tyndal,  Huxley,  Spencer  and 
others  claim  to  be  positivists,  and  still  they  occupy  them- 
selves very  much  with  theological  and  metaphysical  ques- 


US  AH'ifMKNTS    FOR   THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


tions.    This  shows  that  the  interest  in  religion  has  remained 
oven  in  the  "age  of  positivism." 

The  agnosticism  was  advocated  by  Comte,  but  it  was 
advanced  first  by  Protagoras  among  the  ancient  Greeks, 
and  then  by  the  Frenchman,  Jean  Baptiste  Robinet,  in  the 
last  century. 

In  our  generation,  it  is  the  English  philosopher.  Herbert 
Spencer,  who  is  considered  the  main  representative  of 
agnosticism.  According  to  this  "  new  philosophy,"  as  set 
forth  by  him  in  the  "  First  Principles"  time  and  space, 
matter  and  spirit,  cause  and  force,  change,  motion 
and  rest  are  subjects  Avhich  are  absolutely  "unknow- 
able." Spencer  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  God,  but  he 
thinks  God  is  "  unknowable,"  that  is  to  say,  there  are  no. 
ways  of  knowing  anything  about  God. 

No  matter  how  positive  the  agnostics  are  in  their  asser- 
tions and  how  they  ignore  the  remonstrances  of  their 
opponets,  they  can  not  help  to  admit  that  there  is  no  action 
without  an  actor,  no  thought  without  a  thinker,  no  effect 
without  a  cause,  and  no  phenomenon  without  a  substance. 
These  are  indisputable  truths,  and  the  rock  on  which  the 
ship  of  agnosticism  will  and  must  strand. 

In  ignoring  all  except  the  external  phenomena  and  the 
manifestation  of  force,  agnosticism  repudiates  the  very  same 
principles,  ideas  and  methods  as  "  unknowable  "  by  which 
its  very  system  was  brought  about. 

It  is  just  as  fallacious  to  deny  the  facts  and  the  philosophy 
of  man's  mental,  moral  and  spiritual  nature,  as  it  is  to  deny 
the  facts  and  the  philosophy  of  matter  and  of  the  physical 
phenomena. 

The  categories  of  the  human  mind  which  make  generali- 
zation, classification,  specification,  induction,  deduction, 
etc.,  possible,  can  not  be  denied,  though  they  are  no 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  119 

external  phenomena,  nor  can  the  critera  of  the  logical  and 
psychological  truth  be  denied. 

Agnosticism  is  at  present  the  philosophy  of  fashion 
just  as  the  English  deism  and  the  French  atheism 
were  the  fashion  in  the  last  century,  and  as  the  philosophi- 
cal systems  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel  and  others  were,  in 
succession  the  philosophical  creeds  of  certain  decades. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  man  can  not  know  all  about  God, 
nor  can  he  comprehend  the  Divine  essence.  A  God  whom 
finite  man  could  comprehend,  would  be  no  infinite  God  at 
all ;  it  would  be  a  mere  idol  or  phantasm.  The  infinite  God 
can  never  be  comprehended  by  the  finite  man.  God  is 
incomprehensible,  but  he  is  not  unknowable.  There  are  ample 
evidences  in  history,  nature  and  life  by  which  we  can  know 
not  merely  that  there  exists  a  supreme  Being,  but  also 
much  about  the  Divine  attributes.  There  are  goodness  and 
wisdom  enough  in  life,  nature  and  history  to  warrant 
inferences  in  behalf  of  the  nature  of  a  supreme  Being. 
Those  who  are  earnest  in  seeking  God  will  find  his  traces. 

The  idea  that  history  is  an  organism  developed  and 
ruled  by  invariable  laws  became  prevalent,  not  merely 
among  the  metaphysicians,  but  also  among  the  theologians. 
Foremost  among  them  was  Baron  Bunsen,  who  considered 
it  his  liVs  object  to  translate  the  Semitic  truths  into  the 
Japhetic  languages.  The  proof  of  the  great  success  he  met 
with  is  his  German  Bible  translation,  with  commentary, 
and  his  "  Gott  in  der  Weltgeschichte." 

In  this  latter  work  he  undertook  to  trace  the  idea  of 
Providence  in  the  literature  of  the  Aryanic  and  Mongolic 
nations  as  well  as  that  of  the  Hebrews. 

Dilating  on  the  laws  which  govern  history,  Bunsen 
remarks  :  "  Xoble  and  enlightened  minds  have,  from  early 
times,  sought  to  justify  the  moral  order  of  the  world, 


120          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

according  to  which  all  evil  is  self-destructive  and  doomed 
finally  to  perish,  but  not  until  after  apparent  victory  and 
lengthened  domination,  while  the  good  prevails  at  last,  but 
only  after  an  arduous  struggle  and  after  a  long  period  of 
misconception  and  oppression.  This  justification  may 
either  seek  its  ground  in  fact  or  in  thought. 

"The  conception  of  Divine  Providence  as  consistent 
with  human  conscience  and  reason  is  presented  among  the 
Semitic  people  in  the  history  telling  how,  from  Abraham  to 
Moses,  God  delivered  his  people  with  a  strong  hand,  and, 
again,  in  the  book  of  Job,  as  the  lesson  of  submission  to 
his  mighty  arm.  Among  the  Hellenes,  the  triumph  of 
divine  justice  was  celebrated  in  epic  and  drama.  The  exhi- 
bition of  the  divine  Nemesis  in  the  destruction  of  Troy  is 
the  immortal  type  of  the  former  kind — the  epi-theodicy ; 
the  vivid  representation  of  an  avenging  fate  in  the  tragedies 
of  "^Eschylus  "  and  "  Sophocles  "  is  an  equally  immortal 
hymn  to  the  moral  order  of  the  world.  Finally,  in  the 
historical  works  of  Herodotus,  the  same  circle  of  ideas  is 
exhibited  in  contact  with  the  actual  destinies  of  nations 
and  their  leaders. 

"The  modern  German  school — Kant,  Lessing,  Herder 
and  others — was  also  the  first  to  apprehend  in  all  their 
depths  the  questions  which  mankind  in  our  late  age  must 
natura'ly  propound  to  itself:  Is  there  such  a  thing  as 
progress  in  the  history  of  the  human  race?  If  so,  wherein 
is  it  visible?  What  is  its  formula?  These  questions  are 
only  capable  of  a  solution  if  we  start  from  the  assumption  of 
a  moral  order  of  the  world  and  the  essential  unity  of  the 
human  race.  For  progress  presupposes  something  that 
can  advance  and  that  bears  within  itself  the  law  of  its  own 
advance.  But  this  is  the  case  only  with  mind  conscious 
of  volition  and  cognition,  and,  therefore,  any  intelligent 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  121 

idea  of  progress  presupposes,  equally  with  religion,  a 
Divine  government."  * 

In  chapter  eight  of  the  same  book,  Baron  Bunsen  says  : 
il  The  individual  for  the  nation,  the  nation  for  humanity, 
humanity  for  God ;  but  each  individual  in  God  and  God  in 
each  individual.  This  is  the  supreme  law  of  existence  in  this 
tidal  wave  of  the  collective  race.  The  mystery  of  humanity, 
as  of  the  universe,  is  personality ;  that  is  to  say,  the  exist- 
ence of  a  Being  possessed  of  consciousness  and  volition, 
having  his  place  in  the  great  Whole  of  which  he  is  a  part, 
and  yet  forming  an  antithesis  to  that  Whole — in  other 
words,  the  co-existence  of  the  free,  self-determining  moral 
Will  on '  the  one  hand,  and  of  External.  Necessity  on  the 
other.  This  moral  personality  is  the  mysterious  element 
in  human  history." 

And  in  the  third  chapter  of  the  same  book  Baron  Bunsen 
argues  :  "  But  if  there  be  a  moral  order  of  the  world — 
a  cosmos  of  mind  which  corresponds  to  the  cosmos  of 
the  visible  world,  it  must  necessarily  have  cognizable  laws. 
For,  if  the  laws  of  nature,  uninformed  by  mind,  have  been 
discovered,  the  laws  of  development  of  mind  must  be 
much  more  discoverable.  If  the  observation  of  a  portion 
of  a  planet's  course  enables  the  astronomer  to  draw  the 
whole  curve  of  its  orbit,  ought  not  so  many  thousands  of 
years  of  human  development  enable  us  to  recognize  the 
laws  of  the  orbit  of  humanity  to  understand  the  present? 
dimly,  at  least,  to  forecast  the  future?  If  geology  has  ex- 
plained to  us  the  succession  of  the  earth's  strata,  ought  not 
scientific  history  to  give  us  still  more  intelligible  answers  as 
to  the  successive  deposits  of  language  and  religion?  The 
deposition  of  strata  shows  us  the  order  in  which  the  crust 

*  Book  I.,  Introduction,  Wink  worth's  English  translation. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  or  GOD. 


of  our  planet  has  been  formed;  the  strata  of  man's  con- 
sciousness of  (tod,  during  the  successive  ages  of  humanity, 
reveal  to  us  with  equal  certainty  a  process  of  development; 
hut,  more  than  this,  they  present  to  us  a  reflection  of  our 
own  inner  nature  in  the  mirror  oi  all  time— the  unfolding 
of  the  conscious,  finite  mind  on  the  scale  of  universal 
history." 

The  discovery  of  the  invariable  laws  of  history,  Baron 
Bunsen  thought,  was  possible  only  by  the  application  of 
the  Baconean  methods  to  history. 

The  greatest  imaginary  contrast  to  Bunsen's  "  Gott  in  der 
Weltgeschichte "  (1857)  Avas  Buckle's  "History  of  Civiliza- 
tion" (1858).  Both  Baron  Bunsen  and  Mr.  Buckle  hold  that 
history  is  ruled  by  fixed  laws  ;  and  both  maintain  that  the 
discovery  of  these  laws  must  be  brought  about  by  means  of 
the  Baconean  methods,  and  still  the  difference  is  as  day  and 
night. 

Bunsen  considered  the  laws  of  history  to  be  the  design 
and  Avisdom  of  a  supreme  Being,  just  as  it  is  \vith  the  laws 
of  nature,  while  Buckle  Avas  a  necessitarian.  All  existences 
and  all  that  is  to  take  place,  are  so  of  necessity.  Buckle's 
"  History  of  Civilization"  breathes  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  the  philosophy  of  materialism.  Climate,  food,  soil 
and  the  general  aspect*  of  nature  he  considered  the  most 
powerful  agents  in  the  rise  of  thought  and  habit.  With  the 
influence  of  the  physical  world  upon  the  human  mind  and 
r!>r  fcrna-,  he  accounts  for  everything.  He  denied  the  free 
Avill  of  man.  Physical  causes,  physical  antecedents  and 
physical  sequences  Avere  to  him  the  alpha  and  the  omega  of 
his  theory.  The  statistics  were  to  him  an  infallible  oracle; 
and  they  showed,  manifestly,  that  there  is  a  law,  not  merely 
in  marriages,  and  suicides  and  crimes,  but  also  even  in  such 
seemingly  accidental  things,  as,  for  example,  that  a  certain 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  123 

number  of  letters  are  annually  dropped  into  the  letter- 
boxes upon  which  no  direction  has  been  put. 

There  is  no  denying  it,  Buckle's  "  History  of  Civiliza- 
tion" is,  despite  the  great  errors  it  contains,  a  highly  inter- 
esting work ;  and  its  greatest  merit  consists  in  having 
induced  a  great  many  to  think  on  the  questions  of  which 
it  treats. 

One  great  mistake  Buckle  made,  was  in  considering  the 
number  of  statistics  as  safe  and  reliable,  as  precise  and 
unerring  as  the  laws  of  nature.  The  doctrines  of  the  statistics 
are  only  arithmetical  means,  probabilities  and  approxima- 
tions. Besides,  these  statistics  can  give  only  a  report  as  to 
human  actions ;  but  there  are  no  statistics  as  to  human 
thoughts  and  feelings,  to  human  motives  and  to  the  change 
of  human  mind ;  and  it  is  just  the  knowledge  of  this  that  is 
indispensably  necessary  if  the  statistics  of  crime  and  misery 
are  to  be  considered  laws  of  nature. 

Another  great  mistake  of  Buckle's  was  to  consider 
climate,  food,  soil  and  the  general  aspects  of  nature  the 
sources  from  which  man's  actions  spring.  There  are  coun- 
tries of  about  the  same  climate,  food,  soil  and  general 
aspects  of  nature,  and  still  the  inhabitants  have  a  different 
state  and  mode  of  civilization.  This  is  an  evidence  against 
Buckle,  and  shows  that  human  actions  are  dependent  upon 
the  moral  and  spiritual  resources  of  man's  mind  and  upon 
the  genius  of  the  nations.  If  everything  depends  merely  on 
climate,  food,  soil  and  the  general  aspects  of  nature,  why 
does  Greece  not  produce  at  present  such  great  men  in  art, 
politics  and  philosophy  as  it  did  in  antiquity?  Why-  does 
Palestine  not  produce  at  present  such  religious  and  moral 
geniuses  as  it  did  of  old?  The  climate,  the  food,  the  soil 
and  the  general  aspects  of  nature  have  not  materially 
changed  in  those  countries. 


124  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

In  a  lecture  on  woman,  Buckle  made  the  assertion  that 
the  greatest  discoveries  in  science  were  made,  not  by  experi- 
mental studies,  but  by  intuition.  Well,  how  does  the  theory 
of  intuition  agree  with  his  materialism,  expressed  in  his 
"  History  of  Civilization?" 

Like  all  materialists,  Buckle  did  not  consider  that  if 
man  had  no  free  will,  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to 
break  away  from  his  former  principles  and  habits  ;  that  all 
courses  of  actions  would  be  alike  to  him,  and  that  it  would 
be  a  mere  absurdity  to  speak  of  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong, 
or  of  moral  principles. 

If  man  has  no  free  will,  by  what  right  does  Buckle  inveigh 
against  the  tyrants,  priests,  Jesuits,  Inquisition,  etc.? 

Buckle  thinks  religion  was  the  bane  of  human  society. 
He  mistakes  the  abuse  of  religion  and  the  religious  hy- 
pocrisy for  real  religion.  Abuse  is  unavoidable ;  but  this 
will  not  induce  any  sensible  man  to  abstain,  on  that  account, 
from  the  proper  use  of  the  subject.  One  of  the  greatest 
mistakes  of  Buckle  was  the  assertion  that  moral  principles 
are  stationary,  and  that  the  progress  of  civilization  was 
solely  due  to  the  intellectual  development  and  to  the  diffu- 
sion of  knowledge. 

The  history  of  the  internal  development  of  the  ethical 
science  itself,  as  well  as  the  history  of  the  civil,  criminal 
and  international  codes  indisputably  shows  that  morality  is 
not  stationary.  There  is  a  moral  progress  in  the  life  of  the 
nations,  as  well  as  in  the  life  of  the  individuals.  Without 
morality,  the  most  intelligent  and  learned  classes  of  people 
would  be  only  a  learned  and  intelligent  mob.  Civilization 
owes  to  the  progress  of  morality  just  as  much,  and  perhaps 
more,  than  it  does  to  the  intellectual  progress. 

Buckle's  starting  point  was,  to  use  his  own  words  :  "  Our 
acquaintance  with  history  being  so  imperfect,  while  our 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  125 

materials  are  so  numerous,  it  seems  desirable  that  some- 
thing should  be  done  on  a  scale  far  larger  than  has  hitherto 
been  attempted,  and  that  a  strenuous  effort  should  be  made 
to  bring  up  this  great  department  of  inquiry  to  a  level  with 
other  departments,  in  order  that  we  may  maintain  the 
balance  and  harmony  of  our  knowledge.  In  regard  to 
nature,  events,  apparently  the  most  irregular  and  capricious, 
have  been  explained  and  have  been  shown  to  be  in  accord- 
ance with  certain  fixed  and  universal  laws.  This  has  been 
done  because  men  of  ability  and,  above  all,  men  of  patient 
and  untiring  thought  have  studied  natural  events  with  the 
view  of  discovering  their  regularity,  and  if  human  events 
were  subjected  to  a  similar  treatment,  we  have  every  right 
to  expect  similar  results.'' 

This  favorite  idea  of  Buckle  that  history  can  be  treated 
by  methods,  as  can  any  natural  science,  was  controverted 
by  the  great  English  historian,  James  Anthony  Fronde.  His 
opinion  was  that  "  a  science  of  history,  if  it  is  more  than  a 
misleading  name,  implies  that  a  relation  between  cause  and 
effect  holds  good  in  human  things  as  complete  as  in  all  oth- 
ers ;  that  the  origin  of  human  action  is  not  to  be  looked  for 
in  mysterious  properties  of  the  mind,  but  in  influences  which 
are  palpable  and  ponderable.  When  natural  causes  are 
liable  to  be  set  aside  and  neutralized  by  what  is  called 
volition,  the  word  science  is  out  of  place.  If  it  is  free  to 
man  to  choose  what  he  will  do,  or  not  do,  there  is  no  ade- 
quate science  of  him."  * 

Froude,  in  writing  this,  overlooked  the  fact  that  Buckle 
was  a  necessitarian  denying  the  volition  of  man. 

Froude  does  not  merely  deny  the  existence  of  fixed  laws 
reigning  in  history — as  it  is  held  by  Buckle  from  a  statistical 


*  Short  Studies,  Vol.  I.,  page  15. 


r_>(>  ARCiUMENTS   FOR   THE    EXISTENCE   OF    GOD. 


point  of  view— but  he  altogether  denies  the  rule  of  laws  in 
history.  If,  so  he  remonstrates,  there  were  fixed  laws  ruling 
historv,  why  can  the  historian  not  predict  the  occurrence 
of  historical  phenomena  and  events  with  such  an  exactitude 
as  the  astronomer  can  predict  the  cycles,  or  the  appear- 
ance of  the  comets  and  the  course  of  planets? 

The  subject  of  this  analogy  is  well  chosen,  but  it  is  not 
well  applied.  The  astronomer  can  foretell  merely  the 
recurrence  of  certain  phenomena  which  have  been  in  exist- 
ence, but  he  can  predict  as  little  as  the  historian  what  new 
planets  there  will  arise  in  time,  or  which  of  them  will  wreck, 
or  what  collisions  or  perturbations  there  will  take  place  in 
the  planetary  world. 

Though  Mr.  Fronde  negatives  the  rule  of  laws  in  history, 
he  admits — nay,  he  holds  most  emphatically  that  history  is 
"a  voice  forever  sounding  across  the  centuries  the  laws  of 
right  and  wrong.  Opinions  alter,  manners  change,  creeds 
rise  and  fall,  but  the  moral  law  is  written  on  the  tablets  of 
eternity.  For  every  false  word  or  unrighteous  deed,  for 
cruelty  and  oppression,  for  lust  and  vanity,  the  price  has  to 
l>e  paid  at  last,  not  always  by  the  chief  offenders,  but  paid 
by  some  one.  Justice  and  truth  alone  endure  and  live.  In- 
justice and  falsehood  may  be  long-lived,  but  doomsday 
comes  at  last  to  them  in  French  revolutions  and  other 
terrible  ways.''  * 

This  assertion  of  Froude  that  there  is  a  moral  order 
and  a  retribution  in  history — though  more  a  part  of  the 
moral  argument  for  the  Divine  existence — does  at  the  same 
time  imply  principles  which  are  hunt,  invariable  laws  in  the 
organism  of  history,  and  does  on  that  account  constitute  a 
part  of  the  historical  argument. 

*  Short  Studies  on  Great  Subjects,  I.,  page  28. 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  127 

Considering  all  that  has  been  written  on  the  ''reign  of 
law  in  history "  by  such  prominent  men  as  Vico,  Kant, 
Herder,  Fichte,  Hegel,  Bimsen  and  others,  one  can  not  help 
to  think  that  there  must  be  at  least  some  truth  in  the  belief 
that  history  is  ruled  by  certain  fixed  and  invariable  laws. 

The  prevalence  of  a  law,  or  of  laws,  in  history  is  an 
eridence  of  the  existence,  wisdom  and  nature  of  a  supreme 
Being.  All  that  has  been  advanced  since  Lucretius,  down 
to  the  last  Darwinist,  against  a  design  in  nature,  will,  in  the 
one  or  in  the  other  form,  be  also  advanced  against  the 
existence  of  a  design  in  history,  but  either  is  refutable.  To 
the  present  day  there  have  been  a  great  many  things  raised 
by  atheists,  materialists  and  Darwinists  in  objection  to  a 
design  in  nature,  but  there  is  not  one  of  all  these  things 
and  ideas  that  could  not  be  refuted  by  facts,  or  by  cogent 
reasoning.  This  applies  also  to  all  objections  raised  against 
the  assertion  that  there  is  design  in  history. 

It  has  been  demonstrated  that  if  there  is  a  law  ruling 
history,  then  God  can  not  be  considered  free  in  His  guidance, 
and  all  that  occurs  does  so  from  necessity.  There  is  no 
more  difficulty  in  reconciling  the  idea  of  a  law,  or  laws,  in 
history  with  the  idea  of  the  freedom  of  God's  actions,  than 
there  is  in  reconciling  the  idea  of  the  rule  of"  invariable 
laws  in  nature  with  the  idea  of  God's  freedom.  In  either 
domain  God  is  the  source  of  all  laws ;  they  are  his  will, 
his  wisdom,  and  their  invariability  and  efficacy  depend 
wholly  and  solely  upon  him. 

The  Oxford  Professor.  Goldwin  Smith,  denouncing  the 
theory  that  there  is  a  rule  of  necessary  laws  in  history, 
says  : 

"  I  submitted  that  history  is  made  up  of  the  actions 
of  men,  and,  that  each  of  us  is  conscious  in  his  own 
case  that  the  actions  of  men  are  free.  I  am  not  aware 


FOR   THE 'EXISTENCE    OF    GoD. 


that  even  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  reconcile  the 
judgments  of  the  retrospective  conscience,  the  belief 
implied  in  those  judgments  that  each  action  might 
have  been  done,  or  undone,  and  the  exceptional  allow- 
ance which  conscience  makes  in  the  case  of  actions 
done  wholly,  or  partly,  on  compulsion,  with  the  hy- 
pothesis that  our  actions  are  subject  to  causation,  like 
the  events  of  the  physical  world.  Wherein  is  an  Alfred  more 
the  subject  of  moral  approbation  than  a  good  harvest,  or  a 
Philip  II.  more  the  subject  of  moral  disapprobation  than  a 
plague?  This  is  a  question  to  which  I  am  not  aware  that  an 
answer  has  yet  been  given. 

-  Still,  if  it  could  be  shown  that  history  does,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  run  in  accordance  with  any  invariable  law,  we 
might  be  obliged  to  admit  that  the  necessarians  had  gained 
their  cause,  though  a  strange  contradiction  would  then  be 
established  between  our  outward  observation  and  our  inward 
consciousness."  * 

Goldwin  Smith  thinks  the  idea  that  history  is  ruled  by 
invariable  laws  is  irreconcilable  with  man's  volition.  That 
is  not  naturally  so.  The  Jews  believe  in  the  volition  of 
man,  and  consider  it  one  of  the  cardinal  teachings  of  their 
faith,  and  still  they  admit  that  all  is  foreseen  by  God. 
Rabbi  Akiba,  one  of  their  greatest  teachers  and  an  out- 
spoken advocate  of  man's  free  will,  said :  "  Everything  is 
foreseen  and  still  man  is  free."  f 

Rabbi  Akiba's  idea  was  that  there  is  a  Divine  plan  in  the 
guidance  of  mankind  :  that  plan  has  been,  and  is  going  to 
be,  realized  without  fail,  but  there  is  no  predetermination 
as  to  the  individuals  that  are  instrumental  in  it.  It  is  the 
law  of  Divine  wisdom  that  good  people  shall  be  instru- 

*  Lectures  on  the  Study  of  History,  II.     t  Pirkeh  Aboth,  IV. 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  129 


mental  in  the  good  occurrences,  while  the  wicked  are  instru- 
mental in  the  evil  events.  (Megalgelin  Schuth  al  Yedey 
Saccie.)  This  rabbinical  idea  is  illustrated  by  Rabbi  Akiba 
in  the  following  most  interesting  way :  "The  delivery  from 
Egypt  would  have  taken  place  even  if  Moses  and  Aaron 
had  not  arisen  in  its  behalf;  the  temple  at  Jerusalem 
would  have  been  built  even  if  David  and  Solomon  had  not 
taken  steps  for  its  erection  ;  the  idolatry  would  have  been 
practiced  among  the  ten  tribes  of  Israel  even  if  Jeroboam 
had  not  introduced  and  favored  it;  and  the  temple  at 
Jerusalem  would  not  have  escaped  destruction  even  if 
Nebuchadnezzar  had  not  been  born."  * 

According  to  this  idea,  the  Divine  plan  is  to  be  realized 
unconditionally  and  without  fail  by  some  one,  but  no 
certain  individual  is  predetermined  for  that  purpose.  Thus 
the  rabbis  thought  to  have  solved  the  problem  of  God's 
foreordination  and  man's  volition. 

John  Draper  is  of  the  opinion  that  "  the  civilization  of 
Europe  has  not  taken  place  fortuitously,  but  in  a  definite 
manner  and  under  the  control  of  natural  laws;  that  the 
procession  of  nations  does  not  move  forward  like  a  dream, 
without  reason  or  order,  but  that  there  is  a  predetermined, 
solemn  march,  in  which  all  must  join,  ever  moving,  ever 
resistless,  advancing,  encountering  and  enduring  an  inevit- 
able succession  of  events ;  that  individual  life,  and  its 
advancement  through  successive  stages,  is  the  model  of 
social  life  and  its  secular  variations.  The  control  of  natural 
law  in  the  shaping  of  human  affairs  is  not  consistent  with 
free  will,  any  more  than  the  unavoidable  passage  of  an  indi- 
vidual, as  he  advances  to  maturity  and  declines  in  old  age,  is 
inconsistent  with  his  voluntary  actions.  That  higher  law 


*  Masecheth  Simchoth,  VIII. 


130          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


limits  our  movements  to  a  certain  direction  and  guides 
them  in  a  certain  way. 

"As  a  stoic  of  old  used  to  say  :  'An  acorn  may  lie  torpid 
in  the  ground,  unable  to  exert  its  living  force  until  it 
receives  warmth  and  moisture,  and  other  things  needful 
for  its  germination ;  when  it  grows,  it  may  put  forth  one 
hud  here  and  another  bud  there,  the  wind  may  bend  one 
branch  and  the  frost  blight  another,  the  innate  vitality  of  the 
tree  may  struggle  against  adverse  conditions  or  luxuriate  in 
those  that  are  congenial,  but,  whatever  the  circumstances 
may  be,  there  is  an  overruling  power  forever  constraining 
and  modeling  it :  the  acorn  can  only  produce  an  oak.'  "  * 

In  the  same  strain,  Draper  says,  right  in  the  first  chap- 
ter :  u  *  *  *  Yet  it  is  none  the  less  true  that 
these  contradictory  conditions— free  will  and  fate,  uncer- 
tainty and  destiny — coexist,  and  all  are  watched  by  the 
sleepless  eye  of  Providence.  *  *  *  Well  has  a  Hindoo 
philosopher  remarked  that  he  who  stands  by  the  bank  of  a 
Mowing  stream  sees,  in  their  order,  the  various  parts  as  they 
successively  glide  by,  but  he  who  is  placed  on  an  exalted 
station  views  at  a  glance  the  whole  as  a  motionless  silvery 
thread  among  the  fields.  To  the  one  there  is  an  accumu- 
lating experience  and  knowledge  of  man  in  time ;  to  the 
other  there  is  the  instantaneous  and  unsuccessive  knowledge 
of  God." 

As  this  illustration  of  an  acorn  shows,  Draper  took  the 
volition  of  man  not  for  the  power  in  man  to  choose  at  any 
rnoment  anything  he  pleases,  but  rather  as  the  development 
of  the  better  peculiarities  of  man's  nature,  combined  with 
the  ability  to  conform  his  actions  to  the  dictates  of  that 
better  developed  nature. 

*  History  of  Intellect.  Develop,  of  Europe,  XXIV. 


THE  HISTORICAL  ARGUMENT.  131 


Man  ceases  not  to  be  free  even  if  circumstances  from 
without,  or  physical  circumstances  from  within,  interfere 
with  the  realization  of  his  plan  or  ideas.  On  the  contrary, 
just  such  obstructions  and  hindrances  may  elicit  his  voli- 
tion, if  he  learns  to  know  them,  and  to  act  accordingly, 
t(  Man  is  free,  is  free  though  he  be  born  in  chains." 

The  volition  of  man  is  not  conditioned  by  the  power  to  do 
what  one  pleases ;  it  is  only  the  rude  man  who  considers 
that  man's  freedom  of  will,  while  the  better  educated  a  man 
is,  the  more  regard  in  his  actions  will  he  have  for  justice, 
truth,  virtue,  humanity,  welfare  of  others  and  to  the  duties 
of  life. 

If  man  is  considered  a  free  being,  despite  all  the  lower 
instincts,  proclivities  and  temper  of  his  nature,  then  there 
is  no  reason  indeed  why  he  shall  not  be  considered  a  free 
being,  despite  the  limitations  which  the  reign  of  laws 
in  history  impose  upon  him. 

It  is  a  great  mistake  to  believe  that  the  teachings  of 
statistics  prove  that  man  has  no  free  will,  but  is  subject  to 
the  laws  of  necessity  as  arising  from  the  force  of  circum- 
stances. Just  the  reverse  is  the  truth.  The  statistics  of 
crime  and  misery,  and  of  everything  touching  the  volition 
of  man,  are  only  a  regularity  of  occurrences,  which  happens 
only  because  people  do  not  use  their  free  will,  or  because 
they  have  not  learned  how  to  use  it.  .Not  necessity,  but  the 
indifference,  ignorance  and  apathy  of  the  people  are  the 
cause  of  the  regularity  of  the  statistical  numbers  as  far  as 
they  come  in  the  sphere  of  volition.  This  is  so  true  and  so 
sure,  that  even  the  statisticians  themselves  admit  that  the 
statistics  are  variable.  How  could  such  a  variability  be 
possible  if  it  did  not  depend  upon  man's  free  will,  and  if 
man  had  none?  The  statistics  of  crime  and  misery  show 
to  man  a  state  of  circumstances  endangering  his  welfare 


AKOCMENTS  FOR  TJIK  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


;m<l  safety  :  however,  he.  by  his  free  will,  is  able  to  guard 
against  them,  or  to  avoid  such  a  state  altogether. 

Man  is  free ;  the  struggles  with  powers  from  without 
and  from  within  are  not  to  enslave  or  to  crush  him,  but 
rather  to  develop  his  manhood  and  the  sterling  qualities  of 
.his  diameter. 

''  Know  that  the  human  being's  thoughts  and  deeds 
Are  not,  like  ocean  billows,  blindly  moved. 
The  inner  world — his  microcosmos — is 
The  deep  shaft  out  of  which  they  spring  eternally. 
They  grow  by  certain  laws,  like  the  tree's  fruit — 
No  struggling  chance  can  metamorphose  them. 
Have  I  the  human  kernel  first  examined, 
Then  I  know,  too,  the  future  will  and  action."  * 


*  Schiller's  The  Death  of  Wallenstein,  II.,  3. 


VI,  THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH 
THEOSOPHY. 


"  Qand  et  comment  la  race  s<5mitique  arriva-t-elle  a  cette 
notion  de  1'unite  divine  que  le  monde  a  admise  sur  la  foi  de  sa 
predication  ?  Je  crpis  que  ce  fut  par  une  intuition  primitive  et 
des  ses  premiers  jours.  On  n'invente  pas  le  monotheisme: 
I'lnde  qui  a  pens6  avec  tant  d'originalite"  et  de  profondeur,  n'y 
est  pas  encore  arriv^e  de  nos  jours  ;  toute  la  force  de  1'esprit  grec 
n'eut  pas  sum  pour  y  ramener  1'humanite  sans  la  cooperation 
des  peuples  s^mitiques.  On  peutaffirmer  de  meme  que  ceux-ci, 
n'eussent  jarnais  conquis  le  dogme  de  1 'unite  divine,  s'ils  ne 
1'avaient  trouve*  dans  les  instincts  les  plus  imperieux  de  leur 
esprit  et  de  leur  coeur."  * 

The  Bible  teaches  a  spiritual,  universal,  one  only  God, 
and  attributes  to  him  holiness,  goodness,  mercy,  righteous- 
ness, omnipotence  and  love.  He  is  long-suffering,  just  in 
retribution  and  merciful  to  forgive.  He  does  not  want  that 
the  sinner  shall  die,  but  that  he  shall  repent  and  live.  He 
has  pure  eyes.  He  will  not  see  wickedness,  and  llates  every 
wrong.  He  is  holy  and  wants  man  to  he  holy.  He  is 
infinite  and  eternal.  He  is  omniscient  and  all-wise.  He  is 
omnipotent  and  omnipresent. 

In  short,  the  conception  that  God  is  the  Creator,  the 
Ruler  and  the  Preserver  of  the  Universe,  and  the  Father  of 
mankind,  reverberates  in  all  teachings,  anthropomorphism, 
anthropopathism  and  in  all  other  presentations  of  him  in 
the  Bible. 


*  Ernest  Kenan,  Ktndes  de  Histoire  Religieuse. 


l:',4  AuiiUMKXTS    FOR   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 


"The  primary  difference  between  the  religion  of  Israel  and 
that  of  the  surrounding  nations,"  says  Professor  Robertson 
Smith.  "does  not  lit-  in  the  idea  of  a  theory,  or  in  a  phi- 
losophv  of  the  invisible  world,  or  in  the  external  forms  of 
religious  service,  but  in  a  personal  difference  between 
Jehovah  and  other  Gods.  That  difference,  again,  is  not  of 
:i  metaphysical,  but  of  a  directly  practical,  nature.  It  was 
not  defined  once  for  all  in  a  theological  dogma,  but  made 
itself  felt  in  the  attitude  which  Jehovah  actually  took 
toward  Israel  in  those  historical  dealings  with  his  nation 
to  which  the  words  of  the  prophets  supply  a  commentary. 
Kverything  that  befell  Israel  was  interpreted  by  the  prophets 
as  a  work  of  Jehovah's  hand,  displaying  his  character  and 
will — not  an  arbitrary  character  or  a  changeable  will,  but  a 
fixed  and  consistent  holy  purpose,  which  has  Israel  for  its 
object  and  seeks  the  true  felicity  of  the  nation,  but,  at  the 
same  time,  is  absolutely  sovereign  over  Israel,  and  will  not 
give  way  to  Israel's  desires  or  adapt  itself  to  Israel's  con- 
venience. No  other  religion  can  show  anything  parallel 
to  this.  The  gods  of  the  nations  are  always  conceived 
either  as  arbitrary  or  changeable,  or  as  themselves  sub- 
ordinate to  blind  fate,  or  as  essentially  capable  of  being 
bent  into  sympathy  with  whatever  is,  for  the  time  being,  the 
chief  desire  of  their  worshipers,  or,  in  some  more  specula- 
tive forms  of  faith,  introduced  when  these  simpler  concep- 
tions broke  down,  as  escaping  these  limitations  only  by 
being  raised  to  entire  concern  in  the  petty  affairs  of  man. 
In  Israel  alone  does  Jehovah  appear  as  a  god  near  to  man 
and  yet  maintaining  an' absolute  sovereignty  of  will,  a 
consistent  independence  of  character;  and  the  advance  of 
the  Old  Testament  religion  is  essentially  identified  with  an 
increasing  clearness  of  perception  of  the  things  which  this 
character  of  the  Deity  involves.  The  name  of  Jehovah 


ARGUMENTATION  OK  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        135 


becomes  more  and  more  full  of  the  meaning;  as  faith  in  his 
sovereignty  and  self-consistency  is  put  to  successive  tests 
in  the  constantly  changing  problems  presented  by  the  events- 
of  history.  *  *  .  *  Now,  when  we  speak  of  Jehovah  as 
displaying  a*  consistent  character  in  his  sovereignty  over 
Israel,  we  necessarily  imply  that  Israel's  religion  is  <&  moral 
religion ;  that  Jehovah  is  a  god  of  righteousness,  whose 
dealings  with  his  people  follow  an  ethical  standard."  * 

In  the  same  spirit  as  Professor  Smith,  Professor  Kuenen 
desc'ribes  the  moral  and  the  universal  character  of  the 
God  of  the  Bible  :  "Who  does  not  remember  how  high  an 
Isaiah,  for  example,  raises  the  grandeur  of  Jahveh,  while 
representing  him  as  the  mighty  One  whose  purposes  with 
regard  to  his  people  are  served  by  Assur  and  Egypt,  and 
these  the  prophets— once  more  to  quote  Wellhausen — 
'  absorbed  into  their  religion  that  conception  of  the  world 
which  was  destroying  the  religion  of  the  nations,  even 
before  it  had  been  fully  grasped  by  the  secular  conscious- 
ness. Where  others  saw  only  the  ruin  of  everything  that 
is  holiest,  they  saw  the  triumph  of  Jahveh  over  delusion 
and  error !  What  was  thus  revealed  to  the  eye  of  their 
spirit  was  no  less  than  the  august  idea  of  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world — crude  as  yet,  and  with  manifold  admix- 
tures of  error,  but  pure  in  principle.  The  prophets  had  no 
conception  of  the  natural  connection  of  the  power  and 
operations  of  nature.  They  never  dreamed  of  the  possi- 
bility of  carrying  them  back  to  a  single  cause,  or  deducing 
them  from  it.  But  what  they  did  see,  on  the  field  within  their 
view,  was  the  realization  of  a  single  plan — everything,  not 
only  the  tumu'ts  of  the  people,  but  all  nature  likewise — sub- 
servient to  the  working  out  of  one  great  purpose.  The 

*  The  Prophets  of  Israel,  p.  80. 


i:>l>  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


name— ethical  monotheism—  describes  better  than  any  other 
the  characteristics  of  their  point  "of  view,  for  it  not  only 
expresses  the  character  of  the  one  God  whom  they  wor- 
shiped, but  also  indicates  the  fountain  from  which  their  faith 
in  him  welled  up.' "  * 

These. two  quotations  make  it  evident  that  even  the  most 
radical  wing  of  the  Ley  den  School,  as  represented  by 
Kuenen,  Robertson  Smith,  Wellhausen,  Oorth,  Knappert 
and  others,  concur  that  the  Bible  is  teaching  a  God  of  a 
righteous,  universal,  spiritual  and  moral  character.  The 
great  question  regarding  the  biblical  conception  of  God, 
which,  mainly  through  the  Leyden  School,  has  caused  of 
late  much  agitation,  is  :  When,  and  at  what  epoch  in  the 
liixtory  of  the  ancient  H>  brews  did  the  conception  of  only  one 
universal  and  spiritual  God  arise? 

The  old  schools  of  biblical  criticism,  represented  by  Eich- 
horn,  Vater,  De  Wette,  Ewald,  Hiipfeld,  Noeldecke,  Hitzig, 
Geiger.  Gnetx,  Dillman  and  others  maintain  that  it  was  Moses 
who  had  the  conception  or  one  only  universal  and  spiritual 
(Jod.  From  this  view  the  modern  Leyden  School  took  a 
departure,  declaring  that  the  prophetic  monotheism — mean- 
ing the  one  only  spiritual  and  universal  God — originated  as 
late  as  the  eighth  century,  and  found  its  first  mouthpieces 
in  the  prophets  Amos  and  Hosea,.800  years  B.  C. 

The  theory  of  the  Leyden  School  as  to  the  conception  of 
God  is  expressed  by  the  pastor,  I.  Knappert,  as  follows: 
"  Moses  not  only  preached  Jahveh  as  the  God  of  Israel,  but 
he  wished  the  tribes  to  worship  this  God  in  contrast  to,  and 
to  the  exclusion  of,  all  other  gods.  But  we  do  not  by  any 
means  intend  to  assert  that  Moses  was  amonotheist,  or  that 
he  supposed  Jahveh  to  be  absolutely  the  only  God,  and  the 

*  Hibbart,  Lectures,  pp.  132-138. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THK  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        137 

•other  gods  are  not  to  exist  at  all.  Such  pure  monotheism  as 
that  belongs  to  much  later  days.  It  was  not  till  many  cen- 
turies after  the  time  of  Moses  that  the  prophets  attained  to 
so  lofty  a  conception.  Moses  himself  believed  in  the  exist- 
ence of  other  gods  just  as  much  as  in  that  of  Jahveh  ;  but  he 
taught  that  Jahveh  was  the  only  one  to  whom  the  Israelites 
ought  to  pray.  He  was  profound ly  impressed  with  Jahveh's 
majesty  and  poAver.  Jahveh  only  was  Israel's  God.  We 
find  this  principle  expressed  in  the  phrase  of  the  Law, 
*•  Ye  shall  have  no  other  gods  before  me."* 

Pastor  Knappert  repeats  only  the  following  view  of  Pro- 
fessor Kuenen :  ';  From  the  written  records  that  have 
been  presented  to  us  in  the  Old  Testament,  we  are  ac- 
quainted with  three  forms  of  Jahvism  —  under  which 
name  we  include  both  the  ideas  which  were  formed  of 
Jahveh  and  the  proper  Jahveh  worship.  Those  three  forms 
are  :  the  Jahvism  of  the  jx'ojile.  of  the  prophet*  and  of 
the  LI.IH-. 

"  The  people  acknowledged  and  worshiped  other  gods 
besides  Jahveh.  and  thus  fell  naturally  into  what  is  usually 
called  by  a  technical  term  syncretism,  that  is,  into  a  com- 
bination and  intermingling  of  ideas  and  customs,  which 
had  originally  been  connected  with  various  gods. 

"  The  prophet*  saw  in  Jahveh  the  only  God,  and  so  became 
naturally,  as  it  were,  to  ascribe  to  him  alone  all  the  attri- 
butes and  characteristics  which  in  polytheism  and  by  the 
people  were  distributed  among  the  various  gods. 

u  The  Lair  finally  must — as  will  be  evident  farther  on — be 
regarded  as  a  compromise  between  the  popular  religion  and 
the  Jahvism  of  the  prophets  ;  and  in  this  is  implied  that  in 


*  Religion  of  Israel,  p.  15. 


l;',s  AH<;UMKXTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE,  OF  GOD, 


the  Jnlwh  worship  of  the  Law  also  there  must  be  elements 
which  originally  belonged  to  the  service  of  other  gods."* 

The  system  of  Professor  Kuenen  and  his  followers  has 
attracted  gveat  attention,  and  its  success  and  fascination 
are  mostly  due  to  the  boldness  with  which  the  evolution 
theory  is  applied  to  the  Bible  and  to  its  great  ideas,  and 
also  to  the  great  learning  manifested  in  Kuenen's,  Well- 
hausen's  and  others'  works. 

The  system  of  the  Leyden  School  is  a  house  divided 
against  itself  by  a  great  many  self-contradictions,  and  is 
based  upon  a  great  number  of  unwarranted  conjectures, 
arbitrary  dislocations  of  passages,  fantastically  interpreted 
words  and  texts,  and  upon  an  endless  confusion  of  premises 
and  sequences. 

The  objection  to  the  Mosaic  antiquity  of  the  conception 
of  the  one  only  spiritual  and  universal  God,  as  advanced  by 
the  Leyden  School,  may  be  summarized  in  the  following 
four  points : 

a.  The  Hebrews  before  Amos  and  Hosea  considered 
Jahveh  to  be  a  tribal,  a  national  god — a  god  among  many 
gods. 

1>  The  Hebrews  before  Hosea  worshiped  their  tribal,  or 
national  God,  Jahveh,  under  the  image  of  bulls  without 
the  contemporaneous  prophets  reproaching  them  for  it. 

c.  The  polytheism  was  not  an  innovation,  or  a  departure, 
from  the  primitive  monotheistic  religion  of  the  Hebrews, 
but  was  their  very  primitive  faith. 

(/.  The  conception  of  Jahveh  before  Amos  and  Hosea 
was  deficient  in  moral  perfection. 

These  views,  as  the  following  examination  shows,  drawn 
mostly  from  disconnected  and  arbitrarily  interpreted  pass- 


*  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.,. 230. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        139 

ages,  will  be  denied  a  general  assent  as  long  as  there  will  be 
one  Hebrew  Bible  left  for  consultation,  and  as  long  as  there 
will  be  readers  who  are  able  to  detect  self-contradictions  in 
a  system  or  a  book. 

The  same  Dr.  Kuenen,  who  holds  that  the  Hebrews  before 
Amos  and  Hosea  did  not  arrive  further  than  at  the  concep- 
tion of  a  tribal  and  national  God,  and  that  they  did  not 
know  anything  about  a  one  only  spiritual  and  universal 
God,  admits,  as  the  following  quotation  shows,  that  the 
Sinaic  Decalogue  is  of  Mosaic  antiquity  :  "  There  is  no  real 
obstacle  to  the  supposition  that  the  ten  words  are  derived 
from  Moses,  or,  on  the  contrary,  that  their  contents  and 
arrangements  are  entirely  in  accordance  with  the  theory  of 
their  Mosaic  origin.  *  *  *  The  tradition  which  ascribes 
them  to  Moses,  is  worthy  of  respect  on  account  of  its  indis- 
puted  antiquity.  Nevertheless,  if  it  were  contradicted  by 
the  contents  and  form  of  the  ;  words,'  we  should  have  to 
reject  it.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  Therefore  we  accept  it, 
reserving  our  right  to  subject  each  separate  commandment 
to  special  criticism,  and,  if  necessary,  to  deny  its  Mosaic 
origin.  We  acknowledge  it  as  a  fact  that  Moses,  in  the 
name  of  Jahveh,  prescribed  to  the  Israelitish  tribes  such  a 
law  as  is  contained  in  the  ten  words."  * 

Now,  what  a  self-contradiction  in  Professor  Dr.  Kuenen. 
The  prophetic  monotheism,  meaning  the  one  only  spiritual 
and  universal  God,  is  not  of  Mosaic  antiquity;  but  the 
1  >ecalogue,  which  gives  the  very  same  conception  of  God,  is 
of  Mosaic  antiquity.  If  this  is  no  contradiction,  then  there 
is  no  such  a  thing  as  contradiction  ;  and  there  is  certainly 
no  good  reason  to  say  that  the  Decalogue  does  not  teach 


*  The  Religion  of  Israel,  pp.  284-286. 


140          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

and  imply  tin-  conception  of  a  one  only  universal  and 
spiritual  God. 

The  German  Professor,  Dr.  Ernest  Meir,  a  distinguished 
( )riental  philologist,  who  has  examined  the  antiquity  of  the 
Decalogue  from  a  liberal  point  of  view,  concludes  his  highly 
interesting  book,  ''  Die  Urspruengliche  Form  des  Deca- 
!ogs,''  with  the  following  ideas  : 

'•  The  conception  of  God  as  a  holy  Being  free  from  all 
restraints  and  above  all  necessitation  of  nature,  must  have 
l)een  gained  in  the  Mosaic  epoch  by  means  of  a  great  his- 
torical event.  In  the  closest  connection  "with  that  idea  is 
the  other  that  this  free  holy  Being  must  be  worshiped  cor- 
respondingly in  the  congregation  :  '  Ye  shall  be  holy,  for  I, 
the  Eternal,  your  God,  am  holy/ 

"  The  Decalogue,  the  Mosaic  origin  of  which  nobody 
doubts,  contains  these  thoughts  in  wonderful  purity.  *  *  * 

"  From  this  it  follows  that  the  teachings  of  Moses  were 
purer,  broader  and  more  original  than  is  generally  believed  ; 
and  that  the  fundamental  teachings  of  the  Pentateuch  like 
'  Love  thy  fellow-man  as  thyself.'  or  '  Ye  shall  be  holy,  for 
holy  am  I,  the  Eternal,  your  God,'  and  a  great  many  others, 
are  of  Mosaic  antiquity:  They  are  essentially  contained  in 
the  Decalogue." 

And  on  page  21,  of  the  same  book.  Dr.  Ernest  Meir  says : 
"The  first  commandment  of  the  Decalogue  contains  the 
idea  of  the  spirituality  of  God  to  the  fullest  extent." 

Another  self-contradiction  of  Professor  Dr.  Kuenen  is 
that,  while  he  strains  every  nerve  to  show  that  the  prophetic 
monotheism  was  propounded  first  by  Amos  and  Hosea  in 
the  eight  century  B.  C.,  he  ascribes  to  some  individuals 
living  before  that  epoch  a  conception  of  God,  which  means 
nothing  else  but  the  pure  "prophetical  monotheism." 

On  page  317  he  says,  concerning  the  Xazaritism  and  the 


Ancr.MENTATIOX    OF   THK    JEWISH    TlIKOSOPHY.  141 


prophecy  of  the  epoch  of  Samuel :  "  The  two  together  serve 
as  a  guarantee  that  the  watchword,  '  Jahveh,  the  God  of 
Israel,'  had  not  fallen  into  oblivion,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
were  alive  in  the  hearts  of  many  in  such  a  way  that  it  com- 
pletely filled  them,  and  gave  a  definite  tendency  to  all  they 
did  or  left  undone.  Not  with  all,  it  is  true,  but  still  with  a 
few,  and  such  a  conception  of  Jahvism  left  no  room  at  all 
for  the  service  of  other  gods." 

On  page  318  it  reads  :  "  Did  Samuel  succeed  in  winning 
him — Saul — over  to  the  worship  of  Jahveh?  Is  this,  per- 
haps, the  real  meaning  of  the  certainly  historical  proverb 
'Is  Saul  among  the  prophets?'  of  which  two  different  and 
not  altogether  satisfactory  explanations  are  given  us  in 
Samuel?  Did  it  thus  originally  express  the  astonishment 
of  those  who  had  discovered  that  a  man  who  had  hitherto 
shown  himself  indifferent  to  Jahveh  was  now  seized  with 
prophetic  enthusiasm?  But,  whatever  may  be  the  history 
of  Saul's  religious  development,  as  king  he  governed  in  the 
spirit  of  the  national  and  Jahvistic  (party.  Thus  it  is 
related  of  him  that  he  tried  to  root  out  the  soothsayers  and 
ventriloquists,  whom  strict  Jahvism  could  not  tolerate." 

In  order  to  keep  up  his  theory,  Professor  Dr.  Kuenen 
ignores  passages  like  the  one  in  Samuel  (viii.  3,  4),  which 
reads :  "  He,  Samuel,  spake  unto  all  the  house  of  Israel : 
If  ye  do  return  unto  Jahveh  with  all  your  hearts,  then  put 
away  the  strange  gods  and  the  Astartes  from  among  you, 
and  turn  your  hearts  unto  Jahveh  and  serve  him  only,  that 
he  may  deliver  you  out  of  the  hand  of  the  Philistines  ; '  and 
the  children  of  Israel  put  away  the  Baalim  and  the  Astartes, 
and  served  Jahveh  only." 

What  docs  it  mean  when  Samuel  said  to  Saul:  "Hath 
Jahveh  as  much  delight  in  burnt  offerings  and  sacrifices  as 
in  obeying  his  voice?  Behold,  to  obey  is  better  than  sacri- 


142          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


lice,  and  to  attend,  more  than  the  fat  of  the  ram.  For  the 
sin  of  witchcraft  is  rebellion,  and  idolatry  and  image- 
worship."  * 

Such  passages,  which  plainly  show  that  the  prophetic 
monotheism  was  known  long  before  Amos  and  Hosea,  do 
not  carry  any  weight  in  the  eyes  of  Professor  Kuenen  and 
his  followers,  and  are,  to  suit  their  hypothesis,  as  a  rule, 
pronounced  to  be  of  a  later  date  and  to  be  interpolations. 

The  great  fault  of  the  Leyden  School  is  that  they  take 
every  passage  of  the  Bible  where  Jahveh  is  represented  as 
a  tribal  and  national  God  in  a  literal  sense,  and  do  not 
make  any  allowance  whatsoever  for  the  Hebrew  idiom.  It 
does  not  follow  that  because  man  says  "  our  God,"  or  "  the 
God  of  my  fathers,  Abraham,  Isaac  and  Jacob,"  that  he 
must  mean  a  national  or  a  tribal  god.  Amos,  Hosea  and 
all  the  later  prophets  used  the  term  "Jehovah,  the  God 
of  Israel."  and  still  even  Dr.  Kuenen  admits  that  they 
were  propounders  of  the  one  only  spiritual  God.  Professor 
Dr.  Wellhausen,  in  his  article  u  Israel,"  in  the  Encylopsedia 
Hritanica,  took  a  step  farther  than  Professor  Kuenen.  He 
denies  the  Mosaic  antiquity  of  the  Decalogue,  and  asserts 
that,  according  to  Exodus  xxxiv.,  the  commandments 
which  stood  upon  the  two  tablets  were  neither  those  of 
Exodus  xx.,  nor  those  of  Deuteronomy  v.,  but  the  ten 
laws  as  contained  in  Exodus  xxxiv.,  from  verse  12  to  27. 

This  hypothesis  is  as  wild  as  one  can  be,  and  reminds 
of  Dr.  Bertheau's  attempt  to  classify  the  laws  of  the  Exodus, 
Leviticus  and  Numbers  in  seven  groups,  each  of  ten  laws. 

The  "  Decalogue  "  of  the  Bible  is  no  other  one  than  the 
Sinaie  one  in  Exodus  xx.  and  Deuteronomy  v.  The  differ- 
ence between  these  two  is  only  a  verbal  one,  and  does  not 

*  Samuel,  xv.  23-24. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        143- 

change  the  sense  materially.  But  suppose  it  would  be  so,  UK 
Wellhausen  claims  it  to  be,  then  his  assumed  Decalogue 
would  be  a  proof  against  Dr.  Kuenen's  theory,  because  just 
these  passages — 12-27  in  Exodus  xxviv. — breathe  a  pro- 
phetic monotheism. 

Kuenen  and  his  followers  maintain  that  the  Hebrews 
prior  to  the  eighth  century  B.  C.  had  worshiped  Jahveh 
under  the  form  of  a  bull  and  other  images  without  the 
prophets  censuring  them  for  it. 

This  assertion  is  in  contradiction  with  the  second  of  the- 
Ten  Commandments,  but  Dr.  Kuenen  is  not  embarrassed  at 
all.  He  argues :  "  Moses'  attitude  toward  the  worship  of 
images  is  a  very  disputed  point.  The  second  of  the  Ten 
Commandments  forbids  it  without  reserve,  but  it  is  strongly 
suspected  of  having  been  remoulded  and  enlarged.  Its  great 
length  alone  gives  rise  to  this  presumption.  If  it  embraces 
nothing  more  than  the  words  '  Thou  shalt  have  none  other 
God  before  my  face,'  we  should  not  think  of  calling  it 
incomplete ;  the  rest  is  superfluous  and,  therefore,  sus- 
pected." * 

The  Ley  den  School  does  not  dispute  that  the  prophets 
were  opposed  to  polytheism,  but  they  claim  that  the  worship 
of  Jahveh  under  the  form  of  a  bull,  or  images,  was  not 
found  objectionable  by  the  prophets. 

This  idea  had  already  been  contested  by  Dr.  Ernest  Meir, 
who  rejects  the  view  that  the  prohibition  of  images  is  a 
mere  appendage  to  the  first  verse  of  the  second  command- 
ment of  the  Decalogue  :  "  Since  the  conception  of  a  spiritual 
God,  who  is  free  from  all  necessitation  of  nature  and  who 
is  the  absolute  power  of  all,  is  the  fundamental  idea  of  the 

*  The  Religion  of  Israel,  227. 


J44  AHOUMKNTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


Jewish  religion,  it  was  plain  and  implicit  that  that  spiritual 
Ueing  can  not  be  represented  by  anything  that  is  visible  or 

tangible."  * 

Of  late,  it  was  also  Dr.  Dillman,  Professor  in  the  Berlin 
I'niversity,  who,  in  his  "Pentateuch  Commentary,"  took 
occasion  to  expose  the  mistakes  of  Kuenen,  Wellhausen 
;md  others.  Their  theory  that  the  prohibition  of  the  images 
in  the  second  of  the  Ten  Commandments  is  not  of  Mosaic 
antiquity,  but  only  a  later  interpolation,  lie  refutes  as 
follows  : 

•'That  a  commandment  to  which  there  underlies  the  idea 
of  the  invisibility  and  spirituality  of  God  was  above  the 
cognition  of  Moses  and,  consequently,  of  much  later  origin, 
can  not  be  held  with  any  good  reason. 

•'  Not  to  mention  Exodus  xxxii.,  where  it  is  said  of  Moses 
that  the  presentation  of  Jehovah  by  an  image  must  not  be 
tolerated,  it  is  indisputable  that  the  traditions  of  the  Patri- 
archs contain  a  religion  without  pictures;  and  that  also  in 
the  central  sanctuary,  after  Moses,  and  in  that  at  Jerusalem, 
a  representation  of  God  by  pictures  was  not  tolerated. 

"The  idolatry  of  the  golden  calf  (Exodus  xxxii.),  as  well 
as  that  of  the  Kingdom  of  Israel,  does  not  prove  at  all  that 
it  was  not  prohibited,  but,  rather,  how  difficult  it  was, 
especially  among  the  Canaanitic  portion  of  the  population, 
to  have  this  prohibition  respected. 

u  The  prophets  Amos  and  Hosea,  who  fought  against  the 
idolatry  of  Dan  and  Bethel,  have  nowhere  pronounced  the 
spirituality  of  (rod  as  a  new  doctrine,  but  have  everywhere 
referred  to  it  as  something  already  well  known  by  the 
people. 

•'A  scrutiny  into  the  post-Mosaic  epoch  will  show  that  the 


rrspruengliche  Form  des  Decalogs,  p.  21. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THKOSOPHY.        145 


worship  of  the  invisible,  spiritual  God  was  introduced  in 
the  central  sanctuary.  Now,  who  else  but  Moses  can  be  its 
author? 

<;He  had  been  led  to  enact  prohibition  laws  against 
idolatry,  partly  through  the  knowledge  he  derived  from  the 
traditions  of  the  Patriarchs,  and  partly  from  aversion  to  the 
Egyptian  mythology. 

"There  were  ancient  lawgivers  besides  Moses  who  have 
rejected  the  idolatry.  This  was  done  by  Mageon ;  *  and 
also  the  Persians,!  in  remote  antiquity,  had  no  idols. 

"•  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  it  does  not  read  '  Thou 
slialt  have  no  picture  of  me,'  but  'Thou  shall 'have  no 
picture.'  While  this  commandment  is  directed  against 
personification,  the  other  one  is  opposed  to  polytheism ; 
and  both  personification  and  polytheism  are  the  most  essen- 
tial criteria  of  heathenism." 

Professor  Smith  goes  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the  image- 
prohibition  was  not  of  Mosaic  antiquity,  and  he  maintains  : 
u  There  is  no  feature  in  Hosea's  prophecy  which  dis- 
tinguishes him  from  earlier  prophets  so  sharply  as  his 
attitude  to  the  golden  calves,  the  local  symbols  of  Jehovah, 
adored  in  the  Northern  sanctuaries.  Elijah  and  Elisha  had 
no  quarrel  with  the  traditional  worship  of  their  nation. 
Even  Amos  never  speaks  in  condemnation  of  the  calves. 
But  in  Hosea's  teachings  they  suddenly  appear  as  the  very 
root  of  Israel's  sin  and  misery.  *  *  *  Amos  never 
speaks  of  the  golden  calves  as  the  sin  of  the  Northern  sanc- 
tuaries, and  he  has  only  one  or  two  allusions  to  the  worship 
of  false  gods  or  idolatrous  symbols."  \ 

Almost  every  idea  expressed  in  these  two  quotations  is  an 


*  Diog.  Laertius,  VI.     t  Strabo,  15,  3,  13.     %  The  Prophets  of  Israel, 

170;  140. 


146 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


error.  It  is  an  inexcusable  mistake  in  Professor  Smith  to 
sav  "that  Elijah  and  Elisha  had  no  quarrel  with  the  tradi- 
tional worship  of  their  nation."  What  did  it  mean  when 
Elijah  said  to  Ahab,  "And  I  will  make  thy  house  like  the 
house  of  Jeroboam,  the  son  of  Nebat,  and  like  the  house  of 
Barla  for  the  provocation  thou  hast  provoked  me  to  anger, 
and  induced  Israel  to  sin? "  (I.  Kings  xxi.  22.)  What  did 
it  mean  when  almost  the  same  words  were  used  by  Elisha's 
disciple  in  addressing  Jehu?  (II.  Kings  ix.  9.)  And  what 
is  the  meaning  of  the  condemnation  of  idolatry  as  expressed 
in  the  first  book  of  the  Kings  (xiv.  25,  26),  and  in  the 
second  book  of  the  Kings  (iii.  2-3)? 

Not  only  Elijah  and  Elisha  denounced  the  image  worship, 
but  their  predecessor,  the  prophet  Abiyah,  quarreled  with 
Jeroboam,  saying,  in  the  first  book  of  the  Kings :  "And 
thou  hast  done  more  evil  than  all  that  were  before  thee ; 
and  thou  art  gone  and  hast  made  unto  thyself  other  gods 
and  molten  images  to  provoke  me  to  anger,  and  me  hast 
thou  cast  behind  thy  back."  (xiv.  9.) 

And  just  as  false  is  also  Professor  Smith's  assertion  that 
Amos  did  not  speak  against  the  golden  calves  as  the  sin  of 
the  Northern  sanctuaries.  Besides  several  allusions,  there 
are  in  the  prophetical  book  of  Amos  direct  attacks  on  the 
idolatry,  (iii.  14;  iv.  4;  v.  24;  viii.  14.) 

With  regard  to  all  this,  and  to  a  great  deal  more  that 
could  be  advanced  in  proof  of  the  Mosaic  antiquity  of 
image-prohibition  among  the  Israelites,  it  is  ridiculous  for 
Wellhausen  to  say  :  "  The  prohibition  of  images  was,  during 
the  older  period,  quite  unknown.  Moses  himself  is  said  to 
have  made  a  brazen  serpent,  which,  down  to  Hezekiah's 
time,  continued  to  be  worshiped  at  Jerusalem  as  an  image 
of  Jehovah."  *  The  same  error  is  expressed  also  by  Dr. 
Kuenen.f 

*  Encyclopedia  Britanica,  Israel,  t  Religion  of  Israel,  I.,  p.  287. 


ARGUMENTATION   OF   THE   JEWISH   THEOSOPHV.          147 

The  brazen  serpent  was  no  image  of  Jehovah, 'or  of  any 
god.  It  was  a  relic  from  the  pre-Sinaic  age,  and  was  a 
momentary  concession  to  the  popular  superstition.  Such 
momentary  concessions  had  to  be  made  by  all  lawgivers, 
but  neither  Moses  nor  any  other  Hebrew  prophet  con- 
sidered it  the  image  of  Jehovah.  That  some  people  brought 
incense  to  it,  is  only  an  evidence  of  their  folly  and  super- 
stition, and  shows  how  hard  work  it  was  for  the  prophets  to 
make  people  understand  the  lofty  conception  of  the  one 
only  spiritual  and  universal  (rod,  who  was  already  pro- 
claimed as  such  by  Moses,  "the  servant  of  Jehovah." 

According  to  Kucnen  and  his  followers,  polytheism  was 
the  original  religion  of  the  Hebrews,  and,  in  time,  it  evolved 
among  them  into  the  belief  in  one  tribal  god,  and  later,  in 
the  days  of  the  prophets  Amos  and  Hosea,  into  the  propheti- 
cal monotheism. 

The  very  same  prophet,  Hosea,  whom  Professor  Kuenen 
considers  as  one  of  the  heralds  of  the  prophetic  monotheismf 
does  not  pronounce  his  monotheistic  views  as  something 
new,  but,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  loudest  in  exhorting  people 
to  return  to  Jahveh — "Return,  0  Israel,  even  unto  Jahveh, 
thy  God."  (Hosea  xiv.2.)  The  term,  "Return  unto  Jahveh," 
is  a  standing  protest  against  Kuenen's  evolution  theory, 
according  to  which  the  prophet  Hosea  ought  not  to  have 
said  "Ri'tuni  unto  God,"  but,  rather,  "  Ad  c  a  nee  unto  God." 
If  the  primitive  religion  of  the  Hebrews  had  been  poly- 
theism, then  neither  Hosea,  nor  any  other  prophet,  would 
have  exhorted  people  to  return  to  the  parental  conception  of 
(rod.  If  polytheism  had,  in  fact,  been  the  primitive,  legiti- 
mate religion  of  the  Hebrews,  Elijah,  the  great  implacable 
antagonist  of  all  idolatry,  would  certainly  not  have  invoked 
when  on  Mt.  Carmel  "Jahveh,  the  God  of  Abraham,  of 
Isaac  and  of  Israel,"  as  he  really  did.  (I.  Kings  xviii.  3H.) 


MS  Al«;fMKNTS    FOR    THK    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 


Ami  Elijah  most  certainly  had  just  as  pure  a  conception 
of  .lahveh  as  the  prophet  Amos,  whom  Dr.  Kuenen  considers 
the  lather  of  the  prophetic  monotheism.  The  expression  of 
Amos  (iv.  l:i),  "Jahveh  is  the  God  of  Hosts,"  is  nothing 
new :  it  was  used  long  before  him  l>y  Elijah  (I.  Kings 
xix.  10),  who,  when  in  the  cave  of  the  Mount  of  God,  said: 
••  1  have  been  very  zealous  for  Jahveh,  the  God  of  Hosts." 
Nay.  the  term  "Jahveh.  the  God  of  Hosts,"  had  already 
been  used  by  Hannah.  "  Die  Prophetenmutter,"  as  Hitzig 
calls  her. 

Professor  Kuenen,  Smith  and  others  refer,  on  behalf  of 
their  hypothesis,  to  passages  like  this  in  Joshua  (xxiv.  2)  : 
-On  the  other  side  of  the  river  did  your  fathers  dwell  in 
old  time,  even  Therach,  the  father  of  Abraham  and  the 
father  of  Xachor :  and  they  served  other  gods."  It  is  plain 
that  Abraham,  the  first  Hebrew,  is  not  included  among  the 
idolatrous  forefathers  ;  and  the  very  same  chapter  in  Joshua 
is  the  best  evidence  against  the  assertion  that  polytheism 
was  the  primitive  religion  of  the  Hebrews.  Not  merely  in 
the  end  of  the  book  of  Joshua,  but  right  at  the  beginning 
(iv.  D),  when  Joshua  addressed  the  people,  Jahveh  is  spoken 
of  as  the  (rod,  the  liring  (rod  of  Israel. 

Laying  all  these  particulars  aside,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  Bible  teaches  that  not  pidy  theism,  but  mono- 
theism, was  the  primitive  religion  of  mankind.  Polytheism 
originated  in  the  degeneracy  and  apostacy  of  the  human 
race,  but  even  then,  according  to  the  Bible,  monotheism  had 
its  representatives  in  individuals  like  Noah,  Hanoch,  Mal- 
kizedek  and  others.  In  conformity  with  the  Bible,  Dr. 
Marx  Mueller  says  :  "  It  is  too  often  forgotten  by  those  who 
believe  that  a  polytheistic  worship  was  the  most  natural 
unfolding  of  a  religious  life,  that  polytheism  must  every- 
where have,  been  preceded  by  a  more  or  less  conscious 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        149 

theism.  In  no  language  does  the  plural  exist  before  the 
singular.  Xo  human  mind  could  have  conceived  the  idea 
of  gods  without  having  previously  conceived  the  idea  of  a 
god."  * 

In  the  "  Lectures  on  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion/' 
given  in  1878  before  the  Hibbert  Institution,  Professor 
Marx  Mueller  took  a  firm  stand  in  repudiating  the  theory 
that  fetichism  was  the  original  religion  of  the  human  race. 
He  showed,  by  references  to  the  works  of  different  mission- 
aries and  travelers,  that  the  real  religion  of  the  savages  and 
negroes  is  something  quite  distinct  from  that  which  is 
generally  called  fetichism.  and  that  they  all  believe  in  a 
Supreme  Being. 

Since  that  time  it  has  become  more  universal  to  assume 
that  monotheism,  and  not  fetichism,  was  the  primitive 
religion  of  the  human  race,  and  that  fetichism  and  poly- 
theism are  a  mere  degeneracy  of  the  original  monotheistic- 
religion. 

Professor  Ronotif  thinks :  '"'It  is  ineontestably  true  that 
the  sublime  portions  of  the  Egyptian  religion  are  not  the 
comparatively  late  result  of  a  process  Of  development,  or 
elimination,  from  a  grosser.  The  sublime  portions  are 
demonstrably  ancient,  and  the  last  stage  of  the  Egyptian 
religion,  though  known  to  the  Givek  and  Latin  writers,  was 
by  far  the  grossest  and  most  corrupt."  t 

The  great  Egyptologist,  Professor  Rawlinson,  expressed 
the  following  opinion  concerning  the  antiquity  of  the  mono- 
theism :  ''First,  then,  it  appears  to  be  certain  that  the 
Egyptian  religion,  liko  most  other  religions  in  the  ancient 


*  Chips  from  a  German  Workshop,  I.,  348. 

t  Hibbert,   Lectures  on  the  Growth   of  the   Egyptian    Religion, 
pp.   119-120,  1879. 


l.V)          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

world,  had  two  phases  or  aspects  :  one  that  in  which  it  was 
presented  to  the  general  public,  or  vast  mass  of  population ; 
the  other  that  which  is  borne  in  the  minds  of  the  intelligent, 
the  learned  and  the  initiated.  To  the  former  it  was  a  poly- 
theism of  a  multitudinous  and,  in  many  respects,  of  a  gross, 
character;  to  the  latter  it  was  a  system  combining  strict 
monotheism  with  a  metaphysical  speculative  philosophy  on 
the  two  great  subjects  of  the  nature  of  God  and  the  destiny 
of  man,  which  sought  to  exhaust  those  deep  and  unfathom- 
able mysteries.  Those  who,  as  Dr.  Birch,  take  the  lowest 
views  of  tin;  Egyptian  religion,  admit  that  the  iflea  of  a  single 
self-existent  deity  was  involved  in  the  conception  which  it 
sets  forth,  and  is  to  be  found  not  infrequently  in  the  hymns 
and  prayers  of  the  Ritual.  It  is  impossible  that  it  should 
have  been  so,  unless  there  was  a  class  of  persons  who  saw 
behind  a  popular  mythology,  understood  its  symbolical  and 
metaphysical  character,  and  were  able  in  this  way  to  recon- 
cile their  conformity  to  the  established  worship,  with  the 
great  truths  of  natural  religion,  which,  it  is  clear,  they  knew 
and  which  they  must  have  cherished  in  their  heart  of  hearts. 

"The  primary  doctrine  of  the  Esoteric  religion  undoubtedly 
was  the  real  essential  unity  of  the  Divine  nature.  The 
saered  texts  taught  that  there  was  a  single  Being,  the  sole 
producer  of  all  things  both  in  heaven  and  earth:  himself 
not  produced  of  any— the  only  true,  living  God,  self- 
originated — 'who  exists  from  the  beginning,'  and  who  has 
made  all  things,  but  has  not  himself  beeri  made.  This  Being 
seems  never  to  have  been  represented  by  any  material  sym- 
iNiliral  form.  It  is  thought  that  he  had" no  name,  or,  if  he 
had,  that  it  must  have  been  unlawful  either  to  pronounce  or 
write  it.  He  was  a  pure  spirit,  perfect  in  every  respect,  all- 
wise,  almighty  and  supremely  good. 

"The  gods  of  the  popular  mythology  were  understood  in 


ARGUMENTATION*  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.       151 

the  Esoteric  religion  to  be  either  personified  attributes  of 
the  Deity,  or  parts  of  the  nature  which  he  had  created,  con- 
sidered as  informed  and  inquired  by  him,"  * 

The  excellent  collection  of  "  The  Egyptian  and  Assyrian 
Records  of  the  Past"  teems  with  monotheistic  conceptions 
like:  "Hail  to  the  One  in  His  Works,  Single  Among  the 
Gods,"  "  Chief  of  all  the  Gods,"  "  Father  of  the  Gods,"  "  Lord 
of  the  Gods,"  "The  One  Maker  of  Existence,"  "The  One 
alone  without  Peer."  "The  true  King  of  Gods."  f 

The  historian  Prescott  tried  to  show  that  the  American 
aborigines  were  monotheists,  and  that  they  believed  in  the 
*•  Great  Spirit"  long  before  they  had  fetiches.  A  great  many 
missionaries  and  travelers  before  Prescott  were  of  the  same 
opinion.* 

"  While  the  mind,"  says  Dr.  Asa  Mahan,  "  also  intuitively 
distinguishes  itself,  as  spirit,  from  all  material  existences 
around  it,  it  can  never,  in  its  primary  and  intuitive  proce- 
dures, apprehend  this  eternal  verity,  this  unconditioned  and 
universal  cause  of  ail  conditional  forms  of  being,  as  an 
inhering  law  or  property  of  matter,  but  as,  like  itself,  a  free, 
self-conscious  spirit,  and  as  such,  unlike  the  finite  itself,  and 
infinite  and  perfect  mind.  Unless  mind  itself  is  a  lie,  mono- 
theism must  have  been  the  primitive  religion  of  the  race. 
It  is  a  shallow,  and  unreflective  and  unobserving  philosophy 
that  represents  the  primitive  race  of  mankind  a  realm  of 
rational  personalities,  as  void  of  religious  ideas  and  senti- 
ments, and  then  as  ascending  from  fetichism  through  poly- 
theism to  monotheism.  There  is  not  a  known  fact  in  the 
history  of  the  race  to  justify  such  a  deduction.  Polytheism 

*  History  of  Ancient  Egypt,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  313-314,  1881. 

t  Volumes  II.,  pp.  129-132;  IV.,  pp.  90-100;  VI.,  p.  100,  etc. 

i  J.  G.  Mueller's  Amerikanische  Urreligionen. 


1T.2          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


and  fetichisin,  oiMhe  otlu-r  hand,  are  degenerate  forms  of 
original  monotheism,  the  pure  religion  corrupted  and 
•spoiled  by  philosophy,'  or  by  'science  falsely  so  called.' 
The  cannibals  of  Xe\v  Zealand  and  of  the  islands  of  the 
South  Pacific  are,  many  of  them,  to  say  the  least,  fetiehists, 
and  thev  are  in  the  lowest  state  in  which  humanity  has  ever 
been  found.  The  question  is:  Are  they  degenerates  from  a 
higher  state  of  civilization,  or  are  they  at  this  point  in  the 
scale  of  ascent  from  a  still  lower  stage?  Many  points  of 
physical  resemblance,  as  well  as  traditions  and  customs 
among  them,  absolutely  evince  the  fact  that  they  are  degen- 
erate descendants  of  a  comparatively  civilized  people  who 
formerly  emigrated  thither  from  Ceylon  and  Southern-India. 
In  India,  for  example,  they  have  an  annual  festival  in  com- 
memoration of  the  escape  of  Noah  and  his  family  in  the 
Ark.  The  same  custom  obtains  among  these  cannibals.  They 
have  not  only  a  specific  tradition  of  the  Flood,  but  build 
vessels  in  imagined  conformity  to  the  ark  in  which  Noah 
and  his  family  escaped.  The  animals  and  reptiles  which 
the  people  of  India  regard  as  sacred,  these  degenerate 
savages,  in  conformity  with  Egyptian  custom,  worship,  not 
as  supreme  divinities,  but  as  containing  the  spirits  of 
finite,  but  higher,  genii."  * 

The  fact  that  the  Bible  starts,  and  is  imbued,  with  the 
view  that  monotheism  was  precedent  to  polytheism,  makes 
the  evolution  theory  of  Kuenen,  as  applied  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  biblical  conception  of  God,  untenable. 

The  Leyden  School  left  out  of  view  that  there  are  also 
such  agencies  as  "  genius  "  and  "  intuition  ;  "  and  where 
they  are  at  work,  the  ideas  come  forth  at  once  like  a  shining 
sun  in  all  its  splendor.  This  was  the  case  with  the  prophetic 


*A  Critical  History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  129-130. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THK  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        15o 

monotheism.  The  prophets,  the  representatives  of  the 
religious  genius  of  the  Hebrews,  had  pronounced  the 
monotheistic  idea  hundreds  of  years  before  the  large  mass 
of  people  raised  itself  to  that  glorious  height,  from  its 
polytheistic  lowland.  But  the  Leyden  School  does  not 
always'  consider  that.  It  frequently  misrepresents  the 
prophets  as  having  shared  the  popular  belief  of  the  large 
mass  of  their  contemporaries,  while,  in  fact,  they  were  the 
antagonists  of  the  popular  belief  and  were  endeavoring 
to  raise  the  people  to  their  higher  standard. 

Every  age  has  its  fashions  and  its  follies,  and,  again,  every 
fashion  and  folly  has  its  age.  The  theories  of  the  Leyden 
School  are  no  exception  to  that. 

Dr.  Wellhausen,  inasmuch  as  he  denied  that  the  primitive- 
phase  of  the  Jahveh  conception  had  any  moral  character, 
went  a  step  farther  than  Kuenen. 

In  his  article  "  Israel,"  in  the  Encyclopjedia  Britanica,  it 
reads  as  follows  :  "  The  essentially  and  necessarily  rational 
character  qf  the  older  phases  of  the  religion  of  Jehovah 
completely  disappears  in  the  quite  universal  code  of  morals, 
which  is  given  in  the  Decalogue  as  the  fundamental  law  of 
Israel;  but  the  entire  series  of  religious  personalities 
throughout  the  period  of  the  Judges  and  Kings — from  De- 
borah, who  praised  Jael's  treacherous  act  of  murder,  to- 
David,  who  caused  his  prisoners  of  war  to  be  sawn  asunder 
and  burnt — make  it  very  difficult  to  believe  that  the  religion 
of  Israel  was,  from  the  outset,  one  of  specifically  moral 
character.  The  true  spirit  of  the  old  religion  may  be  gath- 
ered much  more  truly  from  Judges  v.  than  from  Exodus  xx." 

By  what  right,  or  logic  or  experience  can  a  sensible  man 
think  it  proper  to  judge  the  moral  spirit  of  a  religion  by 
some  of  the  misdeeds  and  by  the  low  moral  standard  of  its 
followers?  No  unbiased,  fair-minded  man  will  think  of 


l.r>4          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


making  the  morality  of  the  Christian  religion  responsible 
for  the  crimes  and  misdeeds  of  some  Christians,  but  Dr. 
Wellhausen  judges  the  moral  character  of  the  primitive 
conception  of  Jehovah  by  the  wrongs  of  some  individuals. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  refute  Wellhausen  by  evidences 
from  the  Bible ;  it  will  suffice  to  adduce  only  two  quotations 
from  the  works  of  two  very  prominent  men  of  his  party  to 
show  his  position. 

Professor  Dr.  Kuenen,  who  has  never  thought  of  denying 
Jehovah  epithets,  like  "holy"  and  "righteous,"  says: 
-"Jahveh  is  distinguished  from  the  rest  of  the  gods  in  that 
he  will  be  served,  not  merely  by  sacrifices  and  feasts,  but 
also — nay5  jn  the  first  place,  by  the  observance  of  the  moral 
commandments,  which  form  the  chief  contents  of  the  ten 

words."* 

From  among  the  many  passages  in  Robertson  Smith's 

books  testifying  to  the  moral  nature  of  the  Jehovah  concep- 
tion in  its  earliest  stages,  the  following  one  will  suffice  to 
-fhow  the  great  contradiction  existing  between  the  men  of 
the  Leyden  School  themselves  :  "  There  are  many  things  in 
the  social  order  of  the  Hebrews,  such  as  polygamy,  blood 
revenge,  slavery  and  the  treatment  of  enemies,  which  do  not 
correspond  with  the  highest  ideal  of  morality,  but  belong 
to  an  imperfect  social  state,  or,  as  the  Gospel  puts  it,  were 
tolerated  for  the  hardness  of  the  people's  hearts. 

'•  But,  with  all  this,  the  religion  of  Jehovah  put  morality 
on  a  far  sounder  basis  than  any  other  religion  did,  because 
in  it  the  righteousness  of  Jehovah  as  a  God  enforcing  the 
known  laws  of  morality  was  conceived  as  absolute,  and  as 
showing  itself  absolute,  not  in  a  future  state,  but  upon 
earth.  I  do  not,  of  course,  mean  that  this  high  view  of 
Jehovah's  character  was  practically  present  to  all  his 

*  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.,  293. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        155 

worshipers.  On  the  contrary,  a  chief  complaint  of  the 
prophets  is  that  it  was  not  so,  or,  in  other  words,  that 
Israel  did  not  know  Jehovah.  But  the  higher  view  is 
never  put  forth  by  the  prophets  as  a  novelty ;  they  regard 
it  as  the  very  foundation  of  the  religion  of  Jehovah  from 
the  days  of  Moses  downward,  and  the  people  never  ven- 
ture to  deny  that  they  are  right.  In  truth,  they  could 
not  deny  it,  for  the  history  of  the  first  creation  of  Israel, 
which  was  the  fundamental  evidence  as  to  the  true  character 
of  Jehovah's  relations  to  his  people,  gave  ho  room  for  such 
mythological  conceptions  as  operate  in  the  heathen  relig- 
ions, to  make  a  just  conception  of  the  Godhead  impossible. 
Heathen  religions  can  never  conceive  their  god  as  per- 
fectly righteous,  because  they  have  a  natural,  as  well  as  a 
moral,  side,  a  physical  connection  with  their  worshipers, 
physical  instincts,  physical  passions,  etc. 

"  The  Old  Testament  brings  out  this  point  with  great  force 
of  sarcasm  when  Elijah  taunts  the  prophets  of  Baal  and 
suggests  that  their  god  may  be  asleep,  or  on  a  journey,  or 
otherwise  busied  with  some  human  avocation.  In  fact,  all 
this  was  consistent  with  the  nature  of  Baal.  But  the 
Hebrews  knew  Jehovah  solely  as  the  King  and  Judge  of 
Israel.  He  was  this  and  this  alone ;  and,  therefore,  there 
was  no  ground  to  ascribe  to  him  less  than  absolute  righteous- 
ness. If  the  masses  lost  sight  of  those  great  qualities,  and 
assimilated  his  nature  to  that  of  the  Canaanite  deities,  the 
prophets  were  justified  in  reminding  them  that  Jehovah 
was  Israel's  God  before  they  knew  Baalam,  and  that  he 
then  showed  himself  a  God  far  different  from  these."  * 

It  can  not  be  doubted  that  the  men  of  the  Leyden  School 
— Kuenen,  Oort,  Knappert,  Wellhausen,  Smith,  Stade  and 

*  Prophets  of  Israel,  73-74. 


1  ."><;  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

others— are  great  scholars.  Nor  can  it  bo  denied  that  their 
works  contain  a  great  many  fine  thoughts,  original  views, 
ingenious  interpretations  and  a  brilliant  presentation  of 
characters  and  topics.  Nevertheless,  the  general  and  the 
characteristic  ideas  of  their  system  are  hypotheses  and 
mistakes  based  upon  detached  passages  and  arbitrary  con- 
structions. It  has  been  conclusively  and  irrefutably  proved 
by  Dr.  Delitsch,  Dr.  Bredenkampf,  Professor  Green,  Dr.  Roos, 
Dr.  Dillman,  Dr  Kumig  and  others  that  the  theories  «f  the 
Ley  den  School  are  objectionable,  not  merely  from  a  dog- 
matical, but  mainly  from  a  scientific,  standpoint. 

THE  GOD  OF  THE  TALMUD. 

There  is  no  precedent  in  Jewish  theology  that  God  was 
named  after  a  book.  Besides  the  terms  Jahveh,  El,  Elohim, 
Shadday,  etc.,  there  are  used  in  the  Bible  appellations  like 
"God  of  Israel;'  "God  of  the  Hebrews,"  "God  of  Life," 
"God  of  all  tlesh,"  "God  of  the  forefathers,"  "God,  the  Crea- 
tor of  the  heavens  and  of  the  earth." 

The  term,  "  God  of  the  Bible,"  is  of  recent  date.  It  is  a  fa- 
vorite with  the  Christian  theologians.  If  there  is  no  opposi- 
tion to  the  use  of  the  term  "  God  of  the  Bible,"  there  can  be 
no  reasonable  objection  to  the  use  of  the  term  "God  of  the 
Talmud,"  either.  The  Talmud  has  contributed  a  great  deal 
to  the  store  of  the  moral  and  speculative  ideas  about  God. 
The  finest  chapter,  the  fifteenth,  in  Moses  Mendelssohn's  Mor- 
gcnstunden,  in  which^the  deficiencies  and  inadequacies  of  the 
philosophical  theism  are  exposed,  does  not  contain  anything 
else  but  the  Talmudical*  theosophy,  according  to  which  the 
greatness  of  God  consists  in  his  condescension.  A  great 
many  of  the  Talmudical  sayings  and  hyperboles  became, 

*Megilla31. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHV.        157 

during  the  .philosophical  epoch,  instrumental  in  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  speculative  conception  of  God  among  the  Jews. 
The  rabbis  of  the  Talmud  did  not  philosophize  the  way  the 
Greeks  did  in  applying  sharp,  logical  methods,  for  the  estab- 
lishing of  a  solid  speculative  system.  The  rabbis  wrapped 
their  philosophy  in  figurative  and  hyperbolic  language.  Their 
view*  as  to  Providence  and  God's  nature  are  Dften  very 
striking  and  significant.  Some  of  the  rabbis  were  also 
skeptical,  but  less  from  metaphysical  motives  than  from  na- 
tional misfortune  and  individual  disappointments  in  their 


The  history  of  the  Talmudical  conception  of  God  com- 
menced with  the  age  of  the  Scribes,  the  Sofrim,  the  last  edi- 
tors and  cannonizers  of  the  Bible.  According  to  the  Talmud, 
these  men  have  altered  quite  a  number  of  biblical  passages, 
for  no  other  reason  than  because  they  and  their  generation 
were  too  far  advanced  in  moral,  aesthetical  and  speculative 
culture  as  to  tolerate  in  their  sacred  literature  offensive  ex- 
pressions. Thus,  for  instance,  the  original  Hebrew  text  in 
Genesis  read  :  "And  God  stood  before  Abraham."  The 
Scribes  reversed  it  into  "And  Abraham  stood  before  God." 

During  the  Alexandrian  epoch  speculation  made  rapid 
progress  among  the  Jews.  Not  only  at  Alexandria  did  the 
Jewish  philosopher,  Aristobul,  deem  it  advisable  to  add  an 
introductory  letter  to  the  Septuaginta  translation,  explain- 
ing philosophically  the  meaning  of  the  biblical  anthropo- 
morphisms and  anthropopatisms,  but  it  was  also  at  Jerusa- 
lem where  the  high-priest,  John  Hyrcan,  had  to  alter  the 
temple  liturgy  on  account  of  its  gross  anthropomorphisms. 
He  abolished  the  Psalm  (44)  :  "  0  awake,  0  God,  why  dost 
tbou  sleep?"  People  had  outgrown  anthropomorphisms  of 
that  kind.  The  anti-anthromorphistic  tendency  was  strong 
at  that  time,  and  it  received  the  fullest  expression  and 


lf>8          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


sanction  in  the  Chaldean  Pentateuch  translation  of  Onkelos, 
where  the  anthropomorphisms  and  anthropopathies  are 
rendered  hy  philosophical  phrases. 

Though  in  the  main  the  Talmud  proceeds  in  the  narrative- 
way  of  the  Bible,  it  has  ways  and  views  of  its  own.  Thus, 
the  biblical  teaching  of  the  Divine  Omnipresence  it  gives  as 
the  idea  of  the  Divine  Immanence  :  "  God  is  the  soul  of  the 
world  ;  (rod  permeates  the  world  like  the  soul  which  per- 
meates the  body ;  God  sees  all,  and  is  himself  invisibler 
likewise  is  the  soul;  God  sustains  the  world,  and  the  soul 
sustains  the  body  ;  God  is  pure,  and  so  is  the  soul ;  God  is 
concealed  and  revealed  in  the  world,  and  so  is  the  soul  in 
the  body."  * 

The  rabbis  considered  God  as  being  the  soul  of  the  world, 
but  they  did  not  consider  the  world  as  the  body  of  God. 
( rod  was  to  them  the  independent,  free  Being,  ruling  all. 

By  way  of  rational  interpretation,  the  Talmud  makes  the 
biblical  passages  say  what,  originally,  they  certainly  did 
not  mean,  for  instance  :  "  Rabbi  Elieser  said,  '  Ever  since 
the  Decalogue  was  proclaimed,  God  does  not  interfere  with 
the  moral  order,  but  leaves  all  to  the  principles  of  self- 
retribution."  And  this  idea  he  derived  from  the  Deuter- 
onomic  passage,  u  Behold  !  I  lay  before  you  life  and  death, 
the  blessing  and  the  curse ! "  If  it  is  not  claimed  that 
this  view  contains  the  only  mode  of  Divine  retribution,  then 
Rabbi  Elieser's  view  is  not  objectionable  at  all. 

NTotably  free  is  the  view  of  Rabbi  Simon  ben  Elieser, 
which  reads  :  "  The  preponderance  of  mankind's  merits  or 
demerits  decides  its  destiny"  (Kiduschin) ;  and  so  is  the 
view  of  the  Midrash  Rabba  in  Leviticus,  according  to  which 


.*  Talmud  Berach. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHV.      159 

the  passage,  u  If  ye  walk  in  my  laws,"  refers  to  the  u  Laws 
of  nature." 

The  writers  on  gnosticism,  the  object  of  which  is  the 
reflection  on  the  creation,  on  the  government  of  th» 
world,  on  the  Divine  nature,  etc.,  can  also  find  in  the  Talmud; 
ample  material.  It  is  especially  the  attribution  to  God 
that  figures  there  considerably.  In  Chagiga  (xii.)  it 
reads  :  "  Ten  attributes  co-operated  in  God's  creation  :  wis- 
dom, reason,  knowledge,  strength,  vocality,  force,  justice, 
righteousness,  love  and  mercy ; "  and  in  Aboth  Derabi 
Nathan  (xxxvii.)  it  reads  :  "God  was  assisted  in  the  crea- 
tion of  the  world  by  seven  attributes :  knowledge,  reason 
strength,  vocality,  justice,  love  and  mercy." 

This  kind  of  gnosticism,  which  arose  under  the  influence 
of  the  Alexandrian  philosophy,  and  presents  the  Divine 
attributes  as  separate  instrumentalities,  was  immediately 
condemned  as  heterogeneous,  and  startled  the  followers  of 
the  pure  Jewish  monotheism.  They  raised  their  voices  in 
protest.  The  Talmud  Yerushalmi  *  states  that  an  anathema 
was  hurled  against  a  man  who  proceeded  to  give  God  too 
many  attributes. 

The  "'  men  of  the  great  Synod  " — started  by  Ezra — con- 
cluded that  the  adherents  of  pure  monotheism  shall  give  God 
not  more  than  three  attributes :  God  is  great ,  mighty  and 
renerable.  These  attributes,  given  at  first  to  God  by  Mosesr 
were  introduced  into  the  main  part  of  the  daily  liturgyr 
the  "  Schemona  Esra  prayer."  The  Talmud  Yoma  shed* 
some  light  on  this  subject :  "  Moses  said  God  is  great, 
mighty  and  venerable ;  but  Jeremiah,  seeing  the  profanity 
the  heathens  committed  in  the  temple,  became  a  skeptic  in 
God's  venerability.  Daniel,  witnessing  the  destruction  of 

*  Berah,  IX.,  1. 


1HO  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


the  sanctuary,  doubted  God's  might,  But  the  "men  of  the 
great  Synod''  argued  that  the  real  greatness,  might  and 
venerability  of  God  consists  in  his  nature  of  heing  slow  to 
punish  and  long  to  suffer." 

Rabbi  Chanina  argued  against  the  attribution  mania  of 
his  contemporaries  by  the  following  illustration  :  "  It  is  an 
insult,  and  not  an  exaltation,  to  a  king  if  he  is  praised  for 
having  silver  money  when  it  is  expected  of  him  to  have 
immense  sums  of  gold.  So  it  is  with  God.  All  attribution 
of  human  language  is  not  adequate  to  his  real  essence."  * 

The  attribution  mania  was  checked  among  the  Jews  when 
the  Jew-Christians  engrossed  the  -Philonic  Logos  into  the 
mediatorship  of  the  "Son  of  God."  Thus  an  extremity 
became  a  cure.  Such  extremity  cures  occur  very  frequently 
in  the  history  of  human  aberration. 

Those  rabbis  who  have  never  been  addicted  to  agnos- 
ticism consciously  believed  that  God  manifests  himself 
under  two  attributes  :  Middath  H add-in  (Justice)  and  Mid- 
ilath  Rachiniin  (mercy),  and  that  he  balances  by  means  of 
these  two  attributes  the  iniquities  of  man,  so  that  the  human 
race  be  forgiven  its  sins  and  be  preserved  in  existence. 

The  controversies  and  the  polemical  discussions  of  the 
Talmud  are  directed,  not  against  atheism,  but  rather  against 
the  errors  of  the  Greeks  and  Persians  and  against  heretic 
conceptions  of  God. 

Rabbi  Abua,  in  refutation  of  the  Persian  dualism  and 
the  Christian  Son-God,  said  :  "  God  is  one,  the  first  and  the 
last.  He  has  no  father,  no  brother  and  no  son."  f 

The  Talmud  Yerushalmi  points  to  it  as  to  a  merit  that 
Judaism  does  not  teach  a  mediator,  and  that  everybody  can 

*  Talmud,  Megillah  and  Kethuboth.     t  Midrash  Rab.  Exodus  xxix. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.       161 

address  himself  directly  to  God,  without  the  intercession  of 
a  mediator.  This  was  said  to  dispute  the  Persian  and  the 
Christian  mediatorships. 

The  Talmud  speaks  very  frequently  of  the  practical 
atheism  (Keilu  Kofer  Beicca.r).  People  who  fly  into  anger, 
or  who  are  proud,  or  who  are  deceitful,  or  who  do  wrong, 
are  considered  practical  atheists. 

As  to  the  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence,  the 
Talmud  refers,  like  the  Bible,  to  the  wonders  of  the  creation 
and  to  the  preservation  and  government  of  the  world. 
Besides  this,  it  contains  some  anecdotes  like  the  following  : 
i-  Rabbi  Joshua  would  prove  to  a  heathen  the  existence  01 
God  by  telling  him  to  look  into  the  sun.  The  heathen 
replies,  '  That  would  blind  me.'  '  Well,'  said  the  rabbi, 
'  Behold,  if  you  are  unable  to  look  into  the  sun,  which  is 
only  a  work  of  God,  how  can  you  be  able  to  expect  to  see 
God  himself?'" 

The  Midrasch  Echa  relates  of  a  child,  which,  when  asked 
where  God  was,  replied  :  "  First  tell  me  where  God  is  not." 

THE  GOD  OF  THE  JEWISH  METAPHYSICS. 

The  Jewish  metaphysicians,  though  they  believed  in  the 
unity,  omnipotence,  holiness  and  providence  of  God,  in 
some  respects  differed  in  their  conception  of  him  from  the 
Bible.. 

The  biblical  conception  of  God,  being  a  poetical  and  a 
prophetical  one,  is  that  of  the  heart  and  of  sound  common 
sense,  while  the  Jewish  philosophers  added  also  a  specula- 
tive, metaphysical  element  to  it. 

When  the  Bible  uses  expressions  like  "  the  knowledge  of 
God  "  or  "  Thou  shalt  know  God,"  it  does  not  mean  any 
metaphysical  knowledge  a  la  Aristotle,  but  it  has  in  view  the 


102  AI:<U;.MKNTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


ways  of  Providence  and  the  ethical  nature  of  God  as  the 
protector  of  truth,  justice,  virtue  and  liberty. 

The  following  biblical  passages  are  proof  of  this  : 

The  prophet  Hosea,  who  pleaded  so  much  in  behalf  of 
the  knowledge  of  God,  says  (vi.  6) :  "  For  piety  I  desire, 
and  not  sacrifice ;  and  the  knowledge  of  God  more  than 
burnt  offerings;"  and  (iv.  1-2)  he  says:  "Hear  the  word 
of  the  Lord,  ye  children  of  Israel,  for  the  Lord  had  a  con- 
troversy with  the  inhabitants  of  the  land,  because  there  is 
no  truth,  nor  kindness,  nor  knowledge  in  the  land ;  "  and 
in  (ii.  21-22)  it  reads:  "And  I  will  betroth  thee  unto  me 
forever ;  yea,  I  will  betroth  thee  unto  me  in  righteousness 
and  in  justice,  and  in  loving  kindness  and  in  memory  ;  and 
I  will  betroth  thee  unto  me  in  faithfulness,  and  thou  shalt 
know  the  Lord." 

It  is  evident  that  the  prophet  Hosea  did  not  consider 
ratiocination,  or  any  metaphysical  studies,  necessary  in 
preparation  for  the  arrival  at  the  knowledge  of  God.  It  is 
the  moral  qualification  that  he  thought  indispensable  for  a 
man  to  "  know  God." 

The  Jewish  metaphysicians  of  the  Middle  Ages  defended 
their  metaphysical  inquiries  by  referring  to  that  classical 
passage  in  Jeremiah  (ix.  22-23) :  "Thus  said  the  Lord :  let 
not  the  wise  glorify  himself  in  his  wisdom,  neither  let  the 
mighty  man  glorify  himself  in  his  might,  nor  let  the  rich 
man  glorify  himself  in  his  riches ;  but  let  him  that  glori- 
fieth  himself  glory  in  this,  that  he  understandeth  and 
knoweth  me,  that  I  am  the  Lord  who  exercises  kindness, 
justice  and  righteousness  on  earth;  for  in  these  things 
I  delight,  saith  the  Lord." 

It  is  plain  that  this  passage  was  abused,  as  it  does  not  say 
anything  that  might  indorse  metaphysical  inquiry,  but  on  the 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        163 


contrary,  it  is  the  apprehension  of  the  moral  nature  of  God 
that  is  called  here  "  the  knowledge  of  God." 

A  metaphysical  conception  of  God  is  naturally  antagonis- 
tic to  anthropomorphisms. 

Saadya,  Bachya  and  Maimonides,  whose  conception  of  God 
was  pre-eminently  a  metaphysical  one,  were  antagonists  to 
all  anthropomorphisms,  while  Rabbi  Abraham  ben  David,  of 
Posquiere,  and  Rabbi  Moses  ben  Chisdai  Taku,  who  occupied 
more  the  biblical  standpoint,  believed  in  anthropomor- 
phisms. 

The  question  is  in  order :  What  did  anthropomorphism 
mean  to  these  last-named  men?  Did  they  take  it  in  a  lit- 
eral sense?  Did  they  really  believe  that  God  is  a  corporeal 
Being? 

It  was  only  their  antagonists,  who  from  partisanship 
imputed  such  a  belief  to  them. 

The  truth  is,  the  Jewish  anthropomorphisms  believed  in 
the  infinity  of  God,  and  applied  to  God  all  the  biblical  pas- 
sages bearing  upon  the  spirituality  of  God  just  as  well  as 
their  antagonists,  the  followers  of  Maimonides,  did  ;  but,  as 
the  Cabbalists,  Rabbi  Joseph  Gikatalia,  the  author  of  the 
Schaareh .  Orah,  and  Rabbai  Mair  Urn  Gabai,  the  author  of 
the  "  Abodath  Haccodesh,  remark,  the  difference  between 
these  two  parties  consisted,  plainly  in  this  : 

The  Jewish  metaphysicians  gave  the  anthropomorphisms 
of  the  Bible  a  philosophical  interpretation,  and  the  meta- 
physical idea  that  they  derived  in  that  way  they  considered 
the  only  and  the  real  meaning  of  the  respective  anthropo- 
morphistic  expressions  of  the  Bible ;  while  the  anthropo- 
morphists  held  that  the  Bible,  havinga  mystical  background, 
is  inexhaustible  in  ideas,  and  that  the  biblical  anthro. 
pomorphisms  have  a  great  many  meanings  and  references 


164  AUGMENTS  KOU  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  COD. 


besides  those  rational  views  derived  from  them  by  the  phi- 
losophers, even  if  those  views  were  true. 

The  anthropomorphists  did  not  protest  so  much  against 
the  rational  views  of  the  philosophers  as  against  their 
sweeping  judgments  that  their  ideas  are  the  only  ones  meant 
by  the  Bible,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  mystical  theory  alto- 
gether. 

The  struggle  of  the  anthropomorphists  against  the  philos- 
ophers was  not  a  struggle  of  the  literal  belief  in  anthropo- 
morphisms with  rational  ideas,  but  a  struggle  of  riri/*t!r!«vi 
<iyain*t  metaphysics. 

The  gnostics  of  the  Talmud  rejected  the  anthropomor- 
phisms only  as  far  as  they  were  offensive  to  their  philosoph- 
ically-trained sense,  Avhile  the  Jewish  philosophers  of  the 
Arabic-Spanish  epoch  rejected  the  anthropomorphisms  as 
being  incongruous  with  their  metaphysical  conception  of 
(rod.  The  Talmudists  were  opposed  to  the  rejection  of  the 
anthropomorphisms,  not,  as  some  think-,  because  they  be- 
lieved in  their  literal  meaning,  but  because  it  involved  part 
of  their  mystical  theory,  which  in  fact  was  the  philosophy 
they  believed  in. 

The  argumentation  for  the  existence  of  God  was  in  use 
even  during  the  biblical  epoch,. when  polytheism  had  yet 
a  strong  hold  on  the  people. 

The  Psalm  94  contains  a,teleological  and  moral  proof  of 
the  divine  existence  :  "  He  that  hath  planted  the  ear,  shall 
he  not  hear?  Or,  he  that  hath  formed  the  eye,  shall  he  not 
see?  He  that  admonished  nations,  shall  he  not  correct?" 
Vestiges  of  the  teleological  proof  in  the  book  of  Job,  "  Prom 
my  Mesh  I  see  the  Almighty,"  and  in  Isaiah,  "  Lift  your  eyes 
jind  behold  who  has  created  these— the  sun,  the  stars,  plan- 
ets " — are  a  trace  of  a  cosmological  argument. 

An  argumentation  presented  in  regular  philosophical  form 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        165 

was  produced  among  the  Jews,  first  by  Philo,  of  Alexandria. 
His  teleological  argument  reads  as  follows  : 

"  If  any  one  comes  into  A  well-ordered  city,  in  which  all 
parts  of  the  constitution  are  exceedingly  well  regulated  and 
arranged,  what  other  idea  will  he  entertain  but  that  the  city 
is  governed  by  wise  and  virtuous  rulers?  He,  therefore,  who 
comes  into  that  which  is  truly  the  greatest  of  cities,  namely, 
this  world,  and  beholds  all  the  land,  both  the  mountains  and 
the  campaign  district  full  of  animals  and  plants,  and 
streams  of  rivers  both  overflowing  and  depending  on  the 
winter  floods ;  and  the  steady  flow  of  the  sea,  and  the  admi- 
rable temperature  of  the  air,  and  the  varieties  and  the  regu- 
lar revolutions  of  the  seasons  of  the  year,  and  then,  too,  the 
sun  and  the  moon,  the  rulers  of  day  and  night,  and  the  rev- 
olution and  regular  motion  of  all  the  other  planets  and  fixed 
stars,  and  the  whole  heaven ;  would  he  not  naturally,  or  I 
should  rather  say,  of  necessity,  conceive  a  notion  of  the 
Father  and  the  Creator  and  Governor  of  all  this  system? 
For  there  is  no  artificial  work  whatever  which  exists  of  its 
own  accord.  And  the  world  is  the  most  artificial  and  skil- 
fully made  of  all  works,  as  if  it  had  been  put  together  by 
some  one  who  was  altogether  accomplished  and  most  per- 
fect in  knowledge.  It  is  in  this  way  that  we  have  received 
the  idea  of  the  existence  of  God."* 

Philo  was  of  the  opinion  that  there  are  four  ways  to  ar- 
rive at  the  knoAvledge  of  God  :  The  phenomena  of  nature,, 
self-knowledge,  the  moral  principles  and  the  ecstasy. 

The  morning  star  on  the  horizon  of  Jewish  philosophy  was 
Saadya  Gaon,  of  Fayum,  in  Egypt  (892-942).  Being  a  Mu- 
tazilite  he  reduced  all  the  attributes  which  were  to  define  the 
conception  of  God  to  three  :  God  is  a  living,  a  mighty,  and  a 

*Monarchy  I.,  IV. 


IOC,  AUGUMKNTS    FOR    THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 

7n>  Being,  whose  attributes  and  essence  are  in  perfect  unity. 
But  Saadva  gave  no  attention  to  the  proofs  of  the  Divine  ex- 
istence. This  was  done  first  by  his  contemporary,  Rabbi 
Bachya  Ibn  Pekudah.  the  author  of  the  "  Chobath  Halwo- 

\voth." 

1'achya  was  also  the  first  Jewish  metaphysician  who  advo- 
cated the  use  of  negative  attributes,  they  being  more  proper 
than  the  positive  ones.  No  Jewish  theologian  before  him 
enunciated  so  emphatically  that  the  word  "Echod,"  "God  is 
One."  must  be  taken  neither  in  the  numerical  nor  in  the  indi- 
vidual sense,  but  that  it  means  a  metaphysical  and  substan- 
tial unit.  The  Jewish  orthodoxy  rejects  this  definition  as 
heretical,  and  holds  that  the  term  "God  is  one"  means  "he  is 
incomparable."  Bachya  was  of  the  opinion  that  a  pure  con- 
ception of  God  can  be  expected  only  of  prophetically-in- 
spired or  philosophically-trained  people,  while  the  large 
bulk  of  people  worship  a  Supreme  Being,  of  whose  true  na- 
ture they  have  no  idea. 

Bachya's  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence  reads 
essentially  as  follows : 

n.  Every  existence  has  cither  produced  itself  or  was  pro- 
duced by  some  outside  cause.  Now,  to  assume  that  the 
world  can  have  produced  itself  is  absurd,  because  it  would 
have  had  to  exist  before  it  existed,  consequently  it  must  be 
produced  by  an  outside  cause. 

h.  Following  up  the  train  of  effects  and  causes,  we  are 
bound  to  assume  a  cause  that  is  the  parent  of  all  causes  and 
effects. 

/•.  It  may  be  remonstrated  that  the  world  is  its  own 
cause.  This  is  inadmissible,  as  the  world  is  composed  of 
compounds ;  and  these  compounds  presuppose  something 
that  is  elementary  and  simple,  prior  to  all  compounds.  This 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        167 

simple  elementary  something,  that  is  prior  to  all  com- 
pounds, is  God. 

d.  The  elements  that  compose  the  world  are  of  an  an- 
tagonistical  nature,  like  fire  and  water,  and  still  they  consti- 
tute a  harmonious  and  beautiful  world.  This  they  can  not 
do  of  themselves.  There  must  be  a  Being  that  enabled 
them  to  do  that. 

Bachya  thinks  that  people  who  believe  that  this  har- 
monious and  beautiful  world  has  been  arranged  and  is  reg- 
ulating itself  by  mere  chance,  are  just  as  mindless  as  if 
they  believed  that  the  water-works,  artificially  made  for 
the  irrigation  of  a  fine  park,  made  themselves ;  or  as  if 
they  believed  that  the  mere  spilling  of  ink  upon  paper  will 
produce  characters  like  those  which  were  made  by  a  care- 
ful and  skillful  calligrapher.* 

Next  to  Bachya  comes  Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  of  Toledo 
(1110-1180),  the  author  of  the  philosophical  book,  "  The 
Sublime  Faith"  (Emunah  Rama).  His  argumentation  for 
the  Divine  existence  is  in  essence  as  follows :  The  world 
must  have  a  prime  cause,  which  exists  of  necessity  and 
implies  all  perfection.  Such  a  being  that  exists  of  necessity 
is  independent  of  all  existences,  while  all  depend  upon  it. 
In  this  argumentation,  the  idea  of  a  necessary  existence 
stands  for  the  cosmological,  and  the  idea  of  perfection  for 
the  ontological,  proof.  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  did  not  yet  draw 
a  line  of  separation  between  these  tAvo  arguments 

The  prince  of  the  Jewish  metaphysicians  was  Moses 
Maimonides  (1135-1204).  Before  his  tribunal  anthro- 
pomorphism found  no  mercy.  As  an  iconoclast,  he  sur- 
passed all  his  predecessors.  Under  the  segis  of  the 
Chaldean  Pentateuch  translation,  by  Unkelos,  which  gives 

*ChobathHalwowoth  I.,  VI. 


1IJ8          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


the  anthropomorphisms  and  anthropopaties  of  the  Penta- 
teuch in  philosophical  paraphrases,  and  under  the  asgis  of 
some  speculative  views  of  the  Talmud  and  Midrash,  he 
interpreted  the  anthropomorphism  and  anthropopathies  of 
the  Bible  in  a  speculative  sense. 

He  thought  that  all  that  is  considered  a  perfection  in  the 
eyes  of  the  people,  they  ascribe  to  God  and  keep  away  only 
what,  according  to  their  notions,  would  be  an  imperfection 
in  the  Divine  nature.* 

Believing  that  "  silence  is  the  most  becoming  praise  of 
God,"  Maimonides  was  opposed  to  all  attribution.  He  fully 
agreed  with  the  Talmudist,  Rabbi  Chanina,  that  the  more 
attributes  there  are  given  to  God,  the  more  is  left  in  God  to  be 
attributed.  But  as  attribution  is  necessary  for  practical 
religious  purposes,  he  adopted  the  four  attributes  :  God  is 
liviny,  miyhty,  wise  and  willing,  because  they  are  the  least 
anthropomorphistic  and  the  most  expressive  of  the  Divine 
relation  to  the  creation. 

These  attributes,  Maimonides  thought,  mean  something 
quite  different  when  given  to  God  than  when  given  to  man 
and  that  there  was  absolutely  no  resemblance  between  that 
which  they  mean  when  applied  to  God  and  that  when 
applied  to  man.  Maimonides  was  right  in  so  far  as  in  God 
life,  wisdom,  power  and  will  are  not,  as  in  man,  accidental 
properties,  but  properties  of  necessity.  However,  from  a 
Jewish  standpoint,  he  was  an  erratic  in  maintaining  that 
there  is,  even  as  to  the  essence,  absolutely  no  resemblance 
between  the  wisdom,  will,  life  and  might  of  God  and  that 
of  man.  If  wisdom,  will,  life  and  might  mean  anything 
real,  and,  if  these  terms  are  no  misnomers,  they  must  mean 
the  same  thing  in  God  that  they  mean  in  man.  The  differ- 

*  Moreh  Nebuchim,  I.,  36,  46-47. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        169 

ence  must  consist  merely  in  the  conditions,  in  the  degree 
of  perfection  and  in  the  magnitude  of  scale. 

God  is  eternal,  means,  as  Maimonides  defines  it,  nega- 
tively, that  he  is  not  dependent  on  time.  God  is  one, 
negatively  defined,  means  that  he  is  incomparable.  God  is 
wise,  means  that  the  world  is  not  ruled  by  chance ;  and 
God  is  living,  means  that  he  is  not  lifeless,  as  the  elements, 
and  that  he  needs  no  subsistence.  God  knows  all  indi- 
viduals and  bodies  by  knowing  the  monads  and  generalities 
of  their  existence.  The  world  and  its  course  being  God's 
embodied  plan,  can  not  increase  his  knowledge.  God  knows 
all  that  is  to  come  when  it  is  yet  potential. 

The  climax  of  the  conception  of  God  consists,  as  Mai- 
monides thinks,  in  the  comprehension  of  God  as  the  knowing 
one,  the  knowledge  and  the  known  one  in  perfect  unity. 

God's  omnipotence  is  restricted  by  his  wisdom,  and, 
accordingly,  there  are  impossibilities,  even  for  God.  God 
can  not  make  another  god  equal  to  him ;  God  can  not 
become  a  man;  (rod  can  not  make  a  triangle  to  be  a 
quadrangle,  etc. 

As  to  Providence,  Maim  onides  believes  that  God,  being 
the  knowing  one,  the  knowledge  and  the  known  one  in 
perfect  unity,  must  know  all  in  general  and  in  particular. 
The  special  providence  extends  only  to  the  individuals  of 
the  human  race,  but  not  also  to  animals  and  plants,  which, 
having  no  reason,  no  moral  and  no  spiritual  properties,  are 
preserved  only  by  God's  general  providence,  as  manifested 
in  the  preservation  of  the  species.* 

Regarding  the  design  in  the  universe,  Maimonides  holds 
that  man  can  not  know  exactly  what,  taken  in  general,  it 
may  be  ;  but  he  does  not  doubt  that  there  is  a  design  in  the 

*  Moreh  Nebuchim,  III.,  17. 


170  Aiuii'MK.vrs  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

universe  corresponding  to  the  Divine  wisdom,  and  that 
there  are  designs  in  the  structures  of  the  creatures,  which, 
in  any  human  production,  would  be  called  wisdom. 

The  Muttakalims  have  not  favored  the  term  of  a  "  first 
cause,"  as  from  that  term  implying  the  necessary  exist- 
ence of  a  being,  which  is  at  the  outset  and  the  bottom  of 
all  second  iry  causes,  they  thought  follows  more  the  idea 
that  God's  relation  to  the  world  is  not  perfectly  free.  They 
would  substitute  for  it  the  term  "  first  activity."  But 
Maimonides  thought  they  overlooked  that  the  term  "first 
cause  "  implied,  not  merely  the  efficient,  but  also  the  formal 
and  the  final  cause,  and  that  only  if  God  is  the  efficient, 
the  formal  and  the  final  cause,  it  can  be  truly  said  of  him 
that  he  is  indispensable  for  the  world's  existence.  Should 
God  he  merely  the  k'  first  activity,"  then  the  products  might 
outlast  that  activity.* 

As  to  the  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence,  Mai- 
monides produced,  in  the  second  part  of  the  "More  Ne- 
buchim,''  the  proofs  which  were  current  among  the  Arabic 
metaphysicians  of  his  day. 

n.  (The  Cosmological  Proof.)  According  to  the  twenty- 
fifth  of  the  twenty-six  premises  of  his  cosmological  inquiry, 
the  world  must  have  a  prime,  motor.  The  existence  of  this 
prime  motor  Maimonides  tries  to  prove  by  the  assumption 
of  the  following  four  cases  :  This  prime  motor  must  be 
either  in  or  outside  the  world.  If  this  prime  motor  is  in 
the  world,  then  it  is  either  divisible  or  indivisible.  But  if 
the  motive  power  is  outside  the  world,  then  it  is  either  a 
body  or  a  mind  separated  from  the  world. 

Of  these  four  cases,  the  first  one  can  not  be,  because  a 
divisible  force  means— according  to  the  twelfth  premise— 

*  M.->reh  Nebuchim,  I.,  69,  III.  13. 


ARGUMENTATION  OK  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHV.        171 

a  final  force,  but  such  a  force  can  not  produce  an  infinite 
motion.  The  second  case  can  not  be,  because  an  indi- 
visible force  like  man's  soul,  is  set  in  motion  accidentally 
by  the  matter ;  but  such  an  accidental  motion — according 
to  the  eighth  premise — must  come  sooner  or  later  to  a 
standstill.  The  third  case  can  not  be,  because  a  corporeal 
motor  is  a  compound  presupposing  another  motor  ad 
infinitum.  Consequently  the  motion  of  the  world  can  be 
'accounted  for  only  with  the  fourth  case,  by  mind  inde- 
pendent of  the  material  world. 

1>.  (The  Ontological  Argument.)  The  things  of  the  world 
being  transient  and  vain,  have  the  possibility  of  non- 
existence,  and,  consequently,  at  a  certain  time,  they  have 
not  existed  at  all.  Now,  if  at  the  time  when  these  things  of 
the  transient  world  have  not  existed,  there  had  not  been 
something  higher  than  that  transient  world,  they  certainly 
would  not  have  come  into  existence.  But  as  the  things  of 
the  transient  world  exist,  they  do  so  only  through  a  Being 
which  has  no  accidental,  but  a  necessary,  existence,  and 
that  necessarily  existing  being  is  God. 

A  necessarily  existing  being  is  that  which  is  so  perfect 
and  absolute  that  it  does  not  depend  on  any  conditions.  Its 
non-existence  can  not  be  imagined,  as  it  combines  all 
possible  and  imaginable  perfection. 

There  are  people  who  ask :  "  If  God  has  created  the 
world,  who  has  created  God?"  Only  secondary  causes  are 
produced,  but  God,  as  a  prime  cause  which  unites  all  per- 
fections, exists  necessarily.  The  ontological  proof,  in  its 
real  and  correct  meaning,  answers  the  question :  "  Who 
created  God?" 

The  arguments  of  Maimon's  were  attacked  by  Chisdai 
Crescas  (1340-1410),  the  great  Jewish  metaphysician,  who 
was  the  first  to  undermine  the  authority  of  Aristotle  by  an 


172          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

exposition    of  the  fallacies   in   the   system   of    that  great 
Stagyrite. 

Crescas'  attacks  upon  Maimon's  proofs  do  not  amount 
to  much,  as  they  concern  merely  the  formalities,  but  not 
the  ideas  proper. 

Crescas  believes  that  the  existence  of  the  first  cause, 
which  is  independent  of  all,  but  upon  which  all  that  is 
caused  depends,  is  above  any  doubt.  He  finds  more  diffi- 
culty in  finding  out  and  in  knowing  something  about  God's 
nature  and  essence,  and  also  whether  there  is  really  only 
one  God.  • 

A  new  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  was  produced 
by  Moses  Mendelssohn.  He  sets  it  forth  as  follows  :  "  He 
who  has  an  idea  of  the  concatination  and  connection  of  the 
truths  and  of  the  unfathomable  depth  of  knowledge,  will 
admit  that  none  of  them  can  be  known  perfectly  and  clearly 
except  by  a  being  that  is  perfect. 

•'The  perfect  Being  that  knows  not  only  man  with  all  his 
criteria  and  qualities,  but  that  knows  also  the  summary  of 
all  potentialities  as  potential  and  the  essence  of  all  actuali- 
ties and  realities  as  actual  and  real — in  short,  that  knows 
perfectly  the  sum  total,  the  essence  and  the  concatination 
of  all  truths,  in  all  their  possible  and  actual  developments, 
is  the  Infinite  Mind."* 

This  argument  starts  with  the  imperfection  of  man's  self- 
knowledge  and  is  based  upon  the  relation,  conversion, 
development  and  nature  of  all  potentialities,  realities, 
actualities  and  truths.  They  force  upon  man's  mind  the 
idea  that  there  must  be  a  being  that  knows  them  all  in  all, 
their  connections  and  relations. 

A  very  interesting  case  occurred  in  the  beginning  of  the 

*  Morgenstunden,  XVI. 


ARGUMENTATION  OP  THE  jE\vr.<-n  THEOSOI-HY.       173 

•eighteenth  century  in  London.  The  very  orthodox  rabbi, 
David  Nieto,  startled  his  congregation  by  the  remark  that 
"  God  and  nature  were  identical/'  The  Amsterdam  rabbi, 
Hirsh  Ashkenasi,  whose  opinion  on  the  subject  was  solicited, 
could  not  see  anything  wrong  in  Nieto's  expression.  He 
argued  that  as  the  term  "  nature  "  admits  of  more  than,  one 
definition,  the  congregation  must  not  take  it  just  in  the  pan- 
theistic sense.  He  referred  them  to  precedents  in  the  book 
"Cusari  '  (I.,  71-80),  by  Juda  Halevi  (1080),  and  in  the 
book  •"  Schelah,"  by  Jesaia  Hurwitz,  where  the  identification 
of  the  terms  "  nature  and  God  "  does  not  mean  to  exclude 
the  conception  of  a  holy,  self-existing,  free,  supreme  Being  * 

Rabbi  Ashkenasi's  decision  is  in  accord  wih  the  views  of 
John  Scotus  Erigena  This  great  mediieval  metaphysician 
(815)  analyzed  the  manifestations  of  nature  into  that  form 
which  creates,  but  is  not  created  ;  then  into  that  form  which 
is  both  creating  and  created  ;  further,  into  that  form  which 
creates  and  is  created,  and,  finally,  into  that  form  which 
neither  creates  nor  is  created. 

The  first  and  the  fourth  of  these  cases  relate  to  God  as 
manifested  in  the  creation,  while  the  second  and  the  third 
cases  refer  to  the  creation. 

In  this  sense,  the  term  "  nature''  applied  to  God  does  not 
mean  a  negation  of  God,  but  God  as  the  natural  cause  of 
the  existence  and  activity  of  nature. 

Some  good  ideas  are  contained  in  Rabbi  Dr.  Ludwig 
Philipson's  theodicy,  "  Wider  den  Unglauben.'1 

The  common  characteristic  of  nature,  human  mind  and 
history  is  that  they  all  are  subjected  to  the  reign  of  law. 

Nature  is  infinite  and  immeasurable,  and  yet  all  its  parts 
form  a  unity  effected  by  means  of  light  and  gravity.  Light 


*  Chacham  Zebi  Rabbin.  Respon.,  XVIII. 


174  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OK  GOD. 

reaches  the  widest  distances  and  makes  the  science  of 
astronomy  possible.  The  gravitation  keeps  all  cosmical 
bodies  together  in  their  place*  and  courses.  Besides  the 
laws  of  light  and  gravitation,  the  laws  of  change  able  ness, 
interdependence,  rise,  development  and  decay  are  general 
laws,  to  which  all  organic,  as  well  as  inorganic,  objects  arc 
subjected 

The  laws  of  nature,  what  are  they? 

Philipson  answers :  They  are  the  thoughts   according  to 
which    all    that    exists    arises,  develops,    influences    and 
perishes.     There  must  be  something  that  has  devised  these' 
thoughts  and  that  has  actualized  them.     That  something  is 
the  highest  universal  reason — God. 

As  to  the  human  soul,  Dr.  Philipson  thinks  that  God  has 
put  it  as  something,  unconscious  into  the  cell,  that  it 
develops  into  consciousness,  operates  in  the  human  body 
and  departs  according  to  a  Divine  plan.  The  whole  nature 
of  the  human  soul  is  such  that  it  can  not  originate  from 
mere  matter,  and,  consequently,  presupposes  a  Divine 
Being. 

Concerning  history,  Dr.  Philipson's  view  is  that  the  first 
glance  at  the  universal  history  would  make  man  inclined  to 
believe  that  the  only  law  of  history  is  that  expressed  in 
Ecclesiastes :  "  One  generation  comes  and  passes,  but  the 
eartli  lasts  forever." 

However,  a  closer  and  deeper  inquiry  into  the  records  of 
history  shows  that  history  is  ruled  by  laws  like  the  law  of 
the  westward  migrations,  or  the  laws  of  international 
alliance,  by  means  of  gain,  thirst  for  power,  religion,  in- 
dustry, commerce  and  science. 

These  laws  show  that  history  is  an  organism  and  sub. 
jected  to  the  laws  of  development. 

That  development  has  not  always  a  progressive  tendency- 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        175 

As  soon  as  nations  have  fulfilled  their  missions,  they  have  to 
make  room  for  others,  who  also  have  missions.  The  in- 
tervals of  such  epochs  are  ages  of  darkness  and  confusion. 

Dr.  Philipson  concludes  his  argument  with  the  remark 
that  mankind  is  created  for  a  purpose,  for  a  certain  plan, 
which  it  has  to  realize. 

Mankind  is  a  collective  body  that  arose,  exists  and 
develops  according  to  laws  and  ideas,  which  presuppose  a 
lawgiver  and  a  deviser — God. 

A  scholarly  theodicy  and  a  masterly  refutation  of  the 
materialistic,  pessimistic  and  atheistic  systems  of  the  day  is 
"The  Cosmic  God,"  by  Rabbi  Dr.  I.  M.  Wise,  President 
of  the  Hebrew  Union  College,  in  Cincinnati. 

Free  from  all  sophistry,  Dr.  Wise  made  it  his  object  "  to 
find  truth  by  the  instrumentality  of  inductive  philosophy, 
and  to  ascertain,  after  a  fair  and  full  consideration  of  the 
philosophy  and  the  sciences  of  the  nineteenth  century,  what 
remains  to  be  held  up  as  the  religious  doctrine  of  honest 
and  intelligent  people,  without  conflict  with  the  intelligence 
of  this  enlightened  and  progressive  age,  and  what  remains  to 
be  constructed  into  the  religion  of  the  future  generation." 

Having  enumerated  and  refuted  all  the  specious  ar- 
guments of  the  advocates  of  the  theory  .of  efficient 
causes,  Dr.  Wise  comes  to  the  conclusion  (page  125) 
that  ''This  truth  of  teleology  is,  first,  in  the  human 
intellect  spontaneously.  Since  man  exists  he  has  sought 
cause  behind  each  effect,  although  he  did  not  always  suc- 
ceed in  finding  the  correct  one,  and  has  always  expected 
the  same  effect  from  the  same  cause.  He  must  have  always 
considered  this  law  universal ;  it  must  be  in  the  intellect. 
Experience  teaches  the  law  of  isolated  cases ;  its  universality 
is  spontaneous  in  the  intellect.  None  can  think  of  a  human 
intellect  in  unobstructed  activity  without  this  synthetical 


17*1  ARGUMENTS  KOU  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


truth,  which  is  one  of  its  attributes,  manifested  in  the  lowest, 
us  in  the  highest,  processes  of  reason.  Therefore  intellect 
juul  law  of  causality  are  inseparable. 

"This  truth  is,  secondly,  in  all  nature  outside  of  the 
human  intellect,  confirmed  by  all  human  knowledge,  obser- 
vation, experience  and  experiments,  as  far  as  science  has 
penetrated  into  the  mysteries  of  existence.  Here  is  already 
something  universal  in  nature  outside  of  the  human  intel- 
lect, which  is  also  in  it — the  law  of  causality,  and  it  is  the 
essentiality  and  motor  power  of  both.  This  law  in  man  is 
in  his  intellect  and  inseparable  from  it;  hence,  this  same 
law  in  nature,  outside  of  man,  must  be  in  an  intellect. 
Well,  then,  here  we  have  already  an  intellect  in  nature  out- 
side of  man. 

"The  law  of  causality  being  admitted,  we  all  agree  that 
nothing  in  this  universe  stands  above  or  beyond  the  law. 
But  as  the  forces  and  elements  are  heterogeneous,  and  each 
follows  its  own  law  or  laws,  still  the  univ  rse,  as  far  as  we 
know,  is  one  in  order  and  harmony;  the  forces  of  nature 
must  either  converge  to  the  one  single  purpose  of  sustaining 
permanently  this  order  and  harmony,  or  one  superior  force 
must  control  all  of  them,  or  else  there  must  be  continual 
conflicts  in  nature  among  elements  and  forces  ;  which  we 
know  is  not  the  case.  Consequently  there  is  co-opera- 
tion, co-ordination  and  subordination  in  nature,  which  is 
its  law  of  laws,  or  force  of  forces.  Illustrate  so:  All  parts 
constituting  a  body,  be  it  a  man,  a  bird,  a  house  a  factory, 
an  earth,  or  a  sun,  must  be  harmonious  in  their  co-ordina- 
tion and  subordination,  and  thus  co-operate  continually  to 
make  the  existence  of  that  respective  body  possible.  If  a 
wheel  or  a  screw  in  a  machine  is  not  constructed  according 
to  the  law  governing  the  whole  machine,  the  order  and 
harmony  thereof  is  destroyed.  If  the  heart  of  a  human 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        177 

being  be  too  large,  or  his  stomach  too  small,  relatively, 
according  to  the  law  governing  his  whole  organism,  then 
the  order  and  harmony  thereof  are  destroyed.  It  is  uni- 
versally so.  although  each  part  of  every  body  is  governed 
by  its  own  laws,  the  whole,  as  a  unit,  must  be  governed  by 
a  superior  force,  or  the  various  forces  must  converge  in  this 
one  particular  point  of  sustaining  intact  that  particular 
unit  or  body. 

"Here,  then,  is  teleology,  here  are  final  causes.  In  every 
unit  you  may  single  out  in  this  universe,  infusorium  or 
man,  fungus  or  palm-tree,  crystal  or  sun,  there  is  final 
cause  before  you,  there  is  teleology,  there  is  end,  aim,  pur- 
pose and  design.  And  if  you  then  rise  from  the  individual 
objects  to  the  universe  as  a  unit,  you  have  before  you  always 
the  same  teleology,  the  same  end,  aim,  purpose  and  design 
of  preserving  the  whole  intact  as  a  harmonious  unit.  There 
is  the  same  final  cause  in  the  grand  totality  of  nature  as  in 
every  minute  object  thereof." 

Regarding  the  historical  proof,  Dr.  Wise  asks  :  "  Is  there 
teleology  and  final  cause  in  history?  Is  end,  aim,  object, 
design,  purpose  and  proper  execution  discernible  in  the 
history  of  man,  or  is  the  human  family  drifting  upon  the 
boundless  ocean  of  existence  without  any  ultimate  purpose? 
If  there  is  teleology  in  history,  then  the  question  arises  by 
what  force  or  forces,  power  or  powers?  It  is  evident,  to 
my  mind,  that  there  is  teleolgy  in  history,  and  by  a  super- 
human power." 

The  general  principles  which,  according  to  Dr.  Wise,  rule 
the  history  of  the  human  race,  are :  "  Every  continuous 
cause  and  effect  in  nature  is  teleology  resulting  continually 
in  teleological  centers,  which  every  individual  being  is. 
*  *  *  What  is  true  in  nature  must  also  be  true  in  history. 
The  same  chain  of  cause  and  effect  must  also  be  teleological, 


ITS  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

and  ouch  state  of  society,  every  day,  every  hour  and  at 
every  place,  must  be  a  teleological  center." 

"  Each  state  of  society  becomes  the  cause  of  the  succeed- 
ing one,  and  so  on  to  the  supposed  end  of  history  ;  hence  the 
whole  chain  is  logical  and  teleological."  (134.) 

"  There  is  a  perpetual  progression  in  history  from  lower  to 
higher  conditions,  exactly  as  in  the  earth's  creation.  There 
are  breaks,  violent  catastrophes  and  eruptions  in  the  earth's 
crust,  and  there  are  also  in  history  apparently  illogically, 
bloody  and  disturbing  eruptions,  cessations  and  retrogres- 
sions, momentarily  and  locally  ;  but  in  the  totality  of  his- 
tory, the  progression  from  lower  to  higher  conditions  is  per- 
petual, incessant  and  logical.  "  (137.) 

"  The  first  general  principle  of  the  Logos  of  history  must 
be,  it  preserves,  utilizes  and  promulgates  all  that  is  good, 
true  and  useful,  neutralizes  all  that  is  wicked,  false  and  use- 
less or  nugatory ;  exactly  as  the  extra-organic  will  and  intel- 
lect works  in  the  organic  kingdoms.  "  (138.) 

"  The  Logos  of  history  manifests  its  extra-human  exist- 
ence also  in  the  inevitable  punishment  of  national  sins.  As 
nature,  everywhere  and  inexorably,  punishes  every  trans- 
gression against  the  physical  laws,  so  the  Logos  of  history 
dispenses  just  retribution  for  national  misdeeds.  "  (141.) 

"  The  next  phenomena  in  which  the  Logos  of  history  man- 
ifests itself  is  most  extraordinary  :  its  name  is  Genius.  The 
existence  of  genius  and  its  appearance  at  the  right  place 
and  time  is  as  mysterious  as  the  center  of  the  universe. 
Genius  is  the  superior  spontaneity  of  the  mind  in  productive 
and  executive  powers ;  it  conceives  not  by  act  of  violation  or 
tiresome  reflection,  but  feeling,  generally  and  unsolicited  ;  it 
conceives  finished  and  complete  thoughts,  schemes,  designs 
or  images  of  universal  truth,  irresistible  impulses  to  execute 
or  realize,  utter  and  promulgate."  (144-145.) 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.        179 


Dr.  Wise's  "  Cosmic  God  "  is  a  product  of  much  reading 
and  careful  reflection,  and  its  illustrations  from  history, 
natural  sciences  and  life  are  well-chosen,  striking  and  in- 
structive. 

An  attempt  to  identify  the  Jewish  Monotheism  and  the 
modern  Monism  was  made  by  Rabbi  Dr.  Ruelf,  in  his 
pamphlet  "  Der  Einheitsgedanke,"  1880.  He  was  apparently 
swayed  by  the  error  that  Monism  is  more  rational  and 
more  in  accord  with  science  than  Monotheism. 

With  regard  to  "  the  unity  of  nature,  "  meaning  that  na- 
ture is  a  Whole  ruled  by  the  same  laws  everywhere,  and 
that  its  elements  and  forces  are  convertible  into  one  an- 
other, there  is  nothing  more  obvious,  more  rational  and 
more  in  accord  with  science  than  the  Monotheism  teaching 
that  God  is  the  cause  of  that  "  unity  of  nature." 

Dr.  Ruelf  in  his  zeal  to  show  that  God,  the  human  soul  and 
force,  were  everything,  depicts  the  world,  the  human  body  and 
matter  so  very  transient,  non-substantial  and  accidental 
that,  without  being  aware  of  it,  he  drifted  into  Acosmism. 

Judaism  is  neither  Acosmism  nor  Monism ;  and  Spinozism 
is  Monism,  but  no  Acosmism.  It  was  Moses  Mendelssohn  who 
defended  Spinoza  against  the  charge  of  Acosmism  in  stating 
the  difference  that  exists  between  Leibnitz  and  Spinoza.  Leib- 
nitz assumed  that  the  world  had  a  two-fold,  a  potential  and 
a  visible  existence.  The  world  existed  potentially  when  it 
was  a  mere  idea  in  God's  mind ;  but  its  visible  existence 
commenced  when  it  was  the  will  of  God  that  it  should  exist 
outside  of  his  mind.  Spinoza's  theory  is  that  the  world 
has  always  been  visible  and  has  always  been  in  God.  A 
world  that  has  always  existed  in  a  visible  form  in  God  can 
be  no  Acosmism. 

It  •  is  indeed  noteworthy  that  while  in  the  last  century 
even  Moses  Mendelssohn,  though  he  thought  that  the  "  re- 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


fined  Spinozism"  is  compatible  with  all  practices  of  religion 
and  ethics,  was  very  anxious  to  defend  his  great  friend, 
Kphmim  G.  Leasing,  against  the  charges  of  Spinozism,it  be- 
comes in  this  century  a  favorite  idea  with  a  great  many 
prominent  Jewish  theologians  to  identify  the  Jewish  Mono- 
theism with  Spinozism. 

The  first  one  to  pronounce  the  Jewish  Monotheism  fully 
in  accord  with  Spinozism  was  Dr.  Mair  Letteris.  (Biccure 
Haittim,  184(5.)  In  his  steps  followed  Rabbi  Abraham 
Krochmal  (Eben  Horosch),  Dr.  Salomon  Rubin  (Teshuba 
Nizachath),  Rabbi  Senior  Sachs  (Hatechiyah  I.,  II.),  Pro- 
fessor Dr.  M.  Joal  (Zur  Genesis  der  Lshre  Spinoza's,  1871) 
and  others. 

These  scholars  were  induced  to  identify  Spinozism  and 
Monotheism  by  the  great  resemblance  of  certain  expres- 
sions, metaphors  and  ideas  in  the  works  of  Spinoza  with 
those  in  the  works  of  his  Jewish  predecessors,  Salomon  Ibn 
Gebirol  (1020-1070),  Abraham  Ibn  Esra(  1088-1167),  Moses 
Maimonides  (1135-1204),  Levy  Gerson  (1288-1340),  Chisdai 
Oescas  (1340-1410),  Abraham  Herera  (1640)  and  others. 

Ideas,  metaphors  and  expressions,  so  they  argue,  which 
are  not  objectionable  when  in  the  works  of  Gebirol  and 
others,  must  not  be  considered  objectionable  when  ad- 
vanced and  used  by  Spinoza. 

It  is  true,  Spinoza  has,  in  common  with  Ibn  Gebirol  and 
Ibn  Esra  the  Monism  ;  with  Moses  Maimonides,  the  idea  that 
there  is  absolutely  no  resemblance  between  what  an  attri- 
bute means  when  applied  to  God  and  when  applied  to  man  ;* 
with  Levi  Gerson  the  idea  of  the  eternity  of  the  world ; 
with  Abraham  Herera  (whose  book,  "Porta  Cceli,"  was 


•Maimonides'  Moreh  Nebuchim,  I.,  52;  Spinoza's  Ethics  I.,  prop. 


ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  JEWISH  THEOSOPHY.      1S1 


translated  from  Spanish  into  Hebrew  by  Spinoza's  teacher, 
Rabbi  Isaac  Aboab),  the  idea  that  God  was  necessitated 
to  act  by  his  own  nature, — but  from  all  this  it  does  not  follow 
that  any  of  all  these  predecessors  of  Spinoza  was  a  Spino- 
zist.  None  of  them  drew  inferences  from  these  ideas  to 
such  an  extent,  nor  did  any  one  of  them  apply  these  ideas 
as  he  did  without  any  regard  to  the  reconciliation  with  Ju- 
daism or  the  practices  of  any  religion. 

Spinoza  deviated  from  all  Jewish  philosophers  by  the  ne- 
gation of  final  causes  ;  by  the  assertion  that  God  was  neces- 
sitated by  his  nature  to  produce  the  world  as  it  is  ;  by  the 
negation  of  man's  free  will  and  by  the  negation  of  the  hu- 
man soul  as  self-existent.  Spinoza's  psychology  is  a  mere 
description  of  man's  passions,  emotions  and  intellect. 

As  great  as  the  difference  is  between  the  theory  of  the  effi- 
cient causes  and  that  of  the  final  causes  ;  between  the  bibli- 
cal idea,  "  that  God  saw  all  he  made  and  it  was  very  good," 
and  the  Brahmanic  idea,  "  as  the  cob-web  comes  from  the 
spider,  the  tree  from  the  seed,  the  fire  from  coal,  the  stream 
from  the  well,  so  does  the  world  emanate  from  Brahma 
without  that  he  knows  it ;"  between  that  idea  that  man  has 
a  free  will,  and  can  choose  and  act  accordingly,  and  the 
idea  that  man  has  in  his  actions  no  more  choice  than  a 
"  stone  that  is  hurled ;"  and  between  the  idea  that  man's 
soul  is  self-existing,  and  the  idea  that  man's  soul  is  noth- 
ing but  the  intellectual  and  emotional  function  of  the  hu- 
man nature,  just  so  great  is  the  difference  between  Judaism  and 
Spinozism. 


VII,  THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH. 


"  Verius  enim  cogitatur  deus,  quam  dicitur  et  verius  est  quam 
cogitatur."  * 

The  conception  of  the  Old  Testament,  that  God  is  the 
Creator,  the  Ruler,  the  Preserver  of  all,  and  the  common 
Father  of  the  whole  human  race,  was  made  the  cornerstone 
of  Christianity. 

The  primitive  Christian  Church  was  not  in  need  of  any 
philosophical  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence.  The 
Jews,  to  whom  the  advocates  of  Christianity  addressed 
themselves,  believed  in  God,  and  the  heathens  could  be 
converted  to  the  belief  in  God  only  the  »way  in  which  the 
idolatrous  Hebrews  were  by  the  prophets,  through  appeals 
to  the  inborn  religious  sentiment,  by  plain  references  to  the 
wonders  and  impressions  of  the  world,  and  by  an  exposition 
of  the  follies  of  idolatry. 

The  philosophical  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence 
was  not  favored  much  in  the  primitive  church.  Even  such 
fathers  of  the  church  as  Clement  and  his  disciple,  Origenes, 
both  men  of  a  high  philosophical  culture  and  the  authors  of 
gnosticism,  were  opposed  to  it,  because  they  thought,  that 
God  must  not  be  considered  and  treated  as  a  scientific  sub- 
ject. They  held  that  the  idea  of  God  is  inborn  in  man,  and 

*  Augustus  de  Trinit,  VII  ,  7. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     183 

that  man  can  not  liberate  himself  from  it,  however  much 
he  would  like  to  do  so. 

The  fathers  of  the  church  who  first  advanced  proofs  of 
the  Divine  existence  were  Athenagoras  and  Theophilos,  and 
they  did  so  merely  to  exonerate  Christianity  from  the  charge 
of  atheism  brought  against  it  for  not  prescribing  animal 
offerings.  In  the  apology,  "  Legatio  pro  Christianis,"  ad- 
dressed to  the  Roman  Emperor,  Marc  Aurel,  and  his  son, 
Commodus,  Athenagoras,  Professor  at  Alexandria,  refuted 
that  accusation. 

The  other  one,  Theophilos,  Bishop  of  Antiochia,  claimed 
that  the  beauty  and  the  wise  arrangement  of  the  world 
would  suffice  to  prove  the  Divine  existence,  were  it  not  that 
man,  being  corrupt  and  sinful,  needs,  on  that  account, 
besides  a  natural,  also  a  supernatural  revelation. 

The  first  father  of  the  Christian  Church  strongly  in  favor  of 
philosophical  arguments  was  Athanasius,  in  the  fourth 
century  Archbishop  of  Alexandria,  called  also,  on  account 
of  his  strong  antagonism  to  Arianism,  "the  father  of  ortho- 
doxy." The  creation  he  considered  an  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  God;  and  all  that  was  said  to  the  contrary. by 
the  Epicureans,  ascribing  all  to  mere  chance  and  atoms,  he 
considered  absurd  and  in  contradiction  to  the  facts  of 
experience.  The  Avorld  was,  in  his  opinion,  made  imperfect 
for  no  other  reason  but  that  it  should  not  be  identified  with 
God  himself.* 

Much  thought  was  given  to  the  conception  of  God  by 
Augustinus  (born  354  in  Africa),  one  of  the  greatest,  most 
learned,  most  philosophical  and  most  productive  men  of 
the  Christian  Church.  Though  his  general  views  on  God 
were  those  of  Plato,  still  he  was  an  independent  thinker  and 

*  Dr.  Alxog's  Grundriss  de,r  Patrologie,  1869. 


184  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


had  a  great  many  ideas  of  his  own.  He  thought  that  man 
can  know  only  what  God  is  not,  and  what  he  can  not  know 
of  him.*  By  this  negative  way  of  inquiry  into  the  idea  of 
God,  there  is  admitted  that  the  human  soul  can  knowr  at 
least,  something  of  him  and  of  his  nature,  and,  consequently,, 
his  invocation  is  warranted.  In  definition  of  what  we 
know  of  God,  he  states  that  God  is  the  supreme  Willr 
Reason,  Might,  Being,  and  all  that  is  and  contains  any 
truth.  These  attributes  are  in  God  inseparable,  and  are- 
one  with  his  essence.  God's  greatness  is  his  wisdom,  and 
his  goodness  is  also  his  wisdom,  so  that  all  these  attributes 
are  mere  modifications  and  manifestations  of  his  Divine 
Being,  f  God  is  the  principle  which  made  all,  and  keeps  all 
the  way  it  is  and  works.  The  term  "  essence  "  he  considers 
more  applicable  to  God  than  the  term  "  substance."  \ 
Augustinus  does  not  like  the  idea  of  calling  God  the  soul  of 
the  universe,  nor  did  he  approve  of  the  idea  that  the  essen- 
tial parts  of  the  human  soul  constitute  the  Supreme  Being. § 
Regarding  the  argumentation  for  the  Divine  existence,. 
Augustinus  deserves  special  attention,  as  he  has  not  merely 
reproduced  the  proofs  of  the  ancient  metaphysicians,  but 
he  has  advanced  an  entirely  new  proof.  He  is  the  father  of 
the  ontological  argument,  which  was  later  developed  byr 
and  accredited  to,  Anselm  of  Canterbury.  This  proof 
Augustinus  styled  "the  argument  of  the  supreme  truth." 
The  supreme  truth  is  above  all  that  is  corporeal.  Reason 
compels  us  to  think  that  there  is  something  that  is  the 
highest,  the  best  and  the  last ;  now,  that  can  only  be  either  that 
supreme  truth,  or  there  must  be  something  higher  yet  than, 
that  supreme  truth.  In  either  case  that  highest  is  God. 

*  De  Ord.,  II.,  47.     t  Solilo.,  I.,  3;  De  Trinitate,  VI.    t  De  Trini- 
tate,  III.    §  De  Divi.,  IV. ;  1%  13. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OK  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     185- 

Besides  this,  he  argues  the  existence  of  God  from  the  de- 
ficiency of  the  world,  which  presupposes  a  more  perfect 
being,  and  also  from  the  craving  of  man  after  a  chief  good. 
Were  there  not  such  a  chief  good — God — man  would  not  be 
constituted  with  a  longing  for  it.* 

The  rest  of  the  fathers  of  the  church  did  only  reproduce- 
\vhat  Augustinus  was  teaching.  The  last  one  of  these, 
John  of  Damascus  (died  755),  whose  authority  even  some 
Protestants  respect,  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  miracles  of 
the  Bible  were  the  best  evidences  of  the  existence  of  God. 
It  is  only  a  pity  that  he  forgot  to  prove  conclusively  that 
the  miracles  of  the  Bible  really  took  place,  and  that  they 
occurred  in  a  really  miraculous  way. 

Albertus  Magnus,  the  greatest  Aristotelian  of  the  medi- 
eval church  and  one  of  the  greatest  Christian  theologians, 
reproduced  the  arguments  of  Augustinus  and  added  to 
them  a  new  one,  derived  from  the  distinction  he  made 
between  "  being  "  and  "  essence." 

The  "  real  being  "  implies  both  the  being  and  the  essence. 
Being  exists  of  necessity.  Its  existence  is  inconceivable. 
Such  a  being  must  be  attributed  to  God.  Only  a  non-being 
would  imply  the  non-existence  of  God.  It  is  impossible  to 
think  of  a  non-being  as  prior  to  the  being,  for  the  very  idea, 
of  non-existence  presupposes  an  existence.  Man  can  not 
comprehendj  God,  for  man  is  finite,  and  a  finite  man, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  can  not  comprehend  the  infinite 
Supreme  Being,  f 

This  proof  of  Albertus  Magnus,  that  non-being  was  incon- 
ceivable, was  rejected  by  his  disciple,  Thomas  Aquino,  and 
for  no  other  reason  but  because,  in  the  second  verse  of 


*  Dr.  H.  Ritter's  Geschichte  der  Christlichen  Philosophic,  II, 
t  Dr.  Ritter,  Geschichte  der  Christlichen  Philosophic,  IV. 


18(»          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


tin-  fifty-second  Psalm,  "  The  fool  saiih  in  his  heart  there  is 
no  God,"  the  non-existence  of  God  is  said  to  be  conceivable. 
More  acumen  and  philosophy  than  in  this,  Aquino  showed 
in  the  following  five  arguments  he  treats  of: 

His  first  argument  was  that  of  Aristotle  that  there  must 
be  a  first  motor. 

His   second    argument   was   that   there  must  be  a  first 

cause. 

His  third  argument  is  derived  from  the  nature  of  a  neces- 
sary being.  All  things  can  not  be  accidental,  for  if  all 
tilings  were  accidental,  then  there  must  have  been  a  time 
when  they  did  not  exist ;  and  if  there  was  a  time  when 
nothing  existed,  that  time  would  have  lasted  until  now  ;  for 
nothing  can  come  into  existence  except  through  something 
already  in  existence.  But  it  being  untrue  that  nothing 
exists  at  present,  consequently  not  all  things  can  be  acci- 
dental :  there  must  be  something  that  is  necessary.  That 
something  necessary,  being  the  cause  of  all  existence,  is 
God. 

His  fourth  argument  is  that  of  via  eminentise,  meaning 
that  there  are  all  degrees  of  goodness,  truthfulness  and 
nobleness.  Now,  that  degree  of  these  perfections  which 
is  the  highest,  is  the  source  and  the  compass  of  them  all, 
and  that  is  God. 

His  fifth  argument  was  that  the  irrational  creatures, 
though  without  reason,  show  a  conduct  that  is  guided,  not 
by  chance,  but  according  to  a  principle  implanted  in  their 
nature ;  and  the  being  that  made  it  so,  is  God. 

In  the  course  of  his  reflections  on  God,  the  idea  of  the 
"  unknowable  "  occurred  to  his  mind,  and  he  opposed  this 
theory  for  two  reasons  : 

Man  is  destined  to  be  happy,  but  no  real  happiness  is 
possible  without  the  knowledge  of  God. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     187 

Man  is  a  religious  being ;  an  irresistible  craving  after  God 
is  implanted  in  him,  and  this  would  not  be  the  case  were 
it  not  possible  to  know  God. 

Aquino  maintained  that  God  was  only  incomprehensible, 
but  not  unknowable.* 

Among  the  latter  Christian  theologians,  it  was  especially 
the  grandiloquent  French  preacher,  Bossuet  (born  1629), 
and  his  contemporary,  the  French  bishop,  Fenelon,  who 
gave  much  attention  to  the  proofs  of  the  Divine  existence. 

Bossuet  has  not  produced  anything  new  in  this  line.  He 
has  merely  amalgamated  the  metaphysical  ideas  of  Plato, 
Augustinus  and  Aquino  with  the  philosophy  of  Descartes 
and  Malebranche.  His  views  are  solid  and  manifest  mod- 
eration and  much  sound,  common  sense.  Bossuet  was  not 
merely  one  of  the  greatest  pulpit  orators  that  ever  lived,  but 
he  Avas  also  one  of  the  most  solid  minds  and  a  great  scholar. 

Some  of  his  best  remarks  in  one  of  his  master  works, 
Traite  de  la  Oonnaisance  de  Dieu  et  de  Soi-meme,  reads  as 
follows  :  "  There  is  nothing  that  is  more  fit  to  elevate  the 
soul  to  God  than  the  knowledge  of  herself  and  of  her  intel- 
lectual operations.  We  have  already  remarked  that  the 
understanding  has  eternal  verities  for  its  object.  The 
standards  by  which  we  measure  all  things  are"  eternal  and 
invariable.  *  *  *  We  know  clearly  that  everything  in 
the  universe  is  made  according  to  proportion,  from  the 
greatest  to  the  least,  from  the  strongest  to  the  weakest,  and 
we  well  know  that  these  proportions  are  related  to  the 
principles  of  eternal  truth.  All  that  is  demonstrated  in 
mathematics  and  in  any  other  science  whatever,  is  eternal 
and  immutable,  since  the  effect  of  the  demonstration  is  to 
show  that  the  thing  can  not  be  otherwise  than  it  is  demon- 

*  Ch.  Jourdain,  La  Philosophie  de  Saint  Tom.  cTAquine,  1858. 


1SS          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


strated  to  be.  So,  in  order  to  understand  the  nature  and  the 
properties  of  things,  which  I  know,  for  example,  a  triangle, 
a  square,  u  circle,  or  the  relation  of  these  figures,  and  all 
other  figures,  to  each  other,  it  is  not  necessary  that  I  should 
find  such  in  nature,  and  I  may  be  sure  that  I  have  never 
traced,  never  seen  any  that  are  perfect.  Neither  is  it 
necessary  that  I  should  think  that  there  is  motion  in  the 
world,  in  order  to  understand  the  nature  of  motion  itself,  or 
that  the  lines  which  every  motion  describes,  and  the  hidden 
proportions  according  to  which  it  is  developed.  When  the 
idea  of  these  things  is  once  awakened  in  my  mind,  I  know 
that,  whether  they  have  an  actual  existence  or  not,  they 
must  be ;  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  be  of  another  na- 
ture, or  to  be  made  in  a  different  way. 

"  To  come  to  something  that  concerns  us  more  nearly,  I 
mean  by  these  principles  of  eternal  truth,  that  they  do  not 
depend  on  human  existence  ;  that  so  far  as  he  is  capable  of 
reasoning,  it  is  the  essential  duty  of  man  to  live  according: 
to  reason  and  to  search  for  his  Maker,  through  fear  of  lack- 
ing the  recognition  of  his  Maker,  if  in  fault  of  searching  for 
him  he  should  be  ignorant  of  him.  All  these  truths,  and 
all  those  which  I  deduce  from  them  by  reasoning,  exist  inde- 
pendent of  all  time. 

"  In  whatever  time  I  place  human  understanding,  I  will 
know  them,  but  in  knowing  them  I  will  find  them  truths  ;  I 
will  not  make  them  such,  for  our  cognitions  do  not  make 
their  objects,  but  suppose  them.  So  these  truths  subsisted 
before  all  time,  before  the  existence  of  a  human  under- 
standing, and  were  everything  that  is  made  according  to 
the  laws  of  proportion — that  is  to  say,  everything  that  I 
see  in  nature — destroyed  except  myself,  these  laws  would  be 
preserved  in  my  thought,  and  I  would  clearly  see  that  they 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     189 

would  always  be  good  and  always  true,  were  I  also  de- 
stroyed with  the  rest. 

"  I  seek  how,  where,  and  in  what  they  subsist,  eternal  and 
immutable.  As  they  are,  I  am  obliged  to  avow  the  exist- 
ence of  a  being  in  whom  truth  is  eternally  subsisting,  in 
whom  it  is  always  understood,  and  this  being  must  be  truth 
itself,  and  must  be  all  truth ;  and  it  is  from  Him  that  truth 
is  in  everything  that  exists. 

"  It  is  He,  in  a  certain  measure,  who  is  incomprehensible 
to  me.  It  is  in  Him,  I  say,  that  I  see  the  eternal  truths ; 
and)  to  see  them  is  to  turn  to  Him,  who  is  immutably  all 
truth  and  to  receive  his  light. 

"  This  eternal  object  is  God,  eternally  subsisting,  eternally 
true,  eternal  truth  itself.  *  *  *  It  is  in  this  eternal  Being 
that  these  eternal  truths  subsist.  It  is  also  by  this  that  I  see 
them.  *  *  *  These  eternal  verities,  which  every  under- 
standing always  perceives  the  same  and  by  which  every 
understanding  is  governed,  are  something  of  God,  or  rather, 
are  God  himself. 

Chapter  xxxvii. :  "  Since  there  is  nothing  eternal,  im- 
mutable and  independent  but  God  alone,  we  must  conclude 
that  these  truths  do  not  subsist  in  themselves,  but  in  God 
alone  and  inhis  eternal  ideas,  which  are  nothing  else  than 
himself. 

"  There  are  those  who,  in  order  to  verify  these  eternal 
truths  which  we  have  proposed,  and  others  of  the  same 
nature,  have  figured  to  themselves  eternal  essences  aside 
from  deity — a  pure  delusion,  which  comes  from  not  under- 
standing that  in  God,  as  in  a  source  of  being,  and  in  his 
understanding,  where  resides  the  art  of  making  and  ordering 
all  things,  are  found  primitive  ideas,  or,  as  St.  Augustine 
says,  the  eternally  subsisting  reason  of  things.  Thus  in  the 
thought  of  the  architect  is  the  primitive  idea  of  a  house 


1(.)<)          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

which  In-  perceives  in  himself;  this  intellectual  house  would 
not  be  destroyed  by  any  ruin  of  houses  built  according  to 
this  interior  model;  and  if  the  architect  were  eternal,  the 
idea  and  the  reason  of  the  house  would  also  be  eternal. 

"  But,  without  recurring  to  the  mortal  architect,  there  is 
an  immortal  architect,  or  rather,  a  primitive,  eternally  sub- 
sisting art  in  the  immutable  thought  of  God,  where  alt 
order,  all  measure,  all  rule,  all  proportion,  all  reason,  in  a 
word,  all  truth,  are  found  in  their  origin.  *  *  *  For  if, 
without  having  ever  seen  anything  eternal,  we  have  so  clear 
an  idea  of  eternity,  that  is  to  say,  of  being  always  the  same  ; 
if,  without  having  perceived  a  perfect  triangle,  we  under- 
stand it  distinctly,  and  demonstrate  so  many  incontest- 
able truths  concerning  it,  it  is  a  mark  that  these  ideas 
do  not  come  from  our  senses."  (Chapter  iv.) 

The  basis,  the  scope  and  the  spirit  of  Bossuet's  argument- 
ation is  in  his  ideas  of  the  nature  of  truth.  Truth  is  that 
which  exists,  which  is  eternal,  and  which  has  an  eternal 
mode  of  existence.  This  can  be  found  only  in  God.  In  God 
all  principles  of  truth  resided  before  the  human  under- 
standing was  created.  Truth  may  be  moulded  in  divers 
shapes  to  suit  our  duties  and  necessities,  but  its  eternal 
principle  is  in  God.  Truth,  being  eternal,  can  only  be  found 
or  discovered,  but  not  created. 

Though  the  proofs  of  Bossuet  are  nothing  new,  still  they 
are  presented  in  such  a  clear,  graphic  manner  and  with 
such  a  force  of  logic,  that  one  believes  them  to  be  original. 

A  younger  contemporary  of  Bossuet  was  the  Archbishop 
Fenelon,  the  "French  Plato."  Besides  that  he  presented 
his  argumentation  in  a  graceful,  fascinating  style,  he  also 
produced  a  new  proof  of  his  own,  the  "  nouvelle  preuve  de 
1'existence  de  dieu,  tiree  de  la  nature  des  idees." 

Fenelon's  book,  "Traite  de  FExistence  deDieu,"  is  divided 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     191 

into  two  parts,  the  first  of  which  contains  the  arguments 
derived  from  the  general  impression  of  the  universe  upon 
man's  mind,  and  from  the  disclosure  of  the  wonders  of  the 
creation  in  consequence  of  the  discovery  of  the  microscope, 
telescope  and  other  instruments  in  the  service  of  natural 
sciences. 

The  second  part  treats  of  four  arguments. 

Regarding  the  proof  derived  from  the  imperfection  of  the 
human  nature,  he  argues :  If  it  is  clear  that  man  is  not 
infinite  and  perfect,  then  it  is  also  clear  that  he  does  not 
exist  through  himself.  If  man  does  not  exist  through  him- 
self, he  must  exist  through  something  else,  and  that  very 
same  "  something  else,"  which  brought  man  from  non-exist- 
ence into  existence,  must  be  existing  through  itself,  and, 
being  infinite  and  perfect,  is  God. 

Regarding  the  proof  derived  from  man's  idea  of  the 
infinite,  Fenelon  argues :  Where  does  man  derive  the  idea 
of  the  infinite?  All  that  surrounds  him  is  finite  and  can 
certainly  not  impress  him  with  the  idea  of  real  infinity.  It 
must  be  inborn  in  man,  and  is  a  manifestation  of  the  infinite 
Being  itself.  ';  I  find  two  reasons  in  myself — one  is  myself 
and  one  is  above  me.  That  which  is  in  me  is  very  imperfect, 
faulty,  *  *  *  and  possesses  nothing  except  what  it 
borrows.  The  other  is  common  to  all  men,  superior ;  it  is 
perfect,  *  *  *  incapable  of  ever  being  exhausted.  What 
is  this  perfect  reason?  It  is  God  whom  I  am  seeking." 

Concerning  the  proof  derived  from  the  idea  of  a  necessary 
Being,  Fenelon  says  :  It  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  man 
has,  more  or  less  "  common  sense  "  or  "  necessary  ideas"  by 
means  of  which  man  is  enabled  to  detect  a  great  many  ab- 
surdities and  contradictions,  and  to  pass  judgment  on  a 
great  many  things  without  any  preparatory  studies.  This 
faculty  can  be  found  on  a  small  scale  even  in  children  of  three 


11)2          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


or  four  years  old.  This  kind  of  "  common  sense  "  does  not 
originate  in  the  flesh  fibres  nor  in  the  blood  substance, 
Init  presupposes  a  necessary  being.  Whatever  effort  of  mind 
man  may  make  he  can  never  succeed  in  doubting  that  two 
and  two  are  four ;  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  any  of 
its  parts  ;  that  the  center  of  a  perfect  circle  is  equidistant 
from  all  points  of  the  circumference.  These  and  similar 
presentations  of  the  "  common  sense  "  or  of  the  "  necessary 
ideas"  are  the  rule  of  man's  judgments.  Far  from  being 
able  to  correct  or  change  this  rule  he  is  corrected  by  it  and 
•considers  it  his  guide  in  all  his  decisions. 

Fenelon's  new  argument  advanced  in  the  fourth  chapter 
•of  the  second  book  of  his  "  Traite  "  is  in  essence  as  follows  : 
•"  My  ideas  are  myself;  for  they  are  my  reason.  My  ideas 
and  the  basis  of  myself  or  of  my  mind,  appear  but  the  same 
thing.  On  the  other  hand,  my  mind  is  changing,  uncertain ; 
ignorant,  subject  to  error,  precipitate  in  its  judgments,  ac- 
oustomed  to  believe  what  it  does  not  clearly  understand,  and 
to  judge  without  having  sufficiently  consulted  its  ideas, 
which  are  by  themselves  certain  and  immutable.  My  ideas, 
therefore,  are  not  myself,  and  I  am  not  my  ideas.  What 
shall  I  believe  that  they  can  be?  Are  my  ideas  God?  They 
are  superior  to  my  mind,  since  they  verify  and  correct  it ; 
they  have  the  character  of  the  Divinity,  for  they  are  univer- 
sal and  immutable  like  God ;  they  really  subsist,  according 
to  a  principle  that  we  have  already  established.  Nothing 
exists  so  really  as  that  which  is  universal  and  immutable.  If 
that  which  is  changing,  transitory  and  derived,  truly  exists, 
how  much  more  so  that  which  can  not  change  and  which  is 
necessary.  It  is  necessary  to  find  in  nature  something  ex- 
isting and  real,  something  that  is  within  me  and  is  not 
myself;  something  that  is  superior  to  me ;  something  that 
is  ever  in  me  when  I  am  not  thinking  of  it ;  something  with 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     193 

which  I  believe  myself  alone  as  though  I  were  only  with 
myself.  I  know  not  what  this  something  so  admirable,  so 
familiar,  so  unknown  can  be  else,  except  God." 

The  writings  of  Bossuet  and  Fenelon  had  a  great  influ- 
ence upon  religious  people.  Their  intelligent,  persuasive, 
inquiring,  suggestive,  amiable  and  gentle  way  of  writing 
had  a  great  effect  upon  those  who  liked  to  be  confirmed  in 
•their  belief  in  God,  and  also  upon  those  who  themselves 
were  unable  to  express  what  they  believed  in  a  mode 
that  would  do  justice  to  the  subject ;  but  they  had  no  effect 
upon  the  following  generation  of  French  materialists. 
Materialism  became  the  spirit  of  the  age.  The  "  System  de 
la  Xatur "  and  the  "  Encyclopedic  Francaise "  were  the 
products  of  that  materialistic  tendency.  In  the  "  System 
de  la  Natur  "  the  existence  of  a  God  is  entirely  denied,  while 
in  the  "  Encyclopedic  "  God  is  presented  as  "  the  animation," 
"  the  universal  life,"  "  the  laws  of  material  essence  "  and 
"  nature ;  "  but  in  fact  the  spirit,  the  views  and  the  tendency 
of  both  works  were  about  the  same.  Both  subserved  the 
<?ause  of  materialism,  and  were  aimed  at  the  destruction  of 
the  Church. 

The  "  System  de  la  Natur,"  the  "  Encyclopedie  Francaise," 
the  works  of  Voltaire,  Rousseau,  Volney  and  othere,  were  so 
many  combustibles  deposited  in  the  citadel  of  the  Christian 
religion.  The  great  French  Revolution  was  the  ignition 
and  the  explosion.  The  misery,  mortification,  trouble  and 
tribulation  of  the  priesthood  and  of  the  Church,  during  that 
epoch,  were  unprecedented  in  the  ecclesiastical  history. 
While  some  of  the  priesthood  considered  these  sufferings  of 
the  Church  a  mere  season  of  affliction  and  trials  which 
must  be  endured  with  firm  belief  in  the  sacredness  of  the 
creed,  there  were  others  who  looked  upon  it  as  upon  the 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


work  of  the  metaphysical  philosophy  and  rationalism  that 
had  permeated  and  seized  the  age,  created  a  new  national 
literature,  and  engrossed  the   attention   of  all  who    were 
striving  for  prominence,  power  and  popularity.     They  were 
right  in  taking  it  in  this  light.  What  was  to  be  done?  Oppo- 
sition, and  nothing  but  opposition  to  the  spirit  of  the  age, 
would  not  do.     That  would  make  it  worse.     The  clerical 
body  realized  that  the  best  and  the  only  way  to  restore  the 
authority  and  the  power  of  the  Church  was  to  make  conces- 
sions ;  to  lead  the  spirit  of  the  age  into  other  directions ;  to 
detract  some  of  its  virus,  and  to  fight  the  spirit  of  the  age 
with  its  own  weapons.  This  gave  rise  to  the  "  Ecole  Theolog- 
ique,"  the  "  French  Theological  Schools  "  which  made  it  its 
end  to  reconcile  the  metaphysical  philosophy  of  the  age 
with  the  doctrines  ot  Christianity ;  to  show  the  fallacies  of 
materialism  and  to  prove  the  rationality  of  the  Christian 
dogmas;    to   demonstrate    the    necessity    of   the   Church 
authority  and  to  make  revelation  the  starting-point  of  all 
sound  philosophy. 

The  main  representatives  of  this  "  Ecole  Theologique  "  are 
Joseph  De  Maistre,  Abbe  Lamenais,  Viscomte  de  Bonaldr 
Baron  de  Eckstein,  M.  Ballanche,  Abbe  Bautain,  M.  Maret, 
P.  I.  B.  Bucher,  Gustave  De  Cavour,  and  the  editors  of  and 
contributors  to  the  "  Universite  Catolique."  *  These  men 
have  brought  to  their  task  great  genius,  splendid  talents,, 
pure  devotion,  burning  zeal,  and  calmness  and  candidness 
in  the  discussion.  In  their  articles,  essays  and  books  no 
new  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  were  advanced,  but  they 
applied  and  reproduced  the  old  ones  with  great  talent  and 


*  Robert  Blakey's  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  IV.,  204- 
247;  625. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  CHURCH.     195 

by  a  great  many  striking  illustrations  The  "  Ecole  Theo- 
logique"  succeeded  remarkably  well  in  its  work  of  reaction 
and  counteraction  to  the  materialistic  and  destructive 
tendencies  of  the  French  encycloparlists. 


VIII,   THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE 
MOHAMMEDANS. 


,,33etradjte  jeben  Saum  unb  merfe 
2ln  jebem  SBaum  ift  jcbeS  33tott 
Gin  ^udj,  barauf  ber  $err  ber  @lar!e 
2>er  Sdjopfung  ©inn  berjeicfynet  fyat."* 

The  belief  that  the  ancient  Arabs  were  worshipers  of 
planets,  plants  and  stones,  and  that  it  was  Mohammed  who 
first  transplanted  the  monotheistic  idea  among  them,  is  at 
present  not  quite  general.  Dr.  Ludolf  Krehl  thinks  :  "  If  it 
is  admitted  that  the  Arabs  had  any  connection  with  the 
descent  of  Abraham,  then  this  implies  the  avowal  that  mono- 
theism, not  the  relative  monotheism  in  contradistinction 
to  polytheism,  but  the  absolute  monotheism,  or,  as  Schelling 
styles  it,  the  primitive  religion,  had  a  homestead  at  least 
among  a  small  portion  of  the  Arabic  population.  How  long 
that  monotheistic  belief  remained  pure,  and  when  it  degen- 
erated into  polytheism  and  fetichism,  can  not  be  proved, 
from  a  lack  of  all  historical  documents.  It  remains  also 
doubtful  whether  the  Semitic  tribes,  which  emigrated  from 
the  Northeast  to  Arabia,  have  embraced  the  religious  forms 
of  the  Arabs,  or  whether  first  under  the  influence  of  these 
foreigners  the  Arabic  belief  entered  into  a  new  phase  of 
development.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the  primitive  mono- 

*  Hammer-Purgstall,  Persische  Duftkoerner. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  MOHAMMFDANS.        197 


theism  of  the  Arabs  must  have  degenerated  under  the  for- 
eign influence  into  a  kind  of  abstruse  deism.  God  was  con- 
sidered extramundane  and  separated  entirely  from  the 
cosmos.  The  idea  of  an  immanent  God,  which  is  indispen- 
sable with  any  sound  religious  want,  was  lost.  When  this  re- 
ligious want  awakened,  a  substitute  for  the  immanence  of 
God  was  sought  for.  People  thought  they  had  found  what 
they  were  craving  for  in  nature  and  her  phenomena.  Thus 
polytheism  had  arisen. "  * 

There  is  a  tradition  that  Mohammed  once  said,  '"  My 
followers  will  be  split  into  seventy-three  sects,"  and,  indeed, 
strife  and  the  splitting  into  sects  commenced  immediately 
after  his  death.  These  many  sects  were  all  orthodox,  and 
remained  so  during  the  whole  reign  of  the  Omeyades,  though 
the  metaphysical  works  of  Aristotle,  Plato  and  others  were 
studied,  from  Syrian  translations,  diligently  and  to  a  large 
extent.  It  was  first  the  political  strife,  attending  the  expul- 
sion of  the  Omeyades  by  the  Abaesides  that  became  favor- 
able to  rationalism  and  to  liberal  doctrines. 

Among  the  Arabs  the  speculative  philosophy  was  not 
introduced,  as  among  the  Christians,  to  be  a  handmaid  of 
theology,  but  it  made  its  appearance  in  the  train  of  medical 
studies.  It  was  self-understood  that  a  prominent  physician 
must  be  also  a  metaphysician. 

The  Arabs,  having  had  much  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  Hindoos,  it  was  very  natural  that  they  became  ac- 
quainted also  with  their  philosophical  systems.  The  Arabic 
metaphysicians  arc  divided  into  two  groups  :  the  leaders  of 
the  Oriental  class  were  Alkindi,  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and 
Algazali,  while  Ibn  Badya  (Avemplace),  Ibn  Tofail  (Abu- 


Ueber  die  Religion  der  Yori*lauiitis  In  r  Aialnr,  von  Dr.  Krehl. 


IDS          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


h.-kr),  Ibn  Roshd  (Averroes),  and  others,  constituted  the 
Moorish  School  of  Spain. 

The  cornerstone  of  the  Islamitic  faith  is  that  ''there  is 
one   only   living    and   true   God,   and   Mohammed    is   his ' 
prophet."    The  Koran,  the  tradition  and  the  law  are  alike 
theistic. 

The  history  of  the  argumentation  for  the  existence  of  God 
can  derive  from  the  Arabic  sources  only  a  confirmation  of 
its  idea,  but  no  new  proofs.  Their  speculative  theology 
concerns  itself  more  with  the  unity  and  attributes  of  God. 
The  nature  of  the  Divine  will,  its  relation  to  the  laws  of 
nature,  to  man's  volition  and  to  the  historical  events,  en- 
gaged the  attention  of  the  Arabic  philosophers  more  than 
the  evidences  for  the  Divine  existence. 

The  belief  that  "Allah  is  God,"  that  he  is  the  creator  of 
the  world  and  the  source  of  all  goodness,  was  to  the  Moham- 
medans a  truth  so  self-evident  that  its  negation  seemed 
almost  impossible  to  them.  The  Mutazilite,  Abul  Hudsail, 
was  of  the  opinion  that  only  those  who  do  not  know  any- 
thing about  a  "  supernatural,  immediate  revelation"  must 
learn  to  know  God  by  means  of  philosophical  argumenta- 
tion, but  not  so  the  Moslems.  To  them  it  was  made  con- 
clusively evident  by  Mohammed's  mission.* 

The  greatest  among  the  Arabic  scholars  was  Alkindi  (died 
870).  He  is  called  the  "  philosopher  of  the  Arabs."  In 
Professor  Dr.  Fluegel's  biography  of  Alkindi  there  are 
mentioned  the  titles  of  two  hundred  and  sixty-five  treatises 
and  books  which  he  partly  composed  and  partly  translated. 
They  cover  the  field  of  philosophy,  mathematics,  medicine, 
etc.,  but  in  the  whole  biography  there  is  no  trace  that  he  has 


*  ^charasht  ni,    Religions-Parteien,   Haarbrucker's  translation, 
II.,  p.  51. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  MOHAMMEDANS.         199 

<lrawn  within  the  sphere  of  his  literary  work  the  proofs  of 
the  Divine  existence. 

!Next  to  Alkindi  comes  Alfarabi.  He  was,  in  the  tenth 
century,  Professor  of  the  Aristotelian  philosophy  at  Bagdad, 
but  later  he  turned  a  mystic  and  joined  the  mystical  sect, 
"  the  Suffis,"  at  Aleppo.  As  such  he  advocated  the  neopla- 
tonic  evolution  theory,  as  set  forth  in  his  book,  "  Hascha- 
loth  Hanimzaoth"  ("The  First  Principles"),  published  by 
Filipowsky  in  1849.  According  to  it,  God,  being  essentially 
the  first  cause,  produced  the  first  intellect.  The  first  intel- 
lect knowing  itself  and  also  God,  its  producer,  is  a  com- 
pound and  is  the  producer  of  the  "cosmical  soul,"  which 
.again  produced  the  active  reason.  By  this  latter  one  gradu- 
ally the  first  form,  and  then  the  first  matter,  were  produced. 

The  great  problem  for  the  followers  of  the  emanation 
theory  was :  How  could  a  compound  cosmical  world  arise 
from  an  absolute,  pure,  spiritual  being?  They  believed  they 
had  solved  it  by  the  assumption  that  a  process  of  a  gradual 
engrossing  of  certain  ideas  and  principles,  which  emanated 
from  God,  took  place.  This  whole  theory  is  nothing  else 
but  the  product  of  human  imagination. 

Alfarabi's  argument  for  the  Divine  existence  is  expressed 
with  regard  to  Smoedler's  "Documenta  Philosophia  Arabum' 
(Bonn,  1836),  by  Professor  Dr.  Ueberweg,*  as  follows  :! 

"Among  the  contents  of  the  metaphysics  of  Alfarabi, 
mention  should  be  made  of  his  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God,  which  was  employed  by  Albertus  Magnus  and  later 
philosophers.  This  proof  is  founded  on  Plato,  Tim.  and 
Aristot.  Metaphys.  (xii.),  or  on  the  principle  that  all 
change  and  all  development  must  have  a  cause.  Alfarabi 
•distinguishes  between  that  which  has  a  possible  and  that 

*\  History  of  Philosophy,  translated  by  Morris,  1871,  pp.  411-412. 


I'm          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

which  has  a  necessary  existence,  just  as  Plato  and  Aristotle 
distinguish  between  the  changeable  and  the  eternal.  If  the 
possible  is  to  exist  in  reality,  a  cause  is  necessary  thereto. 
The  world  is  a  composite,  hence  it  had  a  beginning  or  was 
caused.  But  the  series  of  causes  and  effects  can  neither 
recede  in  iiijinitnw,  nor  return,  like  a  circle,  into  itself;  it 
must,  therefore,  depend  upon  some  necessary  link,  and  this 
link  is  the  first  being  (ens  primum).  This  first  being  exists 
necessarily ;  the  supposition  of  its  non-existence  involves  a 
contradiction.  It  is  uncaused,  and  needs  in  order  to  its' 
existence  no  cause  external  to  itself.  It  is  the  cause  of  all 
that  exists.  Its  eternity  implies  its  perfection.  It  is  free' 
from  all  accidents.  It  is  simple  and  unchangeable.  As  the- 
absolute  good,  it  is  at  once  absolute  thought,  absolute  object 
of  thought  and  the  absolute  thinking  being.  (Intelligentise, 
intelligible,  intelligem.)  It  has  wisdom,  life,  insight,  might 
will,  beauty,  excellence  and  brightness.  It  enjoys  the 
highest  happiness,  is  the  first  willing  being  and  the  first 
object  of  will  (desire).  In  the  knowledge  of  this  being 
Alfarabi  sees  the  end  of  philosophy,  and  he  defines  the 
practical  duty  of  man  as  consisting  in  rising,  so  far  as  human 
force  permits  it,  into  likeness  with  God." 

This  argument  for  God  from  the  necessity  of  his  being,  as 
set  forth  by  Alfarabi,  was  also  adopted  by  the  greatest 
Arabic  philosopher,  Ibn  Sina  (Avicenna).  He  has  intro- 
duced into  philosophy  a  new  element,  which  has  exercised 
a  great  influence.  Technically  it  is  expressed  thus  :  "  In- 
tellectus  in  formis  agit  universalitem,"  and  means  that  the 
genus,  as  well  as  the  species,  the  differentia,  the  accident  and 
the  proprium,  are  in  themselves  neither  universal  nor  par- 
ticular. It  is  the  thinking  mind  which,  by  comparison  of 
the  similar  forms,  defines  what  the  genus  is. 


THE  ARGUMENTATION  OF  THE  MOHAMMEDANS.         201. 

" Avicenna,"  says  Professor  Dr.  Ueberweg,  "  distinguishes 
several  modes  of  generic  existence,  viz  :  ante  res,  in  rebus 
and  post  res. 

"  Genera  are  ante  res  in  the  mind  of  God ;  for  all  that 
exists  is  related  to  God  as  work  of  art  is  related  to  the  artist ; 
it  exists  in  his  wisdom  and  will  before  its  entrance  into  the 
natural  world  of  manifold  existences ;  in  this  sense,  and 
only  in  this  sense,  is  the  universal  before  the  individual. 

"Realized  with  its  accidents  in  matter,  the  genus  consti- 
tutes the  natural  thing,  res  naturalis  (in  rebus),  in  which 
the  universal  essence  is  immanent. 

"  The  third  mode  of  existence  of  the  genus  is  that  which 
has  its  being  conceived  by  the  human  intellect." 

Avicenna  was  an  Aristotelian  and  rejected  Alfarabi's. 
emanation  theory.  To  him  all  was  actually  divine,  and  as 
nothing  changeable  can  come  from  the  first  cause,  which  is 
absolutely  unchangeable,  he  assumed  that  all  was  brought 
about  by  the  first  cause  by  means  of  the  first  intellect  (intel- 
ligentia  prima  or  nous). 

Moses  Maimonides  adduces  an  Aristotelian  proof  in  the 
way  it  was  expressed  by  Ibn  Sina.  It  reads  as  follows : 
The  things  are  either  all  eternal  or  all  transient,  or  some  are 
eternal,  while  others  are  transient. 

Of  this  trilemma  the  first  case  is  false,  as  we  see  daily  so 
many  things  arise  and  perish. 

The  second  case  is  false,  because,  if  all  is  transient,  this 
quality  holds  good  also  of  the  genera,  and  then  whence  any 
rise  of  things? 

Now,  it  follows  that  only  the  third  case  can  be  correct,- 
namely,  that  some  things  are  transient,  while  others  are 
eternal.     Those  things  which  are  eternal  point  to  a  necessary 
being,  which  is  subsistent  by  itself.     That  is  God :  being 
.self-subsistent,  he  is  independent  of  anything  and   of  every 


202          ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


being;  being  the  necessary  existence,  he  is  the  only  one 
Eternal  Being. 

With  Ibn  Sina  or  Aviccnna  the  metaphysical  studies  in 
Arabia  reached  the  summit,  and  now —  as  it  is  everywhere 
and  in  everything — a  reaction  set  in. 

The  representative  of  that  reaction  is  Algazali  (born  1059) 
in  Tus,  Persia.  He  was  teacher  of  philosophy  at  Bagdad, 
Damascus  and  Tus,  and  pretended  to  study  philosophy  with 
the  intention  of  refuting  it. 

He  tried  to  refute  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna.  The  same  fate 
he  experienced  later  by  Averroes,  the  greatest  and  the  most 
sober  Aristotelian  among  the  Arabs. 

The  Aristotelian  philosophy,  teaching  the  eternity  of  the 
cosmical  matter,  was  considered  a  heresy  by  the  orthodox 
Moslems,  and  the  theologians  that  contested  it  were  called 
Mutakallims.  Maimonides,  whose  book,  "Doctor  Per- 
plexorum,"  was,  during  the  Middle  Ages,  the  main  source 
of  information  about  them,  calles  them  Medabrim.  (Lo- 
quentes.) 

In  order  to  understand  well  the  following  seven  arguments 
advanced  by  them  against  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  the 
eternity  of  the  world,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  they  de- 
nied the  existence  of  internal,  natural  forces,  and  the  ex- 
istence of  objective  natural  laws,  called  generally  "  nature." 
To  them  the  world  consisted  of  incoherent  atoms,  directed, 
arranged  and  composed  into  bodies,  directly  by  God. 

1.  The  Mutakallim  believing  the  world  consisted  of  atoms 
incoherent  by  any  internal  natural  force  or  law,  held  that 

•transformation  can  not  take  place  from  within,  but  it  must 
take  place  from  without.  These  transforming  outside  in- 
fluences point  to  a  transformer,  to  God. 

2.  Everything  must  have  a  cause,  and  that  cause  again 
.another  cause,  and  so  on;  but  no  matter  how  far  back  the 


THE  ARGUMENTATIOX  OF  THE  MOHAMMEDANS.        203 

onuses  are  traced  there  must  be  admitted  one  uncreated, 
but  creating  cause.     This  is  the  cosmological  argument. 

3.  The  atoms  of  the  world  being  without  any  internal 
coherency,  were  they  to  remain  combined  they  would  never 
separate,  otherwise  separation  would  be  an  essential  feature 
of  theirs  ;  were  they  to  remain  separated,  they  would  never 
combine,  otherwise  combination  would  be  essential  to  them. 
Since  they  are  ready  for  either  case,  for  separation  and  com- 
bination, there  must  be  a  Being  separating  and  combining 
them. 

4.  The  world  is  composed  of  substances  and  accidents. 
Every  substance  is  attended  by  accidents  and  every  accident 
arises  and  passes.     Now,  the  accession  of  these  accidents  af- 
fects the  bearers  of  these  substances.     Thus  being  affected 
the  substance  must  be  considered  to  the  extent  of  the  affec- 
tation newly  arisen.     Thus  the  whole  universe  must  be  con- 
sidered arisen  or  created. 

5.  A  subject  has  become  what  it  is  through  its  relation 
to  figure  and  measure  and  through  the  circumstances  of 
space  and  time.     But  it  is  also  imaginable  that  that  subject 
could  be  larger  or  smaller,  or  of  a  different  figure  altogether  ; 
or  that  it  might  have  existed  prior  or  later  or  in  another 
place.      Now  that  the    subjects  are  just  as'  they   are  and 
not    different,    though    they   might   have    been    different, 
proves  the  existence  of  a  Being  that  might  have  determined 
them  to  be  just  what  they  are.     There  is  no  reason  why  the 
r?un  shall  be  round  or  why  the  rose  shall  be  red,  but  being  so 
it  must  have  been  the  will  of  the  Supreme  Being. 

6.  The  world  has  only  a  possible  existence.     Had  it  a 
necessary  existence  it  would  be  itself  God.     Now  if  its  ex- 
istence is  merely  a  possible  one  then  this  presupposes  a  God 
who  has  preferred  its  existence  to  its  non-existence. 

7.  The  creation  of  the  world  can  be  proved  by  the  immor- 


•jo  I  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

tality  of  the  souls,  which  the  philosophers  generally  admit. 
Were  the  world  eternal,  then  the  souls  of  those  who  have 
passed  away  would  be  infinite  in  number  and  of  a  simultane- 
ous existence.  This  is  not  admissible. 

These  seven  arguments  of  the  Mutakallim  against  the 
eternity  of  the  cosmical  world  adduced  by  Moses  Maimon- 
ides  (Doctor  Perplexorium  I.,  70-74;)  [were  confirmed  as 
genuine  and  original  by  the  French  scholar,  Gustave  Dugat, 
who  has  composed  his  work  "  Histoire  des  Philosophes,  et  de 
Theologians  Mussulmans7'  (1878),  with  reference  to  modern 
researches,  and  who  has  reopened  sources  of  Arabic  philoso- 
phy- 

But  Maimonides,  though  he  himself  agreed  with  the  Mu- 
takallim against  Aristotle,  that  the  world  was  created  and 
not  eternal,  rejected  all  the  arguments  above  mentioned  as 
fallacious,  except  the  second  one,  the  cosmological  proof. 

He  thought  that  every  argument  based  on  the  theory  that 
the  world  was  composed  of  atoms,  incoherent  by  any  internal 
law,  was  false,  as  it  was  only  too  evident  that  the  cosmical 
world  is  ruled  by  internal  laws  and  forces. 

The  sixth  argument,  according  to  which  from  the  idea  of 
the  world's  possible  existence  there  is  inferred  tLe  existence 
of  a  Being  that  prefers  existence  to  non-existence,  Maimon- 
ides considers  fallacious.  A  preference  presupposes  the  ex- 
istence of  two  subjects  or  the  existence  of  a  subject  which 
is  to  assume  different  forms. 

The  seventh  argument  he  pronounces  false,  on  the  ground 
that  the  souls  which  are  left  behind,  being  incorporeal,  need 
neither  place  nor  space ;  and  may  thus  be  infinite  in  num- 
ber and  simultaneous  in  existence. 

Maimon  found  fault  with  the  arbitrariness  of  the  Mutakal- 
lim in  the  interpretation  of  nature  and  in  the  assumption  of 
promises  devised  with  the  only  regard  to  suit  their  theory. 


\ 

THE  ARGUMENTATION  OP  THE  MOHAMMEDANS.        205 


that  the  world  was  not  caused  nor  eternal,  but  made  or 
icreated. 

They  devised  how  the  world  should  be,  in  order  to  warrant 
their  theories  ;  and  this  fabric  of  their  imagination  they  de- 
clared to  be  the  real  world. 

Maimonides  disapproved  of  such  a  proceeding,  because  he 
believed  in  the  makim  of  the  Philosopher  Themistius  :  k'  The 
nature  of  things  does  not  accommodate  itself  to  human  opin- 
ions, but  human  opinions  must  accommodate  themselves  to 

the  nature  of  things."     (Doctor  Perplexor.  I.  71.) 

*  *  f 


THE    END. 


f 


V* 

Ij 


WHAT  about  the  Judaism  of  the  future  ?     What 
The         sort  of  Judaism  is  it  likely  to  be — merely  a  nega- 
tion of  other  existing  creeds  or  a  real  live  religion  ? 
Outlook     Well,  as  far  as  present  indications    enable  us  to 
judge,  it  will  certainly  not  be  the  Judaism  of  the 
Remoh  (Rabbi  Moses  Isserles,  the  celebrated  commentator  of  the 
Shukltan  Arttch,  born   in  Cracow,  1545)   nor   that  of  any  other 
so-called  authorities  who  added  tnoin  to  Mioin  or,  in  other  words, 
imposed  further  and  wholely  unnecessary  restrictions  upon  our 
people.     These  men  lived  in  an  age  of  persecution,  and  their 
views  and   principles  naturally  assumed  a  sombre  and  austere 
complexion.     The   modern   Jew   who,  after  a   long  protracted 
struggle,  has  at  last  gained  emancipation  for  himself,  and  whose 
earnest  desire  it  is  co  take  his  full  share  in  public  life,  can  have, 
and  has  no  sympathy  with  those  views.      He  breathes  a  free 
atmosphere,  and,  consequently,  his  views  are  broader ;  his  dispo- 
sition  has   become   more  generous,  and   his   sympathies   more 
•catholic.     He  is  less  concerned  about  the  minutiae  of  his  creed, 
about  practices  which  were  good  enough  in  days  of  persecution, 
but  are  out  of  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  more  enlightened  times  ; 
but  he  will  in  all  probability  return  to  the  grand  fundamental 
principles  of  the  ancient  prophets — "  to  act  justly,  to  love  mercy, 
and  walk  humbly  with  thy  God."     That  there  will  also  be  many 
of  our   people  who   care   nothing   for    religion,    and   who   are 
irreclaimably  steeped  in  worldliness,  may  be  expected  ;  but  such 
^people  are  to  be  found  in  any  religious  community — they  are  not 
confined  to  the  Jews.     But  the  better  disposed  Jew  will  give  the 
-world  a  nobler  impression  of  himself  and  his  religion  than  it  has 
had  for  ages  past.     And  if  he  succeeds  in  this,  as  to  all  appear- 
ance he  will,  he  will  have  done  a  vast  amount  of  good  to  his 
people  and  their  religion.     By  his  upright  conduct,  and  by  his 
general  usefulness,  the  emancipated  Jew  of  modern  times  has  to 
demonstrate  beyond  the  possibility  pf  doubt  that  he  is  the  equal 
of  the  most  worthy  of  citizens,  and  that  the  last  lingering  traces 
of.  prejudice  against  him   may  well  be  relegated  to  the  limbo  of 
the  past. 

.  • .  .  ' 


.,-rt     I 


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